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INTRODUCTION
Large punitive damage verdicts typically garner
substantial media attention and stir incredible contro-
versy. Indeed, verdicts like the $2.7 million in punitive
damages awarded to a McDonald's customer after she was
scalded by a cup of coffee2 and the $5 billion in punitive
damages levied against Exxon following the Exxon Valdez
oil spill3 have become part of the popular culture and have
1. See Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks
with the Media As Your Guide: A Content Analysis of Media Coverage of Tort
Litigation, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 419 (1996); Steven Garber, Product Liability,
Punitive Damages, Business Decisions, and Economic Outcomes, 1998 WIs. L.
REV. 237; infra note 95 and accompanying text.
2. See Liebeck v. McDonald's Rests., P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL
360309 (D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994); see also Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How
a Jury Decided That a Coffee Spill Is Worth $2.9 [sic] Million, WALL ST. J., Sept.
1, 1994, at Al; Saundra Torry, Tort and Retort: The Battle over Reform Heats
Up, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1995, at F7 ("In the sound bite wars, the tort reform
opponents' worst nightmare is the infamous $2.7 million punitive damage
award won by an elderly Albuquerque woman who spilled scalding McDonald's
coffee on herself. Tort reformers have gleefully seized on the case as the epitome
of frivolity."). The award was reduced post-trial and the parties eventually
settled for less than $600,000. Gregory Nathan Hoole, In the Wake of Seemingly
Exorbitant Punitive Damage Awards America Demands Caps on Punitive
Damages-Are We Barking Up the Wrong Tree?, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 459, 472
(1996).
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fueled sweeping reforms. However, these reforms have been
largely uninformed by the now sizable empirical literature
examining the factors that influence punitive damages
decision-making. As a result, these reforms have been
primarily designed to address an illusory problem, have
many counterintuitive effects, and fail to address the
specific difficulties that jurors have in determining punitive
damages.
In recent decades, criticism of punitive damages has
sounded from many quarters4-with calls for reform coming
from academia' as well as from business leaders,6 the
judiciary,7 the bar,8 and legislatures.9 Critics of the civil jury
contend that juries are arbitrary, capricious, biased in favor
of plaintiffs, overgenerous, and unprincipled in the manner
in which they award damages, particularly punitive
damages. Moreover, they argue that huge damage awards
determined by juries have fueled a "litigation crisis" and
have contributed to crippling delays in the civil justice
3. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12952, at
*19 (D. Alaska Jan. 27, 1995). The Ninth Circuit recently held that the $5
billion award in Exxon Valdez was excessive. Baker v. Hazelwood, 270 F.3d
1215, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001).
4. For a discussion of the rhetoric of tort reform see STEPHEN DANIELS &
JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM (1995); Stephen
Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice
Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
269 (1989); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Impact That It Has Had Is
Between People's Ears: Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs' Lawyers, 50
DEPAUL L. REV. 453 (2000).
5. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Why There Is No Defense of Punitive Damages,
87 GEo. L.J. 381 (1998); see also Symposium, 87 GEO. L.J. 285 (1998); Special
Issue, The Future of Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1.
6. See, e.g., Richard J. Mahoney & Stephen E. Littlejohn, Innovation on
Trial: Punitive Damages Versus New Products, 246 SCIENCE 1395 (1989).
7. See, e.g., Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873) ("The idea [of punitive
damages] is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and unhealthy
excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of the law."); see also Pac.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42-64 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
8. See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz, White House Action on Civil Justice Reform:
A Menu for the New Millenium, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 393 (2001); Victor
E. Schwartz et al., Reining in Punitive Damages "Run Wild": Proposals for
Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003 (1999); see also
infra notes 10-11.
9. See infra Part III.B. Both the House and Senate versions of the "patients'
bill of rights" legislation that were recently passed contain caps on punitive
damages. H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. § 402 (2001); S. 1052, 107th Cong. § 402
(2001).
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system.1" One advocate of punitive damages reform opined
that "[plunitive damages have replaced baseball as our
national sport," and argued that "[t]he system is a perverse
combination of lottery and bullfighting, selecting benefi-
ciaries and targets almost at random and inflicting brutal
punishment on the latter if they wander into the arena.""
Critics have argued that the civil justice system results in
"freakish punitive damage bonanzas for persons who pour
coffee on themselves or ricochet golf balls into their own
foreheads." 2 And Justice O'Connor wrote in Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip that "[r]ecent years... have
witnessed an explosion in the frequency and size of punitive
damages.
"13
This popular perception of "out of control" punitive
damage awards has led to considerable legal reform
designed to constrain them. In recent years, the U.S.
Supreme Court has imposed constitutional limits on the
size of punitive damage awards"' and has enlarged the role
of appellate judges in reviewing punitive damage awards.
At the same time, legislatures have attempted to restrict
the imposition of punitive damages through mechanisms
such as abolishing punitive damages entirely," placing caps
on the amount of punitive damages that may be awarded,17
adopting higher standards of proof by which plaintiffs must
10. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949); PETER W. HUBER,
LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988); Dan Quayle,
Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559 (1992).
11. Theodore B. Olson, The Dangerous National Sport of Punitive Damages,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1994, at A17.
12. Was Justice Served?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1995, at A14 (quoting Theodore
B. Olson). Responding to evidence that punitive damages are relatively rare,
another advocate of tort reform noted:
"The fact is that punitive damages still have a Russian roulette quality
to them .... The chamber may be larger than we thought. Maybe there
aren't six holes in the chamber. Maybe there are 10. But there's still
that one bullet, and who wants to take a chance of being hit?"
Edward Felsenthal, Punitive Damages Awards Found to Be Generally Modest
and Rare, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1996, at B4 (quoting Victor Schwartz).
13. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 61 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
14. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); see also infra notes
46-56 and accompanying text.
15. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1678
(2001); see also infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part III.B.1.
17. See infra Part III.B.2.
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prove that punitive damages are justified, 8 bifurcating
punitive damages decisions from the rest of the trial,
allocating all or a portion of any punitive damage award to
a state fund rather than to the plaintiff,2 - allocating
responsibility for determining punitive damages to judges
rather than to jurors,2' and reforming jury instructions.22
While the rhetoric has been persistent and the reform
has been considerable, these modifications to the system
have been largely uninformed by empirical research.
Indeed, the punitive damages debate has been described as
"old, long on passion and hyperbole, and short on reason
and hard evidence."23 Until recently there were few system-
atic attempts to understand how decisions about punitive
damages are made. However, there is now a substantial
empirical literature addressing punitive damages decision-
making. Archival research has provided rich descriptions of
the characteristics of punitive damage awards in actual
cases and has illustrated important relationships between
punitive damage awards and characteristics of the cases
and decision makers.24 Experimental research, with its
ability to control extraneous influences and to isolate
variables of interest, is adding to our understanding of how
punitive damages are determined and the factors that
influence such determinations.25
18. See infra Part III.B.3.
19. See infra Part III.B.4.
20. See infra Part III.B.5.
21. See infra Part III.B.6.
22. See infra Part III.B.7.
23. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive
Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1990).
24. In archival research, statistical analysis of case information is conducted
in order to identify relationships between variables of interest. This approach
has the benefit of examining data from the "real world" and allows description
of patterns and trends in the data. Concerns about these correlational studies
center around the limited availability and quality of archival data and a lack of
control that allows alternative explanations to confound the results. See
generally Robert J. MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research
Tells Us About Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL
JURY SYSTEM 137 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
25. In experimental research (in this context, primarily jury simulation
studies), a large number of respondents evaluate the same case. All
characteristics of the case (the defendant's conduct, the plaintiffs injuries, etc.)
are held constant except for the characteristic of interest. Thus, observed
differences in responses can be attributed to the variable of interest,
unconfounded by other influences. Simulation methodology allows replication,
107
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This research reveals a much more complex picture of
punitive damages decision-making than the image
advanced by the tort reformers. On the one hand, juries
seem to operate quite successfully as intuitive retributivists
and to respond appropriately to a number of factors thought
to be important legal underpinnings of punitive damages,
such as the extent to which the plaintiff is injured, the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, and the
defendant's wealth. On the other hand, the research
suggests that jurors have difficulty giving effect to optimal
deterrence, translating their outrage into a dollar award,
and understanding jury instructions. In addition, jurors'
decisions are influenced by the large punitive damage
awards reported in the media. The empirical research
further suggests that the popular notion of unrestrained
punitive damage awards is incorrect-a large body of
archival evidence indicates that punitive damages are not
"out of control."26 Reform efforts have not been responsive to
this research, and many of these efforts have been ill-
targeted because they have focused on restraining awards
rather than on the aspects of the decision-making process
that the research has identified as problematic.
Moreover, a recently emerging body of empirical studies
has examined the possible effects of punitive damages
permits observation of deliberation processes, and allows experimental
manipulation of legal rules and procedures as well as case and party
characteristics. Concerns about simulation methodology typically center around
the verisimilitude of the simulations and the degree to which they generalize to
the actual trial setting. Field experiments, in which trial features of interest are
systematically manipulated, may be feasible in some circumstances (e.g., juror
notetaking), but not in others (e.g., plaintiff or defendant characteristics). For
general discussion of simulation research, see Brian H. Bornstein, The
Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury Still Out?, 23 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 75 (1999); Robert M. Bray & Norbert L. Kerr, Use of the Simulation
Method in the Study of Jury Behavior: Some Methodological Considerations, 3
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 107, 117 (1979); Shari Seidman Diamond, Illuminations
and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 561 (1997);
MacCoun, supra note 24; Wayne Weiten & Shari Seidman Diamond, A Critical
Review of the Jury Simulation Paradigm: The Case of Defendant
Characteristics, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 71, 75-83 (1979). Michael Saks makes
the important point that concerns about methodological features of jury
simulations ought to be focused on whether there is an interaction between the
feature and the effect being studied. See Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury
Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL.
INTERDISc. L.J. 1 (1997).
26. See infra Part III.A.
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reform. This research suggests that policymakers have
proceeded from a set of common assumptions about civil
juries and punitive damages decision-making that do not
accurately reflect the complex effects that the reforms can
have on jurors' punishment decisions. Thus, not only do the
most common reforms target a largely illusory problem, but
it is also not clear that each of these reforms will operate in
practice as intended by supporters. Psychological theory
and existing empirical research on legal decision-making
and cognitive processing suggest that many of these
reforms will have little effect, and that some may even have
effects counter to those intended by their proponents. For
example, the research suggests that caps on punitive
damages may increase punitive damage awards in many
cases. While these effects are counterintuitive and
surprising to most observers, many are consistent with
what we now understand about human decision-making.
This paper draws together the empirical literature that
has examined punitive damages decision-making and the
effects of punitive damages reform. Part I offers some
background about punitive damages-the purposes of
punitive damages, their availability, and a brief review of
the legal landscape. Part II surveys the empirical literature
that has investigated how jurors make decisions about
punitive damages. The research suggests that lay decision-
making is much more orderly in many respects than is
suggested by the reform rhetoric. Nonetheless, the research
also identifies particular aspects of the process that pose
difficulties. Part III considers the implications of this
research for punitive damages reform and argues that
current reforms are ill-suited to address the real difficulties
jurors have in determining punitive damages. First, a
review of studies examining punitive damage awards in
actual cases demonstrates that claims of out of control
punitive damage awards are exaggerated. Thus, the current
reforms have largely targeted an illusory problem. Second,
a review of the experimental literature examining the
potential effects of punitive damages reform reveals that
many reforms have effects that contradict intuitive beliefs
about how punitive damage reforms will influence the
decision-making of civil jurors. Finally, several
modifications to the jury decision-making task-
27. See infra notes 317-22.
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modifications that would address aspects of the process
identified by the research as problematic-are briefly
explored. The paper concludes, in Part IV, that punitive
damages decision-making is a far more complex enterprise
than the popular images of runaway juries would suggest.
Commonly touted reforms fail to take into account the
psychology of punitive damages decision-making and, thus,
may not be the best ways to improve the processes by which
punitive damages are determined.
I. BACKGROUND
Punitive damages are damages that are awarded in a
civil case against a defendant in order to punish the
defendant for engaging in intolerable conduct and to deter
the defendant and others from engaging in similar conduct
in the future. Accordingly, punitive damages may not be
awarded unless the defendant's conduct is "outrageous,
because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless
indifference to the rights of others." 8 Simple negligence,
then, is not sufficient to support a claim for punitive
damages. Instead, for punitive damages to be awarded
there "must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage,
such as spite or 'malice,' or a fraudulent or evil motive on
the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and
deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the
conduct may be called wilful or wanton."29
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1977).
29. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 9-10
(5th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a) (1993)
(requiring that defendant "consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression,
fraud, wantonness, or malice" toward the plaintiff); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-
5. 1(b) (2000) (requiring "that the defendant's actions showed willful misconduct,
malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would
raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences"); IDAHO CODE §
6-1604(1) (Michie 1998) (requiring that defendant engaged in "oppressive,
fraudulent, wanton, malicious or outrageous conduct"); IOWA CODE ANN. §
668A. 1(1)(a) (West 1998) (requiring "willful and wanton disregard for the rights
or safety of another"); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.537(1) (1999) (requiring that
defendant "has acted with malice or has shown a reckless and outrageous
indifference to a highly unreasonable risk of harm and has acted with a
conscious indifference to the health, safety, and welfare of others").
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A. Purposes of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are designed to provide "a form of
monetary civil punishment, not necessarily proportional to
the actual injury, to fulfill a sense of outrage resulting from
affronts to the honor of an individual."3 °
Amid the rhetoric and emotion of the debate about punitive
damages, a basic notion has been lost. The claims of "too many,"
"too high," and "too often" have drowned out the original reasons
for punitive damages and the role they play in establishing social
norms. The idea behind punitive damages is simple. When actors
engage in truly outrageous civil misconduct, they should be
required to pay not only the actual damages their conduct
engenders, but an additional penalty designed to punish their
conduct and to deter them and others from engaging in such
conduct in the future. 1
Two separate justice motivations lie behind a desire to
punish-an instrumental desire to control behavior
(deterrence) and a desire for retribution.32
1. Deterrence. One of the most commonly accepted
reasons to allow punitive damages is that such awards
serve to deter the wrongdoer (specific deterrence) and other
future wrongdoers (general deterrence) from engaging in
harmful conduct.33 Deterrence occurs when a potential
wrongdoer refrains from engaging in prohibited conduct
because he or she perceives and fears the threat of legal
30. Daniels & Martin, supra note 23, at 7.
31. Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, State Punitive Damages Statutes:
A Proposed Alternative, 20 J. LEGIS. 191, 192 (1994).
32. See Dale T. Miller & Neil Vidmar, The Social Psychology of Punishment
Reactions, in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ADAPTING TO TIMES OF
SCARCITY AND CHANGE 145, 146 (Melvin J. Lerner & Sally C. Lerner eds., 1981)
[hereinafter THE JUSTICE MOTIVE]. Ellis identified seven articulated purposes of
punitive damages: punishment, specific deterrence, general deterrence,
preserving the peace, encouraging private law enforcement, compensation, and
paying plaintiffs' attorney fees. Dorsey D. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the
Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1982).
33. Deterrence is the focus of many legal analysts. See, e.g. David Crump,
Evidence, Economics, and Ethics: What Information Should Jurors Be Given to
Determine the Amount of a Punitive-Damage Award?, 57 MD. L. REV. 174
(1998); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998). But see Marc Galanter & David Luban,
Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393
(1993) (focusing on the retributive purposes of punitive damages).
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punishment.34 According to economic theory, the deterrent
effect of compensatory damages alone is likely to be
insufficient if it is difficult to detect or identify the
wrongdoer or to bring the wrongdoer to trial, if a social
judgment has been made that specific illicit subjective gains
should not be allowed to enter into a cost-benefit analysis,
or if compensatory damages are systematically too low. In
these cases, punitive damage awards are intended to
provide the deterrence that compensatory damages alone
cannot provide.36 Punitive damages are also intended to
serve general deterrence purposes by defining and
communicating norms of behavior.37
2. Retribution. The other most common justification for
the use of punitive damages is punishment or retribution. 8
The punishment rationale posits that "every wrong
deserves punishment" that is proportionate to the wrong.
In other words, because the wrongdoer has engaged in what
society considers to be egregious conduct that has injured
another person, he or she must suffer for committing such a
wrong. Retribution is concerned not with the behavioral
consequences of the punishment, but, rather, with its moral
and symbolic effects, particularly when restoration of the
status quo ante through compensation is seen as
34. See generally Jack P. Gibbs, Deterrence Theory and Research, in
NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 1985: THE LAW AS A BEHAVIORAL
INSTRUMENT 87 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1985).
35. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 33, at 874-75.
36. The degree to which punitive damages actually deter undesirable
behavior is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion of psychological
factors that may influence the deterrent effects of tort law, see Daniel W.
Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 115
(1993).
37. Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, "Crimtorts" As Corporate Just
Deserts, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 289, 315 (1998).
38. See Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damage Awards:
Failures of a Social Science Case for Change, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 867, 872 (1999)
("[Dieterrence is not the sole or even the primary justification for punitive
damages."). For discussion of retribution generally, see Robert Hogan &
Nicholas P. Emler, Retributive Justice, in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE, supra note 32,
at 125; Neil Vidmar, Retribution and Revenge, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE
RESEARCH IN LAW 31 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001).
39. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive
Damage Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1320
(1993).
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inadequate.4" When a wrongdoer has evidenced disrespect
for the value of the injured party or has asserted control
over him or her, it is hypothesized that punishment may
help to "reestablish the psychological equilibrium.
Punishment attempts to correct the imbalance between the
parties, acknowledges the worth of the victim, and sends a
public signal that the wrongdoer was blameworthy relative
to the victim.42
3. Additional Purposes. Some commentators argue
that punitive damages are justified because they encourage
private law enforcement and compensate plaintiffs for
losses and expenses that are not otherwise covered in the
law of damages. There is inherently much overlap between
punitive damages and compensatory damages:
[E]ven though damages are labeled compensatory, the focus is not
entirely on the victim's loss, but also on the conduct of potential
wrongdoers....
... Ordinary compensatory damages may be pursued for
purposes of vengeance, retribution, or vindication....
Conversely, punitive damages may be regarded as compensating
for lawyers' fees or some otherwise uncompensated distress or...
as providing adequate incentive for victims or their lawyers to
pursue the matter.
43
40. See TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 104-105
(1997); Miller & Vidmar, supra note 32, at 155; Vidmar, supra note 38, at 35;
see also Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1678,
1683 (2001) (a jury's "imposition of punitive damages is an expression of its
moral condemnation").
41. Miller & Vidmar, supra note 32, at 155; see also Jean Hampton, The
Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 124-28 (Jeffrie G. Murphy &
Jean Hampton eds., 1988); Galanter & Luban, supra note 33, at 1432-33.
42. Galanter & Luban, supra note 33, at 1432-33. Galanter and Luban also
describe the "norm projection rationale" of punitive damages as a means by
which to emphasize the gravity with which society views a particular law. Id. at
1430.
43. Id. at 1405-07. For discussion of the overlap between compensatory and
punitive damages see also Michelle Chernikoff Anderson & Robert J. MacCoun,
Goal Conflict in Juror Assessments of Compensatory and Punitive Damages, 23
LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 313 (1999); Edith Greene, On Juries and Damage Awards:
The Process of Decisionmaking, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225 (1989); Harry
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Not only is litigation expensive, but some losses are not
compensable and others are not readily proved. Therefore,
some note that punitive damages may serve as additional
compensation to plaintiffs. 4  Many object to such rationales
and argue that if the purpose is compensation, then the
solution is to reform the law of damages to allow
appropriate compensation, rather than allowing for such
compensation through the mechanism of punitive
damages.45 In any case, providing plaintiffs with additional
compensation should not be a compelling justification for
allowing punitive damages, if it is assumed that jurors have
an opportunity to fully compensate plaintiffs through
compensatory damages.
B. Legal Developments
Concerns about how punitive damages are awarded
have led to considerable reform of punitive damages.
Judicial decisions have imposed constitutional limitations
on the size of punitive damages and have increased the
scope of judicial review. Similarly, legislative measures
have been directed at limiting the incidence, size, and
unpredictability of punitive damage awards.
In a series of cases in the 1990s, the U.S. Supreme
Court considered whether punitive damages could be so
excessive as to violate due process. 6 In Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip, the Court held that the traditional
method of awarding punitive damages-the determination
of the appropriateness and amount of punitive damages by
Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO
ST. L.J. 158 (1958).
44. See David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems,
and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363 (1994); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 39, at
1321; see also, e.g., Berry v. Loiseau, 614 A.2d 414, 435 (Conn. 1992) (holding
that "punitive damages serve primarily to compensate the plaintiff for his
injuries and, thus, are properly limited to the plaintiffs litigation expenses less
taxable costs").
45. See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 33, at 939.
46. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (finding punitive
damage award constitutionally excessive); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res.
Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (finding punitive damage award not excessive); Pac.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (finding punitive damage award
not excessive); see also Browning-Ferris Ind. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 276-77 (1989) (expressing willingness to address the due process
question, but finding that the issue was not properly raised).
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a jury and subsequent review by both trial and appellate
courts-is not "so inherently unfair as to deny due process
and be per se unconstitutional."47 However, the Court
expressed willingness to consider whether the imposition of
the punitive damages in the specific case before it was
violative of due process.
In considering the constitutionality of the
approximately $840,000 punitive damage award in Haslip,
the Court noted that the award was "more than 4 times the
amount of compensatory damages... [and] more than 200
times the out-of-pocket expenses of' the plaintiff.48 However,
the Court refused to adopt a precise test for determining
whether a punitive damage award was so excessive as to
violate due process. The Court said:
We need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright
line between the constitutionally acceptable and the
constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case. We can
say, however, that general concerns of reasonableness and
adequate guidance from the court when the case is tried to a jury
properly enter into the constitutional calculus.
49
In holding that the punitive damages at issue did not
violate the Due Process Clause, the Court found that the
jury's discretion was adequately limited by post-trial review
of the award and by instructions that confined the jury to
the punishment and deterrence purposes of punitive
damages, required the jury to take into account the
character and degree of the wrong, and reminded the jury
that they were not required to award any punitive
damages.
Similarly, in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp., the Court upheld a punitive damage award
of $10 million (526 times the compensatory damage award
of $19,000), again refusing to adopt a bright line test. 1 The
47. 499 U.S. at 17.
48. Id. at 23. In Haslip, the jury found the defendant, Pacific Mutual, liable
for insurance fraud and assessed damages of $1,040,000. The Court assumed
that at least $840,000 of this award was the punitive component based on the
size of the plaintiffs requests for compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 6
n.2.
49. Id. at 18.
50. Id. at 19-20.
51. 509 U.S. at 458-59. In TXO, the defendant, TXO Production Corporation,
was found liable in an action for slander of title. Id. at 450.
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Court considered the fraudulent nature of the conduct and
the harm that could potentially have resulted and
concluded that the punitive damage award was not grossly
excessive."
In BMW of North America v. Gore, the Court found, for
the first time, that an award of punitive damages was
constitutionally excessive." In Gore, the jury awarded the
plaintiff $4000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in
punitive damages (reduced by the Alabama Supreme Court
to $2 million) for an incident arising out of BMW's
nationwide policy of not disclosing to dealers or customers
when a vehicle had been damaged prior to sale if the
damage was less than 3% of the suggested retail price of the
vehicle.54 In considering this award, the Court articulated
three "guideposts" with which to examine punitive damage
awards for excessiveness: (1) the reprehensibility of the
alleged conduct, (2) the disparity between the harm or the
potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive
award, and (3) the difference between the punitive damages
remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases.55 Analyzing the case using these factors,
the court found that the $2 million dollar punitive damage
award in the case was excessive.5
During this same period, the Court also addressed the
contours of the judicial review of punitive damages. In
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, the Court reviewed an Oregon
constitutional provision that prohibited appellate review ofjury determined punitive damage awards unless there was
no evidence to support the verdict.57 The Court found that
removing the protection offered by judicial review without
replacing such protection with sufficient alternative
52. Id. at 462.
53. 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996).
54. Id. at 564-65.
55. Id. at 575. Consistent with its prior opinions, the Court refused to adopt
a mathematical formula for comparing actual and potential damages to the
punitive award, but found that the ratio at issue, i.e., 500 to 1, must surely
"raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow.'" Id. at 583 (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 481
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
56. Id. at 585-86.
57. 512 U.S. 415, 426-27 (1994) (stating that state law limited judicial
review to cases where a jury was not properly instructed, error occurred during
trial, or there was no evidence at trial to support the award of any punitive
damages).
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safeguards was violative of due process.58 Recently, the
Court revisited the issue of judicial review of punitive
damages. In the Court's most recent ruling on punitive
damages, Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,
Inc., the Court held that appellate courts should review
district court determinations of the constitutionality of
punitive damage awards de novo.59
At the same time that the jurisprudence of punitive
damages has been evolving in the courts, legislatures have
undertaken a number of reforms designed to address the
problem of "out of control" punitive damage awards. These
reforms include: abolishing punitive damages altogether,"
placing caps on the amount of punitive damages that may
be awarded,6 adopting higher standards of proof by which
plaintiffs must prove that punitive damages are justified,62
bifurcating the punitive damages portion of the trial,63
allocating a portion of any punitive damage award to a
state fund rather than to the plaintiff,64  allocating
responsibility for determining punitive damages to judges
rather than to jurors,65 and reforming jury instructions to
include descriptions of those factors that ought to be
considered when making a punitive damage award.66
II. JURY DETERMINATIONS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Concerns about the abilities of jurors to award punitive
damages can, and should, be evaluated systematically
rather than merely relying on anecdote and speculation.61
58. Id. at 432.
59. 121 S. Ct. 1678, 1683 (2001).
60. See infra Part III.B.1.
61. See infra Part III.B.2.
62. See infra Part III.B.3.
63. See infra Part III.B.4.
64. See infra Part III.B.5.
65. See infra Part III.B.6.
66. See infra Part III.B.7.
67. No single empirical study can provide definitive answers or
explanations. Each study, with its own strengths and limitations, contributes to
a growing body of knowledge about how decisions about punitive damages are
made. The data reviewed here were collected using experimental, interview,
and archival methods. Some of the studies used students as participants, many
used jury-eligible adults, some used individuals called for jury service or who
served on juries, and others used judges or other legal professionals. Many
collected the judgments of individuals, several obtained the collective judgment
of groups. A variety of stimulus materials were used. Each study complements
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The existing empirical literature examining juries and
punitive damages is growing; in recent years a number of
studies have been conducted that provide useful
examination of this area." This research has now identified
a number of factors that are important influences on
punitive damages. Specific case characteristics such as the
severity of the harm caused, the reprehensibility of the
defendant's actions, and the wealth of the defendant should
legally be important influences on the appropriate level of
punitive damages. And, in fact, the empirical research
demonstrates that these case characteristics do influence
punitive damage awards. In addition, differences among
decision makers in their attitudes about and perceptions of
the civil litigation system generally, or in the goals they
seek to accomplish by their award, impact decisions.
Additionally, characteristics of the task jurors are asked to
perform can impact judgments about punitive damages.
The social dynamics of the deliberative process and the
translation of outrage and punishment motivations into
dollars are both important aspects of the process that also
influence final judgments. Finally, research comparing
juror and jury decision-making with that of judges
demonstrates a high degree of similarity.
Thus, the empirical literature indicates that jurors
perform some aspects of their role quite well. They are
responsive to legally relevant variations among cases and
have consistent punishment intuitions. However, the
research demonstrates that jurors have difficulty with
specific aspects of their task. Jurors are influenced by
media reports about civil litigation, they do not intuitively
give effect to optimal deterrence, they have trouble
translating their outrage into a monetary equivalent, and
they have difficulty understanding legal instructions.
A. Characteristics of the Case
Many aspects of civil cases appropriately ought to
influence punitive damage awards. Punitive damage
the others as researchers attempt to triangulate in on a clearer picture of how
punitive damages are determined. Correspondingly, each study raises questions
that ought to be pursued.
68. For a review of research examining civil jury decision-making generally,
see Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical
Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849 (1998).
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awards should arguably be higher when the harm caused or
risked is greater, when the defendant's conduct is more
outrageous, and when the defendant is wealthier. Overall,
the empirical research suggests that punitive damages
decision-making is properly influenced by these features of
cases.
1. Harm Severity. Several experimental studies have
found that the severity of the injury caused to the plaintiff
or the potential harm risked by the defendant influences
jurors' punitive damage awards.69 Kahneman and his
colleagues asked jury-eligible citizens to evaluate ten
personal injury claims and to rate the outrageousness of the
defendant's conduct, to rate the appropriate level of
punishment, or to make a punitive damage award.
Kahneman et al. found that the severity of the harm to the
plaintiff influenced jurors' punitive damage awards such
that jurors awarded more in punitive damages when the
plaintiffs injury was more severe."°  In another
experimental study, Robbennolt found that the severity of
the plaintiffs injury influenced punitive damage awards,
such that jury-eligible citizens and trial court judges
awarded more in punitive damages when the actual and
potential injuries to the plaintiff were more severe.71
69. But see Corrine Cather et al., Plaintiff Injury and Defendant
Reprehensibility: Implications for Compensatory and Punitive Damage Awards,
20 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 189, 201-02 (1996) (finding no significant effect of injury
severity on punitive damage awards). These researchers also found that the
severity of the injury did not influence compensatory damage awards. Id. at
201. Thus, they speculate about whether the injuries used were different
enough. Id. at 202.
70. Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The
Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49, 62-63 (1998).
This effect was even more pronounced for larger firms. Id. at 63-64. Ratings of
the appropriate level of punishment (punitive intent) were also influenced, but
reported levels of outrage were not. Id. at 62, 63 fig.2; see also Cass R. Sunstein
et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in
Law), 107 YALE L. J. 2071 (1998).
71. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Punitive Damages Decision Making: The
Decisions of Citizens and Trial Court Judges, 26 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
(forthcoming 2002). While both actual and potential injuries to the plaintiff
combined to influence punitive damage awards, only the actual harm to the
plaintiff influenced compensatory damage awards. Id. However, in a study of
compensatory damages, Viscusi found that jurors' awards were influenced by
the degree of harm risked (and were more likely to be so influenced than were
judges). W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the
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Research in social psychology has demonstrated that
the degree of harm caused by the wrongdoer is related to
punishment reactions more generally.2 This is partly
because observers attribute more responsibility to an actor
when the outcome of the incident is more severe.73 However,
Miller and Vidmar noted that this relationship may also
"reflect cultural learning" about proportionality. my
The experimental studies finding a relationship
between the severity of the injury to the plaintiff and
punitive damage awards are consistent with evidence from
archival studies of damage awards. Using data from forty-
five of the seventy-five most populous counties for 1991-
1992, Eisenberg and his colleagues found a substantial
positive correlation between the size of the compensatory
and punitive damages awarded by juries.75 Similarly,
several studies have found that, in products liability and
medical malpractice cases, compensatory damage awards
are highly correlated with punitive damage awards."
This aspect of punitive damages decision-making
comports with the requirements of the law. The severity of
the harm risked or caused by the defendant is commonly
Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 128-30 (2001); see also Marylie Karlovac & John
M. Darley, Attribution of Responsibility for Accidents: A Negligence Law
Analogy, 6 Soc. COGNITION 287 (1988) (finding that judgments of the degree of
punishment perceived as appropriate were determined by the severity of the
harm risked).
72. Miller & Vidmar, supra note 32, at 158; see also Jennifer K. Robbennolt,
Outcome Severity and Judgments of "Responsibility": A Meta-Analytic Review,
30 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2575 (2000).
73. Miller & Vidmar, supra note 32, at 158.
74. Id.
75. Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 623, 639 (1997) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Predictability]; see
also Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An
Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 772 (2002) [hereinafter Eisenberg et
al., Juries, Judges]; Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., On the
Determinants and Importance of Punitive Damage Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON.
527, 543 (1999); Erik K. Moller et al., Punitive Damages in Financial Injury
Jury Verdicts, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 300 n.52 (1999).
76. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY: VERDICTS AND CASE
RESOLUTION IN FIVE STATES 27-29 (1989) [hereinafter U.S. G.A.O., PRODUCT
LIABILITY] (products liability); Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages
in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 50 (1992) (products liability); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig,
Reconceptualizing Punitive Damages in Medical Malpractice: Targeting Amoral
Corporations, Not "Moral Monsters," 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 975, 1009 (1995)
(medical malpractice).
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thought to be a legally relevant factor in the determination
of punitive damages. While the U.S. Supreme Court has
repeatedly refused to define a mathematical relationship
between the harm done to the plaintiff and the appropriate
level of punitive damages,77 the Court has held that
punitive damage awards ought to have some reasonable
relationship with the harm or potential harm suffered.78
2. Defendants' Conduct. The empirical research also
shows a clear connection between the reprehensibility of
the defendant's conduct and punitive damage awards. First,
archival research shows that punitive damages are more
likely to be awarded in cases involving intentional torts,
fraudulent conduct, and extreme deviations from the
standard of care."9 Given that punitive damages are
reserved for these types of outrageous cases,8" this is hardly
surprising.
Second, a number of experimental studies have demon-
strated a positive relationship between the reprehensibility
of the defendant's actions and the size of punitive damage
awards. In several studies, Greene and her colleagues found
that both students and jurors who had just completed jury
service awarded more in punitive damages against
defendants who had acted in a more reprehensible
manner.81 Similarly, Horowitz and Bordens studied the
77. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp.
v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
78. BMW, 517 U.S. at 580-83. In TXO, the Court explained why calibrating
punitive damages to the actual harm alone is not always sufficient:
"For instance, a man wildly fires a gun into a crowd. By sheer chance,
no one is injured and the only damage is to a $10 pair of glasses. A jury
reasonably could find only $10 in compensatory damages, but
thousands of dollars in punitive damages to teach a duty of care. We
would allow a jury to impose substantial punitive damages in order to
discourage future bad acts."
509 U.S. at 459-60 (quoting Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897,
902 (W.Va. 1991)). But see Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 33, at 914-17
(arguing that potential harm should not be considered given the goal of optimal
deterrence).
79. See infra Part III.A 3.
80. See supra notes 28-29.
81. Cather et al., supra note 69, at 199 tbl.4 (automobile accident, products
liability, and insurance bad faith cases); Edith Greene et al., Compensation
Plaintiffs and Punishing Defendants: Is Bifurcation Necessary?, 24 LAW & Hum.
BEHAV. 187, 196 (2000) [hereinafter Greene et al., Is Bifurcation Necessary?]
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effect of reprehensible behavior in a products liability case.
They found a significant correlation between jury-eligible
adults' estimates of the date the defendant should have
reasonably been aware of the harmful effects of its product
and the size of their punitive damage awards; the earlier
the defendant should have known, the higher the award.82
Robbennolt found that jury-eligible citizens' and trial court
judges' ratings of the offensiveness of the defendant's
conduct were related to their punitive damage awards, such
that those participants who rated the defendant's conduct
as being more offensive awarded more in punitive
damages. M Thus, differences in the reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct and individual differences in how that
conduct is perceived may influence the amount awarded in
punitive damages.84
Again, this aspect of punitive damages decision-making
is consistent with the dictates of the law. The
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct is clearly a
legally appropriate consideration in the determination of
punitive damages. As noted earlier, punitive damages are
only available when the defendant's conduct has reached a
sufficient threshold of culpability; mere negligence will not
suffice.85 In BMW v. Gore the Supreme Court noted that the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct was "[plerhaps
the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a
punitive damages award." 6
(finding influence of reprehensibility on punitive damages in automobile
accident and products liability cases, but not in a medical malpractice case);
Edith Greene et al., The Effects of Limiting Punitive Damage Awards, 25 LAW &
HuM. BEHAV. 217, 225 (2001) [hereinafter Greene et al., Limiting Awards]
(personal injury, products liability, and insurance bad faith cases). Conversely,
compensatory damages did not tend to be influenced by the reprehensibility of
the defendant's conduct. Id. at 231-32.
82. Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An Experimental Investigation
of Procedural Issues in Complex Tort Trials, 14 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 269, 281
(1990) (reprehensibility had no effect on compensatory damages).
83. Robbennolt, supra note 71.
84. One specific aspect of defendant conduct that has received recent
attention is whether the defendant conducted a cost-benefit analysis. See W.
Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547
(2000); see also Robert J. MacCoun, The Costs and Benefits of Letting Juries
Punish Corporations: Comment on Viscusi, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1821 (2000).
85. See supra notes 28-29.
86. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996); see also Keith N.
Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J.
421, 456 (1998) (arguing from an economic perspective that reprehensibility is a
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3. Defendants' Wealth. Several experimental studies
have also found positive relationships between the wealth
of the defendant and the punitive damages awarded.87
Robbennolt found that the wealth of the defendant
influenced punitive damage awards; jury-eligible citizens
and trial court judges awarded more in punitive damages
against a wealthier defendant than against a less wealthy
defendant.88 Similarly, Greene, Woody, and Winter found
that higher amounts of punitive damages were assessed
against wealthier defendants in three different cases.89 In
addition, Kahneman et al. found that the size of the
defendant company (as indicated by annual profits)
influenced punitive damage awards. °
useful factor in determining punitive damages). But see Polinsky & Shavell,
supra note 33, at 905-10 (arguing that reprehensibility should generally not
affect the imposition of punitive damages).
87. Several archival studies have also found that the corporate status of a
defendant is related to the size of the punitive damage award such that higher
awards are made against corporate defendants than against individual
defendants. See, e.g., MARK PETERSON ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CMIL JUSTICE,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 49-53 (1987); Eisenberg et al.,
Predictability, supra note 75, at 639-40. However, these studies use corporate
status as a proxy for the defendant's financial condition. With regard to
compensatory damages, there is experimental evidence that such effects are due
to differential expectations of corporations by jurors, rather than to wealth per
se. In a series of studies, Hans has demonstrated that many decision makers
would hold corporations to a higher standard of conduct because they are seen
as having greater knowledge, expertise, and potential impact. VALERIE HANS,
BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 112-37
(2000) (describing her program of research). Thus, while there may be an effect
of the defendant's status on punitive damage awards, the existing research
suggests that this effect may be driven by differences in how responsibility is
attributed to corporations and individuals and not by wealth per se.
88. Robbennolt, supra note 71. Interestingly, the effect of wealth
information on compensatory damages was marked by a marginally significant
interaction effect. Consistent with the prior research on the "deep-pockets
hypothesis," see infra note 91, citizens' compensatory damage awards were not
influenced by wealth information. However, judges awarded more in
compensatory damages against a wealthier defendant. Robbennolt, supra note
71.
89. Greene et al., Is Bifurcation Necessary?, supra note 81, at 197 (products
liability, automobile negligence, and medical negligence). Consistent with prior
research, the wealth of the defendant did not influence compensatory damages.
Id.
90. Kahneman et al., supra note 70, at 64. Underlying ratings of punitive
intent and outrage were not so influenced. Id. at 62-64. Hastie and his
colleagues have investigated the hypothesis that jurors will attempt to re-
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While some scholars argue that wealth should not be
relevant to the punitive damages calculation, others argue
that eliminating wealth as an appropriate consideration
would undermine both the deterrence and punishment
rationales of punitive damages.91 The U.S. Supreme Court
distribute wealth by awarding larger damage awards to plaintiffs in geographic
proximity to the jurisdiction and against defendants from remote geographical
locations. Reid Hastie et al., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of
Plaintiffs Requests and Plaintiffs Identity on Punitive Damage Awards, 23 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 445 (1999); see also TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509
U.S. 443, 464 (1993) (upholding jury award, but noting that "the emphasis on
the wealth of the wrongdoer increased the risk that the award may have been
influenced by prejudice against large corporations, a risk that is of special
concern when the defendant is a nonresident"). Hastie et al. found that jurors
awarded more to a plaintiff from the jurors' community than to a plaintiff from
a remote location, but did not find a significant effect of the defendant's
proximity to the jurisdiction. Hastie et al., supra, at 460. The authors speculate
that they may have been unable to detect a small effect of the defendant's
location with the materials that they used (e.g., their local defendant was from
the participants' state, but not from their local community). Id. at 464.
91. Compare Kenneth S. Abraham & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Punitive Damages
and the Rule of Law: The Role of Defendant's Wealth, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 415
(1989), and Crump, supra note 33, at 179, and Polinksy & Shavell, supra note
33, at 911, with Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 413, 414-15 (1992), and Hylton, supra note 86, at 458-59, and
Koenig & Rustad, supra note 37, at 289. See also John T. Simpson, Jr.,
Discovery of Net Worth in Bifurcated Punitive Damages Cases: A Suggested
Approach After Transportation Insurance Co. v. Moriel, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 193
(1996) (discussing discovery of net worth in bifurcated trials). It is more clear
that the defendant's wealth should not influence awards of compensatory
damages and, indeed, many empirical studies have found that compensatory
damage awards are not affected by the defendant's wealth. MacCoun found that
jury eligible adults awarded larger compensatory damage awards against a
corporate defendant than against a wealthy individual defendant. However, the
compensatory damages awarded against a wealthy individual were no greater
than those awarded against a poor individual. Robert J. MacCoun, Differential
Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An Examination of the "Deep-
Pockets" Hypothesis, 30 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 121, 131, 137-38 (1996); see also
ROBERT J. MACCOuN, Is THERE A "DEEP-POCKET" BIAS IN THE TORT SYSTEM?: THE
CONCERN OVER BIASES AGAINST DEEP-POCKET DEFENDANTS (RAND Inst. for Civil
Justice Issue Paper No. 130, 1993). Vidmar has found similar results for jurors
deciding medical malpractice cases. NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND
THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE,
DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 203-20 (1995). Hans also
found that while financial information influenced jurors' perceptions of the
defendant's ability to pay the award, the information had no effect on liability
decisions or on compensatory damage awards. HANS, supra note 87, at 184-85.
Hans and Ermann found that mock jurors awarded a plaintiff suing a
corporation more in compensation than a plaintiff suing an individual. Valerie
P. Hans & M. David Ermann, Responses to Corporate Versus Individual
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has indicated that the "financial position" of the defendant
is a factor that can be taken into account in determining the
amount of punitive damages and has approved of standards
for reviewing jury awards of punitive damages that have
included wealth as a factor.92 A number of state statutes
also specifically enumerate the wealth of the defendant as a
factor to be considered in determining the appropriate
amount of punitive damages to award.93 Therefore, this
aspect of punitive damages decision-making also appears to
be in line with the legal requirements.
B. Characteristics of the Decision Maker
In addition to the characteristics of cases that might
influence awards of punitive damages, individual
differences among jurors influence their assessments of the
appropriate level of punitive damages. 94 First, jurors'
Wrongdoing, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151, 157 (1989). However, regression
analysis indicated that there was not a consistent effect of the presumed
resources of the defendant on awards. Rather, awards were more strongly
linked to judgments about the defendants' recklessness with participants
attributing more recklessness to the corporation than to the individual
defendant. Id. at 160-61. Thus, the experimental evidence suggests that, at
least for compensatory damages, there may be an effect of corporate status, but
not of wealth.
92. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1991); TXO Prod.
Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 464 n.29 (1993); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
93. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(c)(6) (Michie 2000); CAL. CIV. CODE §
3295(d) (West 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(b)(6) (1994); MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-913(a) (1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(3) (West 2000);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1)(e) (1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.263(2) (West
2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7)(a) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-
5.12(c)(4) (West 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-35(2)(i) (1999); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2315.21(D)(c)(i) (Anderson 1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1(A) (West
Supp. 2001); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301.812-A(a) (West 1999); TEx. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.011 (Vernon 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(2)
(1960); see also UNIF. MODEL PUNITIVE DAMAGES ACT § 7(4) (1996) (court shall
instruct jury to consider evidence of "the defendant's present and future
financial condition and the effect of an award on each condition" in determining
amount of punitive damages). A few states prohibit the use of financial status
information. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(6) (West 1997); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(3) (1996).
94. Demographic factors have not proven to be terribly influential predictors
of damage awards. See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About
Liability and Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency,
48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 315 (1998); Hastie et al., supra note 90, at 464;
Kahneman et al., supra note 70, at 61-62; Robbennolt, supra note 71; David
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attitudes and perceptions about the state of the civil
litigation system have been found to influence awards in
complex ways. Second, empirical research has
demonstrated that jurors tend to award punitive damages
in ways that are consistent with retributive purposes,
rather than to achieve optimal deterrence.
1. Perceptions of Civil Litigation. The information
available in the media about civil jury decision-making is
not a representative sample of all civil litigation. Content
analyses of news reports of tort litigation find that media
coverage over-represents cases involving products liability
or medical malpractice, cases that go to trial, plaintiff wins,
large damage awards, and awards that include a punitive
component. It is likely that these skewed reports of civil
litigation shape, in part, perceptions of the civil justice
system. In many situations, individuals judge the likelihood
of an event by the ease with which they can recall examples
of similar events. This judgmental decision tool is termed
the availability heuristic.9" Events that are memorable or
that come to mind more easily are often thought to be more
common.
97
It is hardly surprising, then, that punitive damages are
commonly believed to be more customary and more
substantial in size than is supported by the research
findings. Ostrom and his colleagues reported that only 8%
of jury awards were greater than $1 million and that
punitive damages are included in only 6% of civil cases that
result in a monetary award.98 In contrast to this profile,
Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1139, 1156 (2000); Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decisionmaking about General
Damages: A Comparison of Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751,
783 (1999).
95. See, e.g., Bailis & MacCoun, supra note 1 (analyzing national news
magazine articles about tort litigation); Garber, supra note 1, at 277-82
(analyzing newspaper coverage of products liability cases brought against
automobile manufacturers).
96. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A
Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 163 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)
[hereinafter HEURISTICS AND BIASES].
97. Id. at 163-64.
98. Brian J. Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil Jury
in the 1990s, 79 JUDICATURE 233, 237-38 (1996) (not taking into account post-
trial reductions in awards).
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Greene, Goodman, and Loftus found that a substantial
minority of participants in a jury decision-making study
believed that damage awards greater than $1 million were
routine, with 11% of the sample estimating that 50% or
more of plaintiffs receive jury awards of more than $1
million.99 Similarly, Robbennolt found that jury-eligible
citizens estimated that over 30% of jury awards are greater
than $1 million and that almost one-half of jury verdicts
include a punitive damage award."'
These misperceptions are not limited to lay jurors, but
are also common among legal actors. Wissler and her
colleagues found that jurors, judges, and defense attorneys
all tended to predict that an "average juror" would make a
larger general damage award than they themselves would
have made. However, the awards made by the jurors in the
study tended to be lower than those predicted by the judges
and lawyers.1 1 Similarly, Songer found that attorneys and
legislators tended to overestimate the rate at which cases
went to jury trials, the rate at which juries found for
plaintiffs, and the size of jury awards.102
This skewed view of civil litigation can influence
determinations of punitive damages in several ways. First,
it is likely that cases that result in large punitive damage
awards are more available in memory and are called to
mind more easily because they are reported more
frequently in the media than are other cases. °3 Media
reports of plaintiffs winning large punitive damage awards
may inform jurors' judgments of the appropriate range of
recovery in subsequent cases. If jurors use the cases that
are available in memory as benchmarks, larger damage
awards might result. Consistent with this reasoning,
several studies have found a positive relationship between
99. Edith Greene et al., Jurors'Attitudes About Civil Litigation and the Size
of Damage Awards, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 805, 812 (1991).
100. Robbennolt, supra note 71.
101. Wissler et al., supra note 94, at 801 (finding no differences for plaintiffs
attorneys). Jurors, judges, and attorneys all predicted that the "average juror"
would order cases in the same way that these actors did, awarding larger (and
smaller) amounts in response to the same injuries. Id. at 800.
102. Donald R. Songer, Tort Reform in South Carolina: The Effect of
Empirical Research on Elite Perceptions Concerning Jury Verdicts, 39 S.C. L.
REV. 585, 597-98 (1988) (examining perceptions of medical doctors, attorneys,
and state legislators about tort litigation in South Carolina).
103. For a description of the availability heuristic see HEURISTICS AND
BIASES, supra note 96, at 163-64.
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perceptions of the frequency of large damage awards and
damage award decisions. Greene, Goodman, and Loftus
found a significant positive correlation between partici-
pants' estimates of the frequency of large damage awards
and the amount of damages they awarded, such that those
who perceived a high frequency of large damage awards
awarded higher amounts in damages.'o Robbennolt found
that differences in participants' estimates of the frequency
of punitive damage awards and of the frequency of large
awards by juries influenced the participants' compensatory
damage awards, although these estimates did not influence
punitive damage awards.'
In a similar vein, Viscusi specifically examined the
relationship between media reports of large verdicts and
punitive damage awards. Participants who were told that
they had read about a "similar case" in which the jury had
awarded $50 million in punitive damages (that the appeals
court had reduced to $25 million) awarded more in punitive
damages than did participants who were not told about the
case. Consistent with this finding, jurors may use awards
of which they are aware as a benchmark for determining an
appropriate amount of damages in the case before them.
A second effect operates in a different direction,
however. A number of empirical studies have demonstrated
a link between jurors' attitudes about the state of the civil
litigation system and damage awards.' 7 To the extent that
104. Greene et al., supra note 99, at 813.
105. Robbennolt, supra note 71.
106. W. Kip Viscusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J.
LEGAL STUD. 313, 331 (2001).
107. See generally Valerie P. Hans & W.S. Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments of
Business Liability in Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion
Debate, 26 LAw & Soclr REV. 85 (1992) [hereinafter Hans & Lofquist, Jurors'
Judgments]; see also Greene et al., supra note 99; Valerie P. Hans & W.S.
Lofquist, Perceptions of Civil Justice: The Litigation Crisis Attitudes of Civil
Jurors, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 181 (1994) [hereinafter Hans & Loftquist,
Perceptions of Civil Justice]; Elizabeth Loftus, Insurance Advertising and Jury
Awards, 65 A.B.A. J. 68 (1979); Gary Moran et al., Attitudes Toward Tort
Reform, Scientific Jury Selection, and Juror Bias: Verdict Inclination in
Criminal and Civil Trials; 18 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. 309 (1994). Ellsworth and
her colleagues have found evidence that in criminal cases attitudes influence
jurors' evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, their construction of a
narrative summary of the evidence, and the manner in which they apply the
judge's instructions regarding the law to the facts as they have constructed
them. Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Some Steps Between Attitudes and Verdicts, in
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potential jurors hold the view that there is a crisis in civil
litigation and that damage awards are too high, they
appear to attempt to moderate their awards. Hans and
Lofquist interviewed jurors following their jury service in
civil cases. They found that jurors had strong negative
views of both the frequency and legitimacy of civil lawsuits
and believed that civil damage awards are too high. In
addition, jury members' average scores on a measure of
attitudes toward the civil litigation system were correlated
with jury damage awards, such that the more strongly the
jurors believed there was a litigation crisis, the lower were
the damages awarded."8 Similarly, Loftus found that mock
jurors who were exposed to an insurance industry
advertisement asking whether "You really think it's the
insurance company that's paying for all those large jury
awards?" made lower awards for pain and suffering than
did those participants who were not exposed to the ad.0 9
Other researchers have investigated the relationship
between attitudes toward tort reform and legal decisions
and have found similar results. In telephone interviews
with jury-eligible adults, Moran, Cutler, and DeLisa found
that attitudes toward tort reform predicted verdicts in
several civil scenarios."0 Similarly, Greene, Goodman, and
Loftus found that the scores of jury-eligible adults on a
scale measuring attitudes toward tort reform and damages
(e.g., whether there is an insurance crisis, the influence of
media on attitudes about civil lawsuits, and beliefs about
attorney credibility and damage requests) were
significantly correlated with damage awards, such that
those with more favorable attitudes toward tort reform gave
lower damage awards."'
2. Punishment Intuitions. Punitive damages are
intended primarily to punish and deter."2 However, the
existing empirical evidence suggests that lay people are
INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 42 (Reid Hastie
ed., 1993).
108. Hans & Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments, supra note 107, at 97; see also
Hans & Lofquist, Perceptions of Civil Justice, supra note 107 (examining the
attitudes of civil jurors).
109. Loftus, supra note 107, at 69-70.
110. Moran et al., supra note 107, at 321, 324.
111. Greene et al., supra note 99, at 813.
112. See supra Part I.A.
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"intuitive retributivists" rather than "intuitive deterrence
theorists." In the civil context, then, jurors appear to award
punitive damages primarily to punish wrongdoers and to
express their outrage at the defendant's outrageous conduct
rather than to effect optimal deterrence.113
Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade investigated
whether notions of optimal deterrence drive people's
intuitive approach to punitive damages decision-making."
According to optimal deterrence theory, punitive damages
make up for any deficit in the ability of compensatory
damages to deter harmful behavior caused by any ability
the defendant has to escape detection or liability.' In
accordance with this theory, the likelihood that the harmful
conduct will be detected ought to be related to the
appropriate degree of punishment."6 Therefore, Sunstein et
113. The notion of "optimal" deterrence "implies deterring offensive conduct
only up to the point at which society begins to lose more from deterrence efforts
than from the offenses it deters," in contrast to "complete" deterrence in which
the goal is to "stop offenders from committing offensive acts." Hylton, supra
note 86, at 421. That lay decision-making is more consistent with retribution
than with deterrence has also been demonstrated in the context of criminal
punishment. See John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts As
Motives for Punishment, 24 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 659 (2000) (demonstrating that
lay intuitions mirror a just deserts model rather than an incapacitation model
in determining appropriate punishment); Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We
Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. (forthcoming 2002) (finding that lay decision
makers are more sensitive to just-deserts considerations than to deterrence
considerations). Retribution also appears to be the intuitive motive behind
support for the death penalty. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross,
Hardening of the Attitudes: Americans' Views on the Death Penalty, 50 J. Soc.
IssUES 19, 29 (1994); Tom R. Tyler & Renee Weber, Support for the Death
Penalty: Instrumental Response to Crime, or Symbolic Attitude?, 17 LAw & SOC'Y
REV. 21, 40-41 (1982).
114. Sunstein et al., Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
237 (2000).
115. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 33, at 873-74.
It follows from these observations that a crucial question for
consideration is whether injurers sometimes escape liability for harms
for which they are responsible. If they do, the level of liability imposed
on them when they are found liable needs to exceed compensatory
damages so that, on average, they will pay for the harm that they
cause. This excess liability can be labeled "punitive damages," and
failure to impose it would result in inadequate deterrence. In
summary, punitive damages ordinarily should be awarded if, and only
if, an injurer has a chance of escaping liability for the harm he causes.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
116. Id. at 889.
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al. considered whether jury-eligible citizens would evaluate
cases using information about the probability that the
defendant's conduct would have been detected in a way
consistent with optimal deterrence theory. They found that
variations in the probability that the conduct would be
detected did not significantly affect punitive damage
awards.'17 Thus, the participants did not intuitively make
decisions in accordance with a theory of optimal
deterrence."'
An experimental study conducted by Baron and Ritov
also investigated lay intuitions about deterrence objectives
and punishment."9 Using vignettes describing products
liability cases involving birth control pills and vaccines,
Baron and Ritov asked participants12° to assign punishment.
They found that most participants would assess the same
punishment against the defendant company whether the
effect of the punishment would be to cause the company to
manufacture an even safer product or to cease making the
product altogether (even though the product was safer than
the alternatives). 2 ' Similarly, most respondents indicated
that the penalty that they assessed against the company
would be the same even if the penalty would not affect the
company's future behavior.'22
117. Sunstein et al., supra note 114, at 243; see also Viscusi, supra note 106,
at 316 (finding that the probability of detection did not have a significant effect
on determinations of the amount of punitive damages needed for optimal
deterrence, the amount necessary to punish, or final punitive damage awards);
infra Part III.C.2.
118. In a second study, Sunstein et al. asked eighty-four University of
Chicago law students to evaluate a proposal to set aside a jury's award of
punitive damages where there was virtually no possibility of escaping detection;
the vast majority of participants (84.5%) disagreed with the proposal. Sunstein
et al., supra note 114, at 244. The participants "apparently rejected that theory
with the thought that reckless or invidious behavior deserves to be punished
regardless of what deterrence theory may suggest." Id. at 246. The participants
may also have been guided more by a complete deterrence approach, rather
than one of optimal deterrence. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
119. Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Intuitions About Penalties and
Compensation in the Context of Tort Law, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 17 (1993).
120. The participants were arbitrators, economists, environmental activists,
undergraduates, and law students. Id. at 21.
121. Id. at 23-24.
122. Id. at 24. Participants were told that the punishment would have no
influence because it was confidential, the company executives who knew about
it were retiring, and it would be paid by insurance for which the rates were set
industry-wide. Id.
131
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
In a second study, Baron and Ritov found that explicitly
providing participants with an argument about the
deterrence rationale had little effect on punishment
decisions.'23 Finally, in a third study, they asked partici-
pants directly whether the effect of the penalty on the
future actions of the company (i.e., ceasing to produce the
product or making a safer product) should matter and
asked why it might matter. They found much diversity of
knowledge and acceptance of a deterrence rationale-some
participants were familiar with the principles and applied
them to their punishment decisions, others were familiar
with the principles but did not apply them, while others did
not appear to be familiar with deterrence reasoning.' 4
Baron and Ritov concluded that lay intuitions about
punishment "are variable from person to person and are not
typically consequentialist."
125
Greene, Coon, and Bornstein asked participants in an
experimental study to rate the extent to which their
punitive damage award was intended to serve each of three
goals: compensation, punishment, and deterrence. They
found that participants' awards were more intended to
punish the defendant than to serve as a deterrent or to
compensate the plaintiff.' 6 In an experimental study,
Hastie, Schkade, and Payne asked jury-eligible adults to
indicate what proportion of their award was intended to
punish the defendant rather than to deter the defendant or
others. Those who more strongly favored punishment
tended to make higher damage awards.'27 In a second study,
123. Id. at 26-28.
124. Id. at 30.
125. Id. at 31. Individual difference factors that might influence individual
deterrence motives include beliefs that the punishment will act as an effective
deterrent, that the behavior is a personal threat, and, with regard to general
deterrence, that there is a need to deter others and that those others will
become aware of the punishment inflicted. Miller & Vidmar, supra note 32, at
163-64.
126. Greene et al., Limiting Awards, supra note 81, at 229.
127. Hastie et al., supra note 90, at 457. In a second study, the relationship
between punishment and award size was not significant. Id. at 462.
Participants were also given the opportunity to indicate the specific behaviors
they intended to punish or to deter. Participants were more likely to describe
behaviors that they intended to punish rather than behaviors that they wished
to deter. Id. at 456. It is possible that this is a function of the order in which the
questions were asked; participants were asked first to list the behaviors they
intended to punish, then those they intended to deter. Id. at 452.
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in response to an open-ended question asking them to
describe their thinking as they made their awards, more
jurors cited punishment as a goal of their award (31%) than
cited deterrence as a goal (19%).128
Thus, lay decision makers do not appear to intuitively
adopt a perspective that emphasizes optimal deterrence in
setting punitive damage awards. Rather, jurors intuitively
make punitive damage awards that emphasize
retribution. 129 To the extent that optimal deterrence is the
goal of punitive damages, failure to make decisions that are
sensitive to deterrence considerations is problematic.
However, it is not clear what weight to give this problem.
First, not all scholars agree that optimal deterrence is or
should be the goal of punitive damages. Hylton argues that
in many cases complete deterrence would be a more
appropriate goal.3 ' Recently, in Cooper Industries, Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., the Supreme Court stated:
[]t is not at all obvious that even the deterrent function of punitive
damages can be served only by economically "optimal deterrence."
"[C]itizens and legislators may rightly insist that they are willing
to tolerate some loss in economic efficiency in order to deter what
they consider morally offensive conduct, albeit cost-beneficial
morally offensive conduct; efficiency is just one consideration
among many."
131
It remains to be seen whether jurors' notions of
deterrence are more consistent with the goal of complete
128. Id. at 462.
129. Some empirical research suggests that whether or not it is legally
appropriate to do so, some jurors may also use punitive damages to further
compensate plaintiffs. Hastie et al. found that 25% of their mock-jurors
described the reasoning behind their punitive damage award in a way that
indicated that they intended their punitive damage award to compensate the
plaintiff. Id. at 462. Because participants in this study were only asked to
award punitive damages, conflation between compensatory and punitive
damages may have been heightened. Greene et al. also found that while student
jurors intended their punitive damage award more to punish than to
compensate, they nonetheless rated compensation as a moderately important
objective of their award. Greene et al., Limiting Awards, supra note 81, at 229
(rating 5.86 on a 1-10 scale of the extent to which the punitive damage award
was intended to meet the objective of compensation).
130. Hylton, supra note 86, at 423. Hylton also analyzes the difficulties
attendant to requiring a factfinder to estimate the probability that the
defendant would be found liable. Id. at 460-63.
131. 121 S. Ct. 1678, 1687 (2001) (quoting Galanter & Luban, supra note 33,
at 1450).
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deterrence. Second, lay intuitions about retribution are also
an appropriate consideration in determining punitive
damages, a consideration that jurors are particularly well-
suited to reflect. "After all," the Court noted in Cooper,
"deterrence is not the only purpose served by punitive
damages."13 Finally, evidence that lay intuition is not
primarily oriented to optimal deterrence does not
necessarily mean that jurors could not give effect to optimal
deterrence if properly instructed, an issue that is addressed
below. 3'
C. Characteristics of the Process
Finally, there are several aspects of the decision task
itself that influence determinations of punitive damages.
First, the social dynamics involved in the jury deliberation
process result in patterns of awards that are different from
those that would result from individual decision-making-
group punitive damage awards are larger, but potentially
less variable. Second, the task of determining punitive
damages requires jurors to translate their outrage at the
defendant's conduct and their desire to punish the
defendant into a dollar equivalent. Recent research
suggests that jurors (as well as other decision makers) have
difficulty with this task. Finally, empirical research shows
that jurors have difficulty understanding jury instructions
about punitive damages.
1. Group Deliberation. While most empirical research
that has examined how damages are awarded has looked at
the damage awards of individual jurors, a few studies have
examined the effects of group deliberation on group damage
awards. Overall, the existing research indicates that the
dynamics of deliberation are an important influence on the
punitive damage awards made by juries. The research
suggests that the deliberation process results in punitive
damage awards that are higher, but potentially less
variable, than awards made by individual jurors.
132. Id.
133. Whether jurors will make decisions consistent with deterrence
principles in response to instructions is discussed in more detail infra Part
III.C.2.
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Participation in group decision-making processes such
as jury deliberations may influence both the size and the
variability of the damages awarded."' Lempert noted:
In civil juries, there is often a wide range of damage estimates,
and the range is likely to be wider where the standard for damages
has few objective references, as is the case with punitive damages.
Normal jury deliberations bring out reasons for these disparities
and lead to comrbetween the estimates of high and low
damage jurors.
Interviews with jurors suggest that final punitive
damage awards do represent a compromise between high
and low amounts advocated by different factions of the
jury.136 Understanding whether and how these compromises
occur is an important step toward understanding punitive
damages decision-making.
Hastie, Schkade, and Payne analyzed the deliberations
of 121 six-person mock juries who were asked to deliberate
to a unanimous punitive damage liability verdict in one of
four personal injury cases. 137 They found a majority effect
such that jury punitive damage liability verdicts tended to
mirror the predeliberation preferences of the majority of the
individual jurors; the higher the proportion of jurors on the
jury who had predeliberation preferences for liability, the
more likely it was that the jury would return a verdict
imposing punitive liability and vice versa.3 8 However,
Hastie et al. found a slight advantage for a finding of no
liability-juries with an even split between those initially
134. See generally Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing
Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687 (1996) (comparing individual
and group decision-making generally and identifying factors that can lead to
more and less bias in group decisions).
135. Lempert, supra note 38, at 870-71.
136. See Greene, supra note 43, at 231.
137. Reid Hastie et al., A Study of Juror and Jury Judgments in Civil Cases:
Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages, 22 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 287 (1998)
[hereinafter Hastie et al., Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages]. For
commentary on this study see Neil Vidmar, Juries Don't Make Legal Decisions!
And Other Problems: A Critique of Hastie et al. on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW &
HuM. BEHAV. 705 (1999); Reid Hastie et al., Reply to Vidmar, 23 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 715 (1999); Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Sticks and Stones, 23 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 719 (1999); Robert J. MacCoun, Epistemological Dilemmas in the
Assessment of Legal Decision Making, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 723 (1999).
138. Hastie et al., Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages, supra note 137,
at 299.
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favoring liability and those initially favoring no liability
were more likely to return a verdict finding no liability for
punitive damages.139
Hastie et al. found that the content of the deliberations
was related to the decisions ultimately rendered by the
groups-juries choosing to impose punitive damages spent
more time discussing the deterrent purposes of punitive
damages, the blameworthiness of the defendant, and the
maliciousness of the defendant and spent less time dis-
cussing the burden of proof, the involvement of a third
party, the meaning of negligence, the judge's admonition to
follow the instructions, and the need for additional
information than did juries declining to impose punitive
damages.4 Moreover, juries concluding that punitive
damages were appropriate were less likely to discuss each
element of the judge's instructions on punitive damages
liability than were juries deciding not to award punitive
damages.14
In an extensive study of deliberation and punitive
damages, Schkade, Sunstein, and Kahneman asked almost
3000 jury-eligible citizens to consider one of fifteen personal
injury scenarios and deliberate to a unanimous punitive
damages award in six-person groups."' The researchers
compared the awards of the deliberating juries with the
awards that would have been produced by each jury as a
"statistical jury" based on the median of its members' pre-
deliberation responses.'43 Schkade et al. found no differences
139. Id. (finding also that juries with an initial majority favoring no liability
were more likely to reach a no verdict than juries with majorities of equal size
favoring liability were to reach a yes verdict). But see Schkade et al., supra note
94, at 1153 (finding that an initially evenly split jury has a 50% chance of
returning a no liability verdict). See generally Saks, supra note 25, at 37
(discussing the majority effect).
140. Hastie et al., Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages, supra note 137,
at 300-01.
141. See id.
142. Schkade et al., supra note 94, at 1140.
143. Several studies have found that the median of the individual jury
members' predeliberation damage awards is the best predictor of juries' group
damage awards. See James H. Davis et al., Effects of Group Size and Procedural
Influence on Consensual Judgments of Quantity: The Example of Damage
Awards and Mock Civil Juries, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 703, 712
(1997) (finding that a model based on the median of the individual group
members' initial damage awards fit the observed six- and twelve-person group
damage award decisions better than a model based on the mean); Shari
Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict
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in the rate at which non-zero punitive damages were
awarded by statistical and deliberating juries; deliberating
juries tended to reach the liability result favored pre-
deliberation by the majority of its members. In contrast to
Hastie et al.'s findings, juries who began deliberations with
an even split between those who favored liability and those
who did not were equally likely to find for either party."'
In addition, Schkade et al. found that deliberating
juries and statistical juries ranked cases similarly; that is,
cases that received high median awards from deliberating
juries received high median awards from statistical juries
as well.145 However, they found that deliberating juries
made punitive damage awards that were higher than
awards constructed for statistical juries.146 This "severity
shift" is consistent with the findings of several studies by
Diamond and her colleagues for compensatory damages,
that group awards are higher than the median award of the
group members. 47
Thus, there appear to be consistent findings that
damage awards will exceed the median of the individual
group members' predeliberation awards. Several aspects of
the social dynamics of jury deliberation may contribute to
this result. First, psychological theory concerning group
polarization suggests that following group discussion, group
members' positions tend to become more extreme in the
direction initially favored by the majority.148 The general
Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOCY REV. 513,
545 (1992) (final compensatory damage awards of seventy six-person juries in
an antitrust price fixing case were more highly correlated with the median of
the individual jurors' verdicts than with any other predictor examined);
Schkade et al., supra note 94, at 1163 (finding that the median was a better
predictor of punitive damage awards than the mean). Consistent with these
findings, a number of studies have analyzed the awards of "statistical juries"
created by randomly selecting sets of six or twelve individual respondents and
using the median individual judgment of each set as that jury's verdict. See
infra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
144. Schkade et al., supra note 94, at 1152-53.
145. Id. at 1152.
146. Id. at 1153, 1159.
147. See Diamond et al., supra note 94, at 315-16; Diamond & Casper, supra
note 143, at 553-57; see also Martin J. Bourgeois et al., Nominal and Interactive
Groups: Effects of Preinstruction and Deliberations on Decisions and Evidence
Recall in Complex Trials, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 58, 62 (1995) (finding that the
damage awards of juries were higher than their predeliberation awards).
148. See, e.g., Daniel J. Isenberg, Group Polarization: A Critical Review and
Meta-Analysis, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1141, 1145 (1986); Martin F.
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patterns observed in the studies described here are
consistent with this phenomenon. For example, the juries in
the Hastie et al. study were initially more likely to have
large coalitions favoring punitive liability than vice versa;
accordingly, more of the jurors who were undecided prior to
deliberation became decided in favor of punitive liability.'49
Research into the group polarization effect has found
two general mechanisms through which it operates. First,
arguments supporting the initially preferred position tend
to be more varied, more persuasive, and more frequently
mentioned than arguments supporting the non-preferred
position.5 ° As a result, the group discussion will center
around arguments for the initially preferred position. In
this context, then, discussion is likely to center around
reasons for imposing damage awards when most members
of the jury are initially inclined to make an award, to center
around reasons for not awarding punitive damages when
the jury is initially inclined to deny punitive damages, and
to center around high damage awards once there is a
decision to award punitive damages. Presumably, some of
the arguments generated will be unfamiliar to some of the
jurors, and upon considering these "novel and reasonable
arguments, mainly in support of the initially favored
alternative, the typical group member shifts his or her
attitude in that direction, producing an overall shift in this
direction." '' Consistent with this notion, Diamond and
Casper found that the person selected as the foreperson of
the jury tended to have made higher predeliberation
damage awards than had other group members and that
forepersons had a disproportionate level of influence over
Kaplan, Discussion Polarization Effects in a Modified Jury Decision Paradigm:
Informational Influences, 40 SOCIOMETRY 262, 269 (1977); David G. Meyers &
Martin F. Kaplan, Group-Induced Polarization in Simulated Juries, 2
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 63, 63 (1976); David G. Meyers & Helmut
Lamm, The Group Polarization Phenomenon, 83 PSYCHOL. BULL. 602, 603
(1976); Serge Moscovici & Marisa Zavalloni, The Group As a Polarizer of
Attitudes, 12 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 125, 134 (1969); James A.F.
Stoner, Risky and Cautious Shifts in Group Decisions: The Influence of Widely
Held Values, 4 EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 442, 455-56 (1968).
149. Hastie et al., Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages, supra note 137,
at 297-99.
150. See Isenberg, supra note 148, at 1145; see also Schkade et al., supra
note 94, at 1167.
151. ALICE H. EAGLY & SHELLY CHAIKEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDES 658
(1993).
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the group's ultimate decision. 52 In addition, they found that
deliberation increased participants' perception of the defen-
dant's blameworthiness and that such perceptions were
related to damage awards.'53
Second, group members are motivated to make
comparisons between themselves and others and want to
perceive themselves in a socially positive sense and to be
perceived by others in the group in a similarly favorable
way."' Thus, once group members hear about the initial
positions of their peers, they are likely to adjust their
preferences in the direction of those initial norms."'
Moreover, the initial positions expressed in discussion may
be higher than the positions held by the group as a whole.
In their study of deliberation and damage awards, Diamond
and Casper found that jurors whose pre-deliberation
verdicts were lower were significantly less likely to
introduce their predeliberation award as an option for
discussion."' When jurors hear relatively high damage
awards suggested, they may revise their own evaluations of
the appropriate award in an upward direction.
Schkade et al. argue that there is a rhetorical
advantage for arguments in favor of higher damage awards
that implicates both processes underlying group polariz-
ation.'57 They asked eighty-seven University of Chicago law
students to generate the types of arguments that could be
made for either a higher or a lower punitive damage award
in a case in which punitive damages were warranted. They
were then asked to indicate which position they thought
would be more difficult to argue. The majority of
participants anticipated that it would be more difficult to
argue in favor of a lower award.'58 Thus, arguments in favor
of higher awards might be easier for participants to
152. Diamond & Casper, supra note 143, at 557. But see Hastie et al.,
Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages, supra note 137, at 296 (finding that
the foreperson exerted no greater influence over the final jury verdict).
153. Diamond & Casper, supra note 143, at 555.
154. EAGLY & CHAIKEN, supra note 151, at 656; Isenberg, supra note 148, at
1142.
155. See, e.g., Schkade et al., supra note 94, at 1166.
156. Diamond & Casper, supra note 143, at 556.
157. Schkade et al., supra note 94, at 1161.
158. Id. at 1161-62 (55% of participants thought it would be harder to argue
in favor of a lower award; compared to 15% who thought it would be harder in
favor of a higher award).
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generate, might be more persuasive when _resented, and
might be more consistent with social norms.
It is worth noting that the requirement of a unanimous
verdict may be relevant to the severity shifts observed. 6 °
Fewer than one-half of the states require their civil juries to
come to unanimous decisions. 6' Kaplan and Miller
examined how the decision rule affects punitive damage
awards by asking students to deliberate to either a
unanimous or a majority verdict in response to a personal
injury case. Although they found that the punitive damages
awarded by six-person juries were greater than those
awarded by individual jurors under a rule of unanimity,
they found that under a majority decision rule the awards
of jurors and juries did not differ significantly.' Kaplan
and Miller suggested that groups were less able to ignore
individual members with preferences for extreme awards
under conditions in which unanimity was required, and
that extreme individual awards were more likely for the
more normative punitive damages judgment than for
compensatory damages, resulting in increased punitive
damages awards under conditions of unanimity."'
159. Thus, Schkade et al. suggest that arguing in favor of "appropriate
punishment for wrongdoing" is more persuasive than arguing in favor of
"ensuring against overdeterrence." Id. at 1167. This is consistent with the
notion that lay decision makers are intuitive retributionists rather than
intuitive deterrence theorists. See supra notes 113-29 and accompaying text.
However, Hastie et al. found that juries with equal divisions between those who
favored punitive liability and those who favored no punitive liability were more
likely to return a verdict of no liability. Hastie et al., Deciding Liability for
Punitive Damages, supra note 137, at 299. They speculate that the fact that the
plaintiff has the burden of proof may give defendants an advantage in that
situation. Id. at 305.
160. Schkade et al., supra note 94, at 1165 n.75.
161. DAVID B. ROTTMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT
ORGANIZATION 1998 (2000) (twenty states require a unanimous civil jury verdict
in all cases). At least one state statute specifically requires a unanimous
determination as to punitive damages. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(6)
(1996).
162. Martin F. Kaplan & Charles E. Miller, Group Decision Making and
Normative Versus Informational Influence: Effects of Type of Issue and Assigned
Decision Rule, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 306, 309 (1987) (nor did the
mean amounts of compensatory damages awarded by jurors and juries differ).
Kaplan and Miller found no effect of decision rule on compensatory damages.
Id.; see also Davis et al., supra note 143, at 707 (finding no effect of decision rule
on compensatory damages).
163. See Kaplan & Miller, supra note 162, at 309.
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The deliberation process may also affect the variability
of the resulting damage awards. 64 Studies of compensatory
damages have demonstrated that deliberating groups make
less variable awards than do individual jurors. Diamond,
Saks, and Landsman compared the predeliberation compen-
satory damage awards of individual jury-eligible adults
with the verdict reached by 120 deliberating six-person
juries in response to a videotaped products liability trial.
While the juries' higher awards permitted greater
variability in absolute terms, the awards of deliberating
juries were lower than those of individual jurors as
measured both by the standard deviation and as a
percentage of the mean award.165
Studies of "statistical juries" have also found that these
groups make damage awards that are less variable than are
individual awards and less variable than are judges'
awards.'66 This reduced variability is not unexpected given
the mathematics of statistical sampling, but it is not clear
that juries constructed in this manner accurately reflect
164. The optimal level of variability in awards is beyond the scope of this
paper. Wissler and her colleagues have noted:
Perhaps it goes without saying that predictability and consistency
might be purchased at the cost of more important values. For example,
the rule of thumb some lawyers use to come up with a figure for
general damages for purposes of settlement negotiation-multiplying
medical specials by three-would, if adopted as a legal rule for
assigning damages, produce highly predictable outcomes, but at the
expense of injury- and victim-specific considerations. Sometimes the
amount awarded would be too great and sometimes it would be too
small.
It may be worth noting that some level of variability is beneficial to
the legal process. The proper level of uncertainty helps to promote
settlements, while not promoting so many that courts do not receive
the cases necessary to monitor society's disputes, and thereby to
continually refine and announce the law.... A rational goal would be
to aim to calibrate the level of uncertainty to seek its optimal level,
rather than to aim to eliminate uncertainty from the litigation system.
Wissler et al., supra note 94, at 812 n.179.
165. Diamond et al., supra note 94, at 315-16.
166. See Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic
Damage Awards in Medical Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal
Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883, 898 (1993) (finding statistical juries' pain
and suffering awards less variable than arbitrators' awards); Viscusi, supra
note 106, at 328, 335-37 (finding statistical juries' punitive damage awards less
variable than individual jurors' awards); Wissler et al., supra note 94, at 803
(finding statistical juries' general damage awards less variable than judges'
awards); see also supra note 143 (describing statistical juries).
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what might occur in actual jury deliberations. MacCoun has
noted that "the analogy between empanelled juries and
random samples is an imperfect one.""7 Indeed, the
Schadke et al. study suggests that deliberating groups will
make awards that are more variable than those made by
"statistical juries."'68 Accordingly, it is likely that group
deliberation will result in reduced award variability, albeit
a reduction that is unlikely to be of the magnitude
demonstrated by studies of "statistical juries."
2. Translation to Dollars. In determining punitive
damages, jurors must translate their punishment reactions
into a dollar award. This aspect of the process of
determining punitive damages has been identified as an
important factor shaping the pattern of awards.
Kahneman, Sunstein, and Schkade have recently
proposed a general model of the processes by which jurors
determine punitive damage awards.'69 The outrage model
posits that jurors experience outrage in response to a
defendant's action; this outrage is influenced by the malice
or recklessness the defendant shows in committing the act.
Jurors, then, translate their outrage or anger toward a
wrongdoer into a judgment about how severely the
wrongdoer should be punished, a judgment they term
"punitive intent." According to the model, punitive intent is
translated into a punitive damage award by mapping it on
to a dollar scale.Y
-
Kahneman and his colleagues asked jury-eligible
citizens to evaluate ten personal injury claims and to assess
either the outrageousness of the defendant's conduct, the
level of appropriate punishment, or the appropriate level of
punitive damages. They demonstrated a high degree of
consistency among participants about the degree of outrage
felt and the severity of the penalty required, but relatively
less consistency among participants in making punitive
damage judgments' 7 ' Kahneman et al. posit that jurors
167. MacCoun, supra note 24, at 178 n.126.
168. See Schadke et al., supra note 94.
169. Kahneman et al., supra note 70, at 50.
170. Id. at 52.
171. Id. at 63, 66. A similar pattern was detected for "statistical juries"
(constructed by creating twelve-person "juries" and using the median individual
damage award as a proxy for the final jury judgment); ratings of outrage and
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have difficulty with this mapping process because they lack
experience in translating their punitive intent into dollar
values and they have no benchmark to guide them.
Accordingly, jurors who hold similar intentions about
punishing a defendant and who would rank different cases
similarly may award widely different amounts in punitive
damages.172
A study examining non-economic compensatory
damages has demonstrated a similar difficulty with
translating perceptions of a case into judgments about
dollars. Wissler, Hart, and Saks compared how jury-eligible
citizens, attorneys, and judges assessed different injuries
and translated those assessments into general damage
awards. 173 For all groups, assessments of injury severity
were highly predictable from ratings of the specific aspects
of the injury. General damage awards, however, were less
predictable than were assessments of injury severity for all
groups, with the largest decline in predictability occurring
for jurors.175 Wissler et al. suggest that jurors' relative lack
of experience in determining damages may partly account
for these differences. 76 These findings are similar to those
of Kahneman et al. in that decision makers demonstrate
punitive intent made by different statistical juries were much more highly
correlated than were dollar awards. Id. at 68, 70.
172. Id. at 50, 54.
173. Wissler et al., supra note 94, at 756. Using a fractional factorial survey
to examine sixty-two different injuries, Wissler et al. asked each participant to
evaluate two injuries and to indicate the amount of general damages they would
award for each, rate the degree of physical pain, mental suffering, disability,
and disfigurement each injury would have caused the plaintiff, and rate each
injury's overall severity. Id. at 769-70. Fractional factorial designs allow
exploration of the independent main effects and selected interactions of a large
number of factors without the unwieldy size and complexity of a full-factorial
design. Rather than running a complete factorial design, the researcher runs
only a systematically selected portion of the possible factor level combinations.
See B. J. WINER, STATISTICAL PRINCIPLES IN EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 309-11 (2d
ed. 1971); see also Dennis P. Stolle et al., Fractional Factorial Designs for Legal
Psychology, 20 BEHAV. SCI. & L. (forthcoming 2002).
174. Wissler et al., supra note 94, at 782 (predicting 72% of the variance in
injury severity ratings for jurors and 69% for judges).
175. Id. at 794 (the models predicted 23% of the variance in damage awards
for jurors and 42% for judges).
176. Id. at 808. The order in which participants evaluated injuries
influenced the responses of jurors, but not the responses of the other
participants. Differences in gender, income, education may also partially
account for differences; jurors who were most similar to the judges were more
predictable. See id. at 808 n.166.
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more consistency in making discrete ratings of injury
severity or of outrage, but are less consistent when trans-
lating those assessments into unbounded dollar amounts.
3. Jury Instructions. The empirical research
demonstrates that jurors often have difficulty under-
standing and applying the judge's instructions on the law.'77
In several studies, Hastie and his colleagues have found
that jurors' ability to recall the content of the judicial
instructions they received was quite low. In a study of
decisions about liability for punitive damages, Hastie et al.
asked jurors to recall the factors they were instructed to
consider when determining liability for punitive damages in
a series of specific open-ended questions. The mean score
was 9% correct. " 8 Similarly, in a study that asked jurors to
assess damage award amounts, Hastie et al. asked jurors to
list the factors that they had been instructed to consider.
Overall, the average correct recall was 12%."'1 In contrast,
Landsman and his colleagues found relatively high levels of
comprehension in response to multiple-choice questions
regarding punitive liability and damages with overall
accuracy of approximately 67%.180 There are several
possibilities for these differences. First, Hastie asked
participants to recall central aspects of the instructions in
177. For psychological research on jury instructions in other contexts see
AMIRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE (1982)
(jury instructions on negligence); Shari Seidman Diamond & Judith N. Levi,
Improving Decisions on Death by Revising and Testing Jury Instructions, 79
JUDICATURE 224 (1996) (criminal jury instructions); Amiram Elwork et al.,
Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It, 1 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 163 (1977) (jury instructions on negligence); Vicky L. Smith, When Prior
Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping Jurors Use the Law, 17 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 507 (1993); Vicky L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay
Representations of Legal Concepts, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857
(1991). For reviews see Peter English & Bruce Sales, A Ceiling or Consistency
Effect for the Comprehension of Jury Instructions, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
381 (1997); Joel Lieberman & Bruce Sales, What Social Psychology Teaches Us
About the Jury Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 589 (1997).
178. Hastie et al., Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages, supra note 137,
at 295 (the median was 5% correct; 30% of participants received a score of zero;
the highest score was 67%).
179. Hastie et al., supra note 90, at 456.
180. See Stephen Landsman et al., Be Careful What You Wish For: The
Paradoxical Effects of Bifurcating Claims for Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L.
REv. 297, 330, 333 (finding correct answers given approximately two-thirds of
the time).
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open-ended questions while Landsman et al. asked partici-
pants to recognize such information in multiple-choice
questions. It is axiomatic that it is more difficult to recall
information than it is to recognize it.' Second, it is possible
that the content of the questions themselves varied in
difficulty or differed in how strictly they were scored.
Finally, the instructions the researchers used may have
varied in difficulty.
Hastie and his colleagues have also conducted detailed
content analysis of the substance of jury deliberations about
punitive damages. They found that jurors were most likely
to spend time discussing the evidence in the case and next
most likely to spend time discussing the legal issues and
instructions. 82 However, Hastie et al. found that juries did
not engage in a thorough treatment of each element of the
legal instructions, on average only discussing and drawing
conclusions about approximately three of the five elements
in the instructions they were given.' Juries choosing to
impose punitive damages spent less time discussing the
judge's admonition to follow the instructions and were less
likely to discuss each element of the instructions than juries
181. MICHAEL W. EYSENCK, A HANDBOOK OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 145
(1984). For example, a question from the Hastie et al. study reads:
In his instructions to the jury, the judge listed four specific factors that
were of special relevance in determining an appropriate amount of
punitive damages to award when the defendant is a corporation. Try to
list these four factors; if you cannot remember exact words from the
instructions, please use your own words to describe the four factors.
Hastie et al., supra note 90, at 452.
182. Hastie et al., Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages, supra note 137,
at 299-300.
183. Id. at 300. This finding may be partially explained by the specific
instructions that participants were given; participants were told that they could
award punitive damages if they found "that the defendant's conduct (1) was
malicious; or (2) manifested reckless of callous disregard for the rights of
others." The second of these conjunctive conditions required the plaintiff to
prove four separate factors. Id. at 310-11. Theoretically, a jury that considered
the first condition, maliciousness, and decided in the affirmative would not need
to consider in detail the second condition with its four factors. In fact, it appears
that over 80% of juries did discuss the maliciousness instruction. Id. at 302
fig.2. It is entirely possible that the juries did not make this distinction; even so,
it may be premature to draw the conclusion that jurors do not consider the
instructions. In any case, these findings are consistent with other research
suggests that jurors may have difficulty in using legal instructions in making
their decisions. See supra note 177.
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declining to impose punitive damages.84 Almost half of the
individual jurors, asked to write explanations for their
verdicts following the jury deliberation, failed to mention
the judge's instructions. Those who more clearly used the
judge's instructions in accounting for their verdicts were
more likely to have been on juries that did not impose
punitive damages.18
D. Jurors Compared to Judges
While conventional wisdom about the differences
between judges and juries suggests that punitive damage
awards by judges will be less frequent, of smaller
magnitude, and less variable, it is not clear that this will
necessarily be the case.186 Although a great deal of research
has examined juror decision-making in a variety of
contexts,'87 comparatively little research has examinedjudicial decision-making."8 The existing empirical research
investigating decision-making about other legal issues has
shown that judges and jurors are influenced by similar
factors in criminal cases,'89 that judges and jurors have
184. Hastie et al., Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages, supra note 137,
at 301.
185. Id. at 303.
186. To the extent that there are differences, there is not always a clear
benchmark for determining which group's answer is normatively better. See
MacCoun, supra note 137, at 726 ("[T]he observed discrepancy tells us nothing
about whether either decision maker (or group) is actually accurate; both could
be wrong."); Alan Howard Scheiner, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages,
the Seventh Amendment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142,
165 (1991) ( "[Jiury bias can mean that the jury exercises sound discretion, but
that jury determinations nevertheless systematically differ from those that
judges would make because of moral or experiential differences between judges
and juries. Because there is no unbiased baseline, any claim of juror bias of
this... type can be restated as an equally true claim of judicial bias.").
187. See Vidmar, supra note 68 (reviewing the research on civil juries).
188. Anderson & MacCoun, supra note 43, at 328 ("Considering the amount
of attention that has been given to jurors' ability to use legal evidence, it is
remarkable how little we know about their professional counterparts [i.e.,
judges].").
189. See Edmund S. Howe & Thomas C. Loftus, Integration of Intention and
Outcome Information by Students and Circuit Court Judges: Design Economy
and Individual Differences, 22 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 102 (1992) (finding
that while students found higher levels of blameworthiness overall, judges and
students were similarly influenced by the outcome of an offense and by the level
of intention of the perpetrator).
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similar responses to statistical information,19 ° and that
judges, not unlike ordinary citizens, are unable to ignore
inadmissible evidence 9' and are vulnerable to cognitive
illusions such as hindsight bias,'92 anchoring,'93 egocentric
bias,9 framing,'95 and the representativeness heuristic.96 A
190. See Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective
Probability Enough?, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 739 (1992).
191. See Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry
into the Effects of Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil
Litigation, 12 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 113 (1994) (finding that judges' and jurors'
liability decisions and perceptions of the trial were similarly affected by
exposure to potentially biasing, but inadmissible, evidence). Interestingly,
Landsman and Rakos found that while the effect of the biasing information was
the same for judges and jurors, the jurors appeared to be more sensitive to their
cognitive limitations in disregarding the evidence than did the judges. Id.
192. See John C. Anderson et al., Evaluation of Auditor Decisions: Hindsight
Bias Effects and the Expectation Gap, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 711 (1993) (judges
and outcome bias); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL
L. REV. 777, 802-03 (2001). But see Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries
Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance As a Risk Manger, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 901,
906 (1998); Lempert, supra note 38 (critiquing Hastie & Viscusi, supra).
Hindsight bias is unconsciously overestimating the likelihood one would have
assigned to an event once the outcome is known. See generally Barauch
Fischhoff, Hindsight # Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on
Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION
& PERFORMANCE 288 (1975).
193. See Birte Englich & Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing Under
Uncertainty: Anchoring Effects in the Courtroom, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
1535 (2001); Guthrie et al., supra note 192, at 791-92; see also discussion infra
note 319. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 96, at
3, 14-18.
194. See Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in
Bankruptcy Cases, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 979, 982, 994 (1994) (bankruptcy judges);
Guthrie et al., supra note 192, at 814 (magistrate judges); see also discussion
infra notes 327-28 and accompanying text. See generally Michael Ross & Fiore
Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution, 37 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 322 (1979).
195. See Guthrie et al., supra note 192, at 797; see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 176
(1997) (litigants); Linda Babcock et al., Forming Beliefs About Adjudicated
Outcomes: Perceptions of Risk and Reservation Values, 15 INT'L REV. L. ECON.
289 (1995) (lawyers). Framing refers to the evaluation of outcomes relative to a
neutral reference point. Outcomes are evaluated differently depending on
whether they are framed as gains or losses. See generally Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984).
196. See Guthrie et al., supra note 192, at 809-10. Using the
representativeness heuristic, decision makers make categorizations based on
the degree to which the object of the evaluation is representative of the category
to the neglect of other relevant considerations such as base-rates. See generally
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number of studies have recently begun to compare the
damage award decision-making of jurors and judges.
Several studies have asked judges to indicate their
agreement with the juries in the cases they hear. Kalven
and Zeisel, in the first major comparison of judges and
jurors, found that across 4000 civil cases, judges reported
that they would have made the same liability decisions as
did the jury 78% of the time.9 7 When both the judge and
jury would have decided in favor of the plaintiff, judges
reported that juries would have awarded more damages
52% of the time and judges would have awarded more
damages 39% of the time, with approximate agreement in
9% of the cases. On the average, Kalven and Zeisel found
that juries awarded 20% more in damages than judges
reported they would have awarded.'98 Similarly, Heuer and
Penrod found that across sixty-seven civil trials, judges
indicated that their verdict would have been the same as
that of the jury in 63% of the cases. Judicial disagreement
with the jury was approximately equally split in favor of
defendants (17.9%) and plaintiffs (19.4%). 9
Archival studies have compared the damage awards of
juries and judges as well. Clermont and Eisenberg
compared a large number of civil cases tried before judges
and juries over a ten year period. °° They found that
plaintiffs were more successful in front of judges in some
types of cases (notably products liability, medical
malpractice, and motor vehicle cases), but more successful
in front of juries in other types of cases (marine and Federal
Employer's Liability Act cases). 0 ' In some types of cases,
juries awarded more in damages; however, in other types of
cases, judges awarded more.
Eisenberg and his colleagues used data from the Civil
Trial Court Network to compare the punitive damage
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, 76
PSYCHOL. BULL. 110 (1971).
197. Harry Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1065
(1964); see HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 63 (1966).
198. Kalven, supra note 197, at 1065.
199. Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation
of Its Meaning and Effects, 18 LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 29, 48 (1994).
200. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge:
Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1175 (1992).
201. Id. at 1137 tbl.3.
202. Id. at 1141.
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decisions of juries and judges across 9000 civil cases from
1996.03 Overall, they found that almost one-third of
punitive damage awards were awarded by judges. °4 They
note that "[gliven the overwhelming focus on jury punitive
awards in the literature and policy debate, this share is
surprisingly high.""0 5 Controlling for the size of the
compensatory award, the status of the parties, and the type
of case, they found no differences between judges and juries
in the frequency with which they awarded punitive
damages, in the amounts of the awards, or in the amount of
punitive damages they awarded per unit of compensatory
damages.2 6 They did find, however, that judges (more so
than juries) became more likely to award punitive damages
as compensatory damages increased.2 7 Eisenberg et al. also
found mixed evidence suggesting that the punitive damage
awards made by juries were somewhat more variable than
were those of judges. However, jury and judicial awards
were equally likely to be so extreme as to be outside the
range in which 95% of the judges' awards fell. 208 Moreover,
Eisenberg et al. noted that jury awards might be expected
to be more variable if juries hear higher stakes cases or due
to strategic choices by defendants as to how they present
their cases. These case selection effects, they suggest, may
account for differences in variability.0 9 Thus, overall,
Eisenberg et al. concluded that there is little evidence of
meaningful differences in the relative frequencies of
punitive damages awarded by juries and judges or in the
patterns of those awards.
It is quite possible that the strategic decisions litigants
make result in collections of cases with different attributes
going before jurors and judges. Thus, case selection effects
confound these archival studies. Accordingly, there may be
factors other than the identity of the factfinder that
influenced the results in these cases. Nonetheless, the
findings of the archival studies are informative and can be
203. Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, supra note 75, at 747-48.
204. Id. at 752.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 760 tbl.3, 774 tbl.5.
207. Id. at 762 (finding that juries were more likely to award punitive
damages when compensatory damages were low, judges were more likely to
award punitive damages when compensatory damages were high).
208. Id. at 774-76.
209. Id. at 778-79.
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compared with the results of studies using different
methodologies. Experimental studies that ask jurors and
judges to evaluate identical case facts allow for a com-
parison between the two sets of decision makers without
the confound of different case mixes.
Several studies comparing the decisions of jurors and
legally experienced decision makers in awarding compen-
satory damages are instructive. Vidmar and Rice found no
differences in the amounts potential jurors and arbitrators
awarded for pain and suffering in two different medical
malpractice cases.21° Jurors and arbitrators also did not
differ in their perceptions of the case or in the self-reported
reasoning behind their awards.211 The awards made by both
groups were highly variable, although jurors' awards were
more variable than awards made by the arbitrators.212
However, the awards made by "statistical juries" were not
significantly different in magnitude than awards made by
the arbitrators and were less variable. 1 ' Vidmar and
Landau report similar results using a different case and
comparing .jurors and lawyers who were state certified
mediators.21
Similarly, Wissler, Hart, and Saks compared how jury-
eligible citizens, judges, and attorneys make awards of non-
economic compensatory damages in personal injury cases.
They found that characteristics of the injuries influenced
general damage awards in similar ways for jurors and
judges.21 In addition, juror awards were highly correlated
with the awards of judges, suggesting that the two groups
ranked the cases similarly, awarding higher amounts in the
same cases. "' However, the general damage awards jurorsrecommended for the same injuries were larger and more
210. Vidmar & Rice, supra note 166, at 893.
211. Id. at 894-95.
212. Id. at 892-93.
213. Id. at 897 n.58; see also supra note 143 (discussing statistical juries).
214. Neil Vidmar & David Landau, What Animates Jury Awards for Pain
and Suffering in Medical and Automobile Negligence Cases? An Empirical
Study, presented at the annual meeting of the Law & Society Association,
Phoenix, Ariz. (June 1994) (reported in VIDMAR, supra note 91, at 230-232).
215. Wissler et al., supra note 94, at 782. Participants rated the degree of
disability, mental suffering, disfigurement, and pain caused by an injury. For
both groups disability had the greatest impact on awards, followed by mental
suffering and disfigurement; pain had no independent significant impact on
awards. Id.
216. Id. at 799.
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variable than those that judges recommended.21 Consistent
with the findings of Vidmar, Wissler et al. found that
statistical juries' general damage awards (based on the
median of individual jurors' awards) were less variable than
awards by individual jurors and less variable than the
awards made by judges.18
Several experimental studies have also specifically
compared the punitive damage award decisions of jurors
and judges. Viscusi presented a series of scenarios to jury-
eligible citizens and to trial and appellate judges who were
participants in a conference on law and economics.219 One
scenario compared the rates at which judges and jurors
indicated that punitive damages should be awarded in
response to a scenario involving an airplane with a
malfunctioning cargo door. The airline did not repair the
door and damage occurred. Judges and jurors were asked to
determine whether a court should award punitive damages
in response to three different versions involving different
probabilities that an accident would occur and different
levels, types, and manners of occurrence of loss.22 ° Across
the cases, jurors indicated that punitive damages should be
awarded between 74% and 96% of the time; judges
indicated that punitive damages should be awarded
between 18% and 70% of the time. Both groups were more
likely to think that punitive damages were appropriate as
the stakes increased; however, for each scenario, judges
were less likely to think an award of punitive damages was
appropriate.221
In a second case (involving an unsafe oil well), Viscusi
found that although all the judges made damage awards
while 5% of jurors did not, damage awards by jurors were
higher and more variable than awards made by judges.2 In
related research, Hastie and Viscusi asked citizens and
217. Id. at 798-99.
218. Id. at 801-02; see also supra note 143 and accompanying text.
219. Viscusi, supra note 71; see also W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think
About Risk?, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 26, 28 (1999).
220. Viscusi, supra note 71, at 111-15.
221. Id. at 112-14. If Viscusi is correct that in the scenarios described "the
firm should not be found negligent, much less be punished with a punitive
damages award," then it is notable that as many as 70% of the judges indicated
that they thought punitive damages were appropriate. Id. at 111, 114 (personal
injury/crash scenario).
222. Id. at128-29. The type of damages participants were to award was not
specified. Id.
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judges to determine whether a railroad should pay punitive
damages (liability had already been determined and
compensation paid) after failure to improve the track
resulted in an accident. Jurors appeared to be more likely to
believe that punitive damages ought to be paid. 23
In another experimental study, Robbennolt found that
judges and jurors considered similar factors when
determining punitive damage awards in response to a
medical malpractice case against an HMO.24 Both jury-
eligible citizens and trial court judges used information
about the actual and potential severity of the injury to the
plaintiff in making their punitive damage award decisions,
awarding greater amounts in punitive damages when the
actual and potential injury to the plaintiff was more severe
than when the actual and potential injury to the plaintiff
was lower.22 Similarly, the wealth of the defendant influ-
enced the punitive damage awards of both groups, such
that higher punitive damage awards were made against
wealthier defendants.226 Moreover, judges and jurors did not
award significantly different amounts in punitive damages
and the awards of both groups were equally variable.2
Thus, the empirical results provide a somewhat mixed
picture of possible differences between judges and jurors in
the decisions they make about damages. Several studies
find that judges are less likely to award punitive
damages,"' while others find no differences. 29 The evidence
is similarly mixed with regard to the relative size and
variability of punitive damage awards by jurors and judges.
It is possible that in cases about which there is little
agreement that punitive damages liability is appropriate,
differences between judges and jurors are more likely to
emerge. In the studies finding similarities between judges
and jurors, punitive damages were awarded at relatively
223. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 192, at 919; see also Viscusi, supra note
71, at 128-30 (discussing the same data).
224. Robbennolt, supra note 71.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. Consistent with prior studies, the compensatory damages of jurors,
on the other hand, were marginally higher than those of judges and were more
variable. Id.
228. See Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 192; Viscusi, supra note 71.
229. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 200; Eisenberg et al., Juries,
Judges, supra note 75, at 762; Robbennolt, supra note 71.
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high rates.23 ° In contrast, for those studies finding differ-
ences, liability rates tended to be lower.23' This suggests the
possibility that differences between judges and jurors may
be more likely to emerge in closer cases.
Second, several of the studies finding differences
between judges and jurors used a sample of judges who
attended a conference on law and economics and included
both trial and appellate state court judges.2 3 It might be
expected that participants in a law and economics confer-
ence may not be representative of the larger population of
judges, and might be more apt to focus on economic
efficiency.234 In addition, there could be differences in the
decision-making of trial and appellate judges stemming
from either differences in their experiences or in their
differing institutional goals.235
230. See Robbennolt, supra note 71 (91% of citizens and 85% of judges
awarded punitive damages); Viscusi, supra note 71 (oil well scenario; 95% of
citizens and 100% of judges awarded damages).
231. See Viscusi, supra note 71, at 125, 128-30 (airplane door scenario; 18-
70% for judges and 74-96% for jurors); Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 192, at 917
(25% for judges and 67% for jurors).
232. It is also possible that in some subset of these less clear cases, judges
would not instruct the jury on punitive damages in the first instance; thus,
juries would not be asked to decide them. See Vidmar, supra note 137, at 709-
10. Other differences among the scenarios used might also be found to
differentially influence judges and jurors. See studies described supra Part II.A
(finding that case characteristics matter); see also Eisenberg et al., Juries,
Judges, supra note 75, at 765 n.75.
233. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 192, at 905; Viscusi, supra note 71, at 109.
234. See Guthrie et al., supra note 192, at 818 n.201; Eisenberg et al.,
Juries, Judges, supra note 75, at 765 n.75; Lempert, supra note 38, at 893.
235. The U.S. Supreme Court recently hypothesized as to the potential
differences in the relative abilities of trial and appellate court judges:
Differences in the institutional competence of trial judges and
appellate judges are consistent with our conclusion.... Only with
respect to the first Gore inquiry [the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's misconduct] do the district courts have a somewhat
superior vantage over courts of appeals, and even then the advantage
exists primarily with respect to issues turning on witness credibility
and demeanor. Trial courts and appellate courts seem equally capable
of analyzing the second factor [the disparity between the harm (or
potential harm) suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages
award]. And the third Gore criterion [the difference between the
punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases], which calls for a broad
legal comparison, seems more suited to the expertise of appellate
courts.
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1678, 1687-88
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Third, the studies varied in the set of legal decisions
participants were asked to make.236 Jurors who were only
given one mechanism through which to be able to express
their outrage (i.e., a punitive damage award), might have
been more likely to exercise that option than jurors in
actual trials who have the ability to utilize a compensatory
remedy as well.237 Eisenberg speculates that judges may be
more likely to "understand that the existence of a
compensatory award already expresses disapproval of the
behavior."' These are all, of course, empirical questions
that merit further study. Finally, it is worth noting that no
experimental studies have compared the punitive damages
decision-making of judges and deliberating juries. As
described earlier, deliberation may have a large impact on
damage awards that have important implications for
comparisons between juries and judges.2 9
At this early stage of the research there is no clear
evidence to support the notion that judges will make
qualitatively different decisions than juries across cases.
The important task for future studies will be to shed light
not only on whether the punitive damages awarded by
judges and jurors differ in frequency, magnitude, or
consistency, but also, more importantly, on the circum-
(2001) (footnote omitted). Archival research by Eisenberg and Wells found that
cases that result in published opinions involve higher award levels and higher
ratios of punitive damages to compensatory damages than do cases at state trial
court level. Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Punitive Awards After
BMW, A New Capping System, and the Reported Opinion Bias, 1998 Wis. L.
REV. 387, 414. Thus, trial and appellate courts may see different mixes of cases.
Exposure to different samples of cases may influence decision-making via the
availability and anchoring heuristics. See supra notes 96-107 and accompanying
text; see also Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes
Perceptions of the Federal Court System?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1989)
(describing the different mix of constitutional tort cases at the trial and
appellate level); Lempert, supra note 37, at 884-85 (noting that trial and
appellate judges may have different values or experiences).
236. See Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, supra note 75, at 747-78 (actual
cases in which juries determined liability and damages); Hastie & Viscusi,
supra note 192, 902-03 (punitive damage liability only); Robbennolt, supra note
71 (compensatory and punitive damages only); Viscusi, supra note 71, at 112
(punitive liability only). The studies also differed in the response options
available. For example, Viscusi gave participants responding to the oil well
scenario five dollar ranges from which to select. Viscusi, supra note 71, at 140.
237. See Ellsworth, supra note 137, at 720.
238. Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, supra note 75, at 765 n.75.
239. See supra Part II.C.1.
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stances under which any differences might emerge. Various
factors have been articulated as reasons why differences
might be expected in how judges and jurors make judg-
ments including: differences in their attitudes toward
wealth and corporations,24 ° differences in their emotional
responses,24 ' differences in education and experience,24 ' and
differences in how they perceive risk.243
Jurors, less wealthy on average than judges, are
suspected of holding "stronger redistributive inclinations
and biases against wealthy defendants" than judges 244 and
of being easily "swayed by arguments that seek to base the
calculation of punitive damages on a percentage of the
defendant's net wealth or income." 4 Robbennolt found that
although jury-eligible citizens had lower incomes and
perceived the defendant company to be more wealthy, more
successful, and more likely to engage in such conduct again
in the future than did judges, these difference did not
240. See Paul Mogin, Why Judges, Not Juries, Should Set Punitive
Damages, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 179, 210 (1998) ("Judges are better suited than
juries to give appropriate weight to a defendant's finances. They are less likely
to be swayed by arguments that seek to base the calculation of punitive
damages on a percentage of the defendant's net wealth or income."); The Paths
of Civil Litigation, Problems and Proposals in Punitive Damages Reform, 113
HARv. L. REV. 1783, 1801-04 (2000) [hereinafter Problems and Proposals]
(suggesting that jurors tend to show bias against corporations); Jury
Determination of Punitive Damages, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1527 (1997)
(suggesting that jurors, who tend to have lower incomes than judges, may
"possess stronger redistributive inclinations and biases against wealthy
defendants").
241. See, e.g., Mogin, supra note 240, at 208 ("[Judges] are more likely to be
able to base the severity of the penalty on a rational assessment of the facts,
rather than an emotional reaction to the defendant's misconduct."); Jury
Determination of Punitive Damages, supra note 240, at 1528 ("[Jludges are
thought to be more dispassionate decisionmakers, whereas juries are less able
to resist the sway of emotion and bias.").
242. See Lempert, supra note 38, at 893; Mogin, supra note 240, at 210-11
n.191; Limits on Jury Discretion: Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,
105 HARv. L. REV. 216, 224-25 (1991) ("[Jludges are repeat players and hence
are better able to ensure that damage awards do not 'exceed an amount that
will accomplish society's goals of punishment and deterrence.") (internal
quotation omitted); Sunstein et al., supra note 70, at 2127.
243. Viscusi, supra note 71, at 130.
244. Jury Determination of Punitive Damages, supra note 240, at 1527; see
also Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled
Approach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 665 (1980) (evidence of wealth may give rise to
"Robin Hood syndrome").
245. Mogin, supra note 240, at 210.
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significantly influence the amounts of punitive damages
awarded to the plaintiffs.246
Another possible difference is that, as a result of their
experience, judges are less susceptible to the influence of
emotion or sympathy for the plaintiff than are jurors. 247 The
available evidence suggests that sympathy for plaintiffs
does not play a major role in jury decision-making. Hans
has found that jurors are concerned about frivolous
lawsuits and are, accordingly, highly skeptical of plaintiffs
and their claims.248 Experimental research also indicates
that jurors do not favor plaintiffs when judging the
plaintiffs comparative negligence. 49 Hastie et al.'s analysis
of jury deliberations about punitive damages liability found
a notably low occurrence of jurors expressing sympathy for
the plaintiff.5 Finally, Robbennolt found that jury-eligible
citizens reported feeling more sympathetic for the plaintiff
than did trial court judges. However, these differential
sympathy ratings did not influence participants' punitive
damage awards.251 Thus, while jurors may feel more
sympathy for injured plaintiffs, they may be able to make
their damage award decisions without being unduly
influenced by this information.
Judges, as a result of their legal experiences, may have
different perceptions of the civil litigation system and the
246. Robbennolt, supra note 71. Instead, in contrast to the speculation that
citizens would be biased against wealthy defendants, it was the compensatory
damage awards made by judges, not citizens, that were marginally influenced
by the wealth of the defendant. Id.
247. For a detailed discussion of the appropriate role of sympathy in legal
decision-making see Neal R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A
Psychological Analysis, 65 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1997).
248. Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors' Treatment of
Corporate Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327, 334-35 (1998); HANS, supra note
87, at 22-78; Hans & Lofquist, Jurors'Judgments, supra note 107, at 94-100.
249. See Douglas J. Zickafoose & Brian H. Bornstein, Double Discounting:
The Effects of Comparative Negligence on Mock Juror Decision Making, 23 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 577, 586 (1999); Neal Feigenson et al., Effect of
Blameworthiness and Outcome Severity on Attributions of Responsibility and
Damage Awards in Comparative Negligence Cases, 21 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 597,
610-12 (1997).
250. Hastie et al., Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages, supra note 137,
at 300, 308.
251. Robbennolt, supra note 71; see also Neal Feigenson et al., The Role of
Emotions in Comparative Neligence Judgments, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
576, 588 (2001) (finding that compensatory damages awards were not mediated
by emotional reactions, including sympathy).
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range of awards made than do jurors. Wissler et al. have
noted that across their program of research on non-
economic damages, damage awards are better predicted by
case or injury attributes when participants are asked to
judge multiple cases or injuries."' They suggest that judges
may possess "a more complete cognitive reference scale of
injuries to provide a context for thinking about the case now
under consideration" and that this may account for any
observed differences in the decisions of judges and jurors.
As noted above, a number of studies have found a
connection between perceptions of the civil litigation system
and damage awards.254 Robbennolt found that judges and
jurors did differ in their perceptions of the typical outcomes
of civil litigation (estimates of the percentage of jury awards
that are greater than $1 million and of the percentage of
jury awards that include punitive damages were higher
than those of judges). Trial court judges, who have more
experience with the routine distribution of awards than do
lay jurors made much smaller (and more accurate)
estimates.5 While Robbennolt found that differences in
perceptions of typical outcomes influenced the participants'
compensatory damage awards, no differences in punitive
damages were detected.256
Exploring another possible difference, Viscusi examinedjudges' and jurors' risk beliefs. By asking respondents to
estimate the risk posed by a series of possible sources of
mortality, Viscusi demonstrated that both groups tended to
overestimate small risks and to underestimate large
risks.257 This pattern is consistent with previous psychologi-
cal research on risk perceptions. 58 These effects were
smaller in magnitude for judges than they were for jurors. 59
252. Wissler et al., supra note 94, at 808 n.166.
253. Id.
254. See supra notes 103-11.
255. Robbennolt, supra note 71.
256. Id.
257. Viscusi, supra note 71, at 131-32.
258. See Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived
Risk, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 96, at 463, 467; Sarah Lichtenstein
et al., Judged Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM.
LEARNING & MEMORY 551 (1978). But see HOWARD KUNREUTHER ET AL., DISASTER
INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS 237 (1978) (suggesting that
some low risks are ignored).
259. Viscusi, supra note 71, at 131-32. No statistical test of these differences
was provided. Viscusi reports the results of a second question assessing how
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It is currently unclear whether this, or any other, difference
in how judges and jurors think about risk impacts their
decision-making in the courtroom, but the potential for such
differences to influence decision-making warrants further
study.
In sum, the research examining the processes by which
jurors determine punitive damages suggests that jurors
take into account important characteristics of the cases in
making their punitive damage awards. Punitive damage
awards are sensitive to variables such as the degree of
harm risked or suffered, the outrageousness of the defen-
dant's conduct, and the financial status of the defendant.
Other influences on punitive damages are potentially more
troubling. In particular, jurors appear to be influenced by
media reports of high awards in complex ways, their
intuitions about punishment emphasize retribution to the
neglect of deterrence considerations, they have difficulty
mapping their punishments onto a dollar scale, and they
have difficulty understanding the legal instructions.
Nonetheless, jurors do not appear to make decisions that
clearly differ from the decisions that judges would make,
certainly not to the dramatic extent that most critics of the
jury would suggest.
The picture of punitive damages drawn by this research
is increasingly important as policymakers promote changes
to the civil litigation system, the law of punitive damages,
and the role of the jury in determining damages. Empirical
research provides a more solid foundation for policy
decision-making than do anecdotes, misperceptions, and
hyperbole. Potential reform of the manner in which
punitive damages are awarded ought to specifically target
the aspects of the process shown to be problematic. Instead,
the most common reforms have been more consistent with
the popular notion of unrestrained awards and have focused
on limiting awards.
participants would trade off money and risk. However, it appears that the
judges and jurors were asked questions that differed in critical ways, making
any comparison difficult. Compare Viscusi, supra note 71, at 133 (asking jurors
about reducing risk of dying in a car accident from 2/10,000 to 1/10,000), with
Viscusi, supra note 219, at 37 (asking judges about reducing risk of dying at
conference from 1/10,000 to zero).
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III. A MISMATCH BETWEEN REFORMS AND PROBLEMS
Virtually every state has undertaken some reform of
punitive damages. 60 However, these reform efforts have not
responded to the empirical research just described by
addressing the demonstrated difficulties that jurors have
with determining punitive damages. Rather, notions that
punitive damages are out of control have driven the
principal reform efforts. Consequently, the most popular
reforms are focused on controlling awards that are
perceived to be wildly unrestrained. However, the empirical
research examining patterns of punitive damage awards
suggests that punitive damages are not out of control in
ways consistent with popular conceptions. Archival
research examining overall patterns of awards find that
punitive damages are infrequently awarded, moderate in
size, awarded in response to outrageous conduct, and often
reduced post-trial.
Moreover, the experimental research that specifically
examines particular reform measures finds that such
measures are unlikely to accomplish their intended
purposes and may even have paradoxical effects. For
example, under some circumstances caps may increase the
size and variability of punitive damages and bifurcation has
been shown to increase punitive damage awards as well.
Rather than continuing to pursue reform measures that are
aimed at the largely illusory problem of overly-generous
punitive damage awards and do not take into account the
complexities of the decision-making process, reform efforts
ought to specifically target decision-making challenges.
Psychological research suggests avenues that this targeted
reform might take.
A. Current Reforms Target an Illusory Problem
Public attention has focused primarily on a few highly
publicized cases. For example, most observers are aware of
verdicts such as the $2.7 million in punitive damages
awarded to a McDonald's customer after she was seriously
burned by a cup of coffee. 261 However, there are now a
260. See infra Part III.B.
261. See Liebeck v. McDonald's Rests., P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995
WL 360309 (D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994). Many more are unaware of the details of
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number of empirical studies that have looked at overall
patterns of punitive damage awards.262 The studies have
common findings: although there are variations across
geographical area and type of case, punitive damages are
not often awarded, are rarely extreme in size, are awarded
the case. Seventy-nine year old Stella Liebeck was hospitalized for a week after
she suffered second and third degree burns when she spilled the coffee on
herself while sitting in a parked car. McDonald's kept its coffee approximately
200 hotter than did other restaurants and had received approximately 700 burn
complaints over the previous decade. See Gerlin, supra note 2, at Al. The award
was later reduced to $480,000 and the parties then settled for an undisclosed
amount. See Hoole, supra note 2, at 472.
262. See, e.g., DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 4, at 199-200, 213-43
(reporting on their program of research); CAROL DEFRANCES ET AL., CIVIL JURY
CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES (Bureau of Justice Statistics Special
Report No. NCJ-154346, 1995) (examining civil cases from forty-five of the
seventy-five most populous counties in 1991-1992); ERIK MOLLER, RAND INST.
FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS SINCE 1985, at 33-38 (1996)
(comparing awards in 1985-1989 with those in 1990-1994 from fifteen counties
in six states); PETERSON ET AL., supra note 87, at 8-31 (examining punitive
damages in two counties from 1960-1984); MICHAEL G. SHANLEY & MARK A.
PETERSON, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, POSTTRIAL ADJUSTMENTS TO JURY
AWARDS 36-37 (1987); U.S. G.A.O., PRODUCT LIABILITY, supra note 76
(examining products liability cases from five states in 1983-1985); Daniels &
Martin, supra note 23 (examining awards in civil cases from forty-seven
counties in eleven states from 1981-1985 and from two counties in two states
from 1970-1988); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, New Light on
Punitive Damages, REGULATION, Sept./Oct. 1986, at 33 (examining products
liability cases from 1982-1984 (federal) and 1984-1985 (state)); Ostrom et al.,
supra note 98 (examining civil cases from forty-five of the seventy-five most
populous U.S. counties); Rustad, supra note 76 (examining products liability
cases over a twenty-five year period); Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive
Damages: Current Data and Further Inquiry, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 15 (reviewing
nine empirical studies on the pattern of punitive damages in the United States);
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 76 (examining a nationwide sample of medical
malpractice cases from 1963-1993); Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for Medical
Malpractice and Post-Verdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV.
265, 280-98 (1998) (reviewing medical malpractice awards in three states); see
also Stephen E. Chappelear, Jury Trials in the Heartland, 32 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 241 (1999) (describing civil jury trials in Franklin County, Ohio over
thirteen year period); Thomas A. Eaton et al., Another Brick in the Wall: An
Empirical Look at Georgia Tort Litigation in the 1990s, 34 GA. L. REV. 1049
(2000) (describing patterns of civil litigation in six Georgia counties); Deborah
Jones Merrit & Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in Crisis? New
Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 332-98 (1999) (describing jury
verdicts in Franklin County, Ohio over twelve year period); Neil Vidmar &
Mary R. Rose, Punitive Damages by Juries in Florida: In Terrorem and in
Reality, 38 HARv. J. LEGIS. 487, 490-92 (2001) (examining Florida cases from
1988-2000).
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in response to egregious conduct, and are not often collected
in the amounts awarded by juries.
1. Incidence. Empirical studies of punitive damages in
actual cases have found that juries award punitive damages
relatively infrequently. Studies conducted by researchers at
the RAND Corporation found that punitive damages are
only awarded in 1-8% of civil cases.6' Other studies have
found punitive damages to be awarded at similar rates. In
the sample of cases examined by Daniels and Martin,
punitive damages were awarded in only 4.9% of civil cases
and in 8.8% of cases in which the plaintiff prevailed.264
Studies conducted by researchers at the Bureau of Justice
Statistics and the National Center for State Courts both
found that juries awarded punitive damages in roughly 3%
of cases overall and in 6% of cases in which the plaintiff
prevailed.265
Products liability and medical malpractice have
received particular attention as areas in which punitive
damages are supposedly out of control. However, the
empirical studies have found that the incidence of punitive
damages in these types of cases is notably low. The Bureau
of Justice Statistics and National Center for State Courts
studies found that punitive damages were assessed in only
2% of products liability cases and in only 3% of medical
malpractice cases in which the plaintiff prevailed.266 Rustad
263. MOLLER, supra note 262, at 33; PETERSON ET AL., supra note 87, at 9
tbl.2.1. In some jurisdictions, incidence rates were rising, in others rates were
falling. MOLLER, supra note 262, at 34.
264. DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 4, at 214. An earlier study found similar
results, 4.9% and 8.8% respectively. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 23, at 31.
265. See DEFRANCES ET AL., supra note 262, at 5-6; Ostrom et al., supra note
98, at 233, 238. Ostrom et al. found that in two out of three courts punitive
damages were awarded in fewer than 5% of cases in which the plaintiff
prevailed. See id.
266. DEFRANCES ET AL., supra note 262, at tbl. 8; Ostrom et al., supra note
98, at 238. Given plaintiff win rates of approximately one in three in these types
of cases, these rates represent less than 1% of all cases of these types. See id.;
see also Daniels & Martin, supra note 23, at 38 (punitive awarded in 2.9% of
plaintiff wins in medical malpractice cases (0.9% of all medical malpractice
cases) and 8.9% of plaintiff wins in products liability cases (3.5% of all products
liability cases)); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 76, at 1006 (punitive damages are
awarded in less than 1% of decided medical malpractice cases). Two smaller
studies also found that punitive damages were rarely awarded in products
liability cases. Landes and Posner found that punitive damages were awarded
in only 10 of the 172 cases studied (5.8%). Landes & Posner, supra note 262, at
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and Koenig studied both products liability cases and
medical malpractice cases and concluded that punitive
damages are rarely assessed in medical malpractice cases
and that with the exception of asbestos cases, the incidence
of punitive damage awards in product liability cases has
declined since the mid-1980s."' Similarly, Peterson,
Sharma, and Shanley found that juries awarded punitive
damages in only 1-2% of personal injury cases.268 In
contrast, studies have found increases in the incidence of
punitive damage awards in business tort and breach of
contract cases.
These incidence rates are based only on the small
fraction of disputes that result in trials. One major study of
civil litigation found that only 5% of grievances (cases in
which an injury was noticed) were ultimately filed as
cases. 7 Moreover, fewer than 10% of filed cases result in
trials.27' The studies of punitive damages reviewed here
only examine the few cases that actually make it to the trial
stage. Thus, the number of cases that result in punitive
damages represents an even smaller fraction of the total
number of injury incidents. Nonetheless, the prospect of
punitive damages may affect all cases in some way. For
example, the possibility of liability for punitive damages
may have an impact on litigation strategy or settlement
negotiations.272
35. A study by the U.S. G.A.O. found that only 23 of the 305 cases in their
sample (7.5%) resulted in a punitive damage award. See U.S. G.A.O., PRODUCT
LIABILITY, supra note 76, at 29.
267. See Rustad, supra note 76, at 36 (products liability); Rustad & Koenig,
supra note 76, at 1082 (medical malpractice).
268. See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 87, at 12. But see Moller et al., supra
note 75, at 308 (finding that from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, the
incidence of punitive damages in financial injury cases decreased).
269. See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 87, at 12.
270. See Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and
Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 525, 544-45
(1980-81) (of 1000 grievances, 718 were brought to the attention of the
wrongdoer, 449 were not resolved initially between the parties, 103 were
brought to the attention of an attorney, and only 50 were filed as cases); see also
Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1184 (1992).
271. See Saks, supra note 270, at 1212-13. Ostrom et al. found that
appoximately 2.7% of case dispositions are by jury trial. See Ostrom et al.,
supra note 98, at 234.
272. See Tom Baker, Transforming Punishment into Compensation: In the
Shadow of Punitive Damages, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 211; Herbert M. Kritzer &
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2. Size. Not only are punitive damages awarded
infrequently, but they are typically not awarded in
headline-grabbing amounts. As noted above, punitive
damages tend to be closely related in size to compensatory
damages.273 Median awards tend to be relatively low;
several studies have found that the median award is
approximately $50,000.274 Daniels and Martin found that
fifteen of the twenty counties with more than ten punitive
damage awards for the period studied had median punitive
damage awards below $40,000 and thirteen of the twenty
counties had median awards below $30,000.275 Moreover,
studies have found that median awards for the majority of
Frances Kahn Zemans, The Shadow of Punitives: An Unsuccessful Effort to
Bring Them into View, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 157; Thomas Koenig, The Shadow
Effect of Punitive Damages on Settlements, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 169; A. Mitchell
Polinsky, Are Punitive Damages Really Insignificant, Predictable, and Rational?
A Comment on Eisenberg et al., 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 663 (1997) (outlining possible
ways in which threat of punitive damages could influence settlement).
273. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76. Rustad found that in more
than one-third of the products liaiblity cases he studies, the punitive damage
award was lower than the compensatory damage award. See Rustad, supra note
76, at 50. The Bureau of Justice Statistics found that punitive damages were
lower than compensatory damages in more than one-half of cases. DEFRANCES
ET AL., supra note 262, at 10; see also Vidmar & Rose, supra note 262, at 500-01.
274. See DEFRANCES ET AL., supra note 262, at 6; Ostrom et al., supra note
98, at 239 (in tort cases the median was $38,000).
275. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 23, at 42. Combining the above
information about the incidence and size of punitive damages (using the data
presented by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, see DEFRANCES ET AL., supra note
262), the expected punitive damages liability faced by a defendant who reaches
a jury trial can be crudely demonstrated mathematically. Across all jury cases,
plaintiffs win in 51.8% of cases, plaintiffs are awarded punitive damages in
5.9% of the cases they win, and the mean punitive damage award (when there
is one) is $735,000. Thus, the expected punitive damage verdict is $22,463
(51.8% * 5.9% * $735,000). The expected punitive liability in products liability
and medical malpractice cases specifically is even lower. In products liability
cases, the plaintiff win rate is 40.5%, punitive damages are awarded in 2.2% of
plaintiff wins, and the mean punitive award is $12,000 resulting in expected
punitive liability of $107. In medical malpractice cases, the plaintiff win rate is
30.3%, punitive damages are awarded in 3.1% of plaintiff wins, and the mean
punitive awards is $245,000, resulting in expected punitive liability of $2,301.
See DEFRANCES ET AL., supra note 262, at 4 tbl.5; (plaintiff win rates), 8 tbl.8
(punitive damage rates and mean awards). Moreover, this analysis does not
take into account post-trial reductions in punitive awards. Approximately one-
half of punitive damage awards are reduced post-trial and defendants
ultimately pay only approximately 50% of the total award in these cases. See
infra Part III.A.4.
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cases with moderate award size have remained relatively
stable.276
Median awards are consistently lower than mean
awards, suggesting a pattern of a large number of moderate
awards and a few high awards.277 Indeed, Daniels and
Martin found that 88% of punitive damage awards were
lower than the mean award.78 Conversely, extremely high
awards are relatively rare. The National Center for State
Court studies found that only 8% of all jury awards were
greater than $1 million.279 The Bureau of Justice Statistics
study found that less than 25% of punitive damage awards
were greater than $250,000 and less than 12% were greater
than $1 million.28° Increases in punitive damage awards
over time are largely attributable to these few cases with
the largest awards, particularly a few large verdicts in
business and contract cases.
3. Conduct. As noted earlier, punitive damages are
only available when the defendant's conduct is egregious. 82
Therefore, it is not surprising that punitive damage awards
are most likely to be awarded in intentional tort cases.
276. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 23, at 52, 59-60 (finding only a slight
increase in the 25th percentile of cases over time, that punitive awards are a
stable percentage of total awards, and that the ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages has declined); PETERSON ET AL., supra note 87, at 18 fig.
2.2 (showing relatively stable medians). Award levels have also found to be
relatively stable in products liability and medical malpractice cases. See Daniels
& Martin, supra note 23, at 56.
277. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 23, at 41; Ostrom et al., supra note
98, at 239; PETERSON ET AL., supra note 87, at 17.
278. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 23, at 41.
279. See Ostrom et al., supra note 98, at 237 (not taking into account post-
trial reductions in awards).
280. See DEFRANCES ET AL., supra note 262, at 6. They found that during
1991-1992 fewer than one-third of punitive damage awards in medical
malpractice cases were greater than $250,000 and no awards were greater than
$1 million. See id. at 8. In products liability cases no awards were greater than
$250,000 during that time. See id.
281. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 23, at 52 (finding increases in the
75th percentile over time); Moller et al., supra note 75, at 308 (finding that the
amounts awarded in finanical injury cases have increased); PETERSON ET AL.,
supra note 87, at 17 (finding that the size of the largest awards has increased).
282. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
283. See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 87, at 11-13. In the counties studied,
between 33% and 40% of intentional tort cases that resulted in compensatory
damages also resulted in a punitive damage award. MOLLER, supra note 262, at
34.
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Several studies have found that rates of punitive damages
are higher in cases involving fraudulent or intentional
misconduct and in cases involving slander or libel,
employment harassment or discrimination, or unfair
business practices.284  Rustad found several types of
"reprehensible" conduct which repeatedly resulted in
punitive damage awards in products liability cases: "(1)
fraudulent-type misconduct; (2) knowing violations of safety
standards; (3) inadequate testing and manufacturing
procedures; (4) failures to warn of known dangers before
marketing; and (5) post-marketing failures to remedy
known dangers."285 Similarly, Rustad and Koenig found that
the most common basis for punitive damages in medical
malpractice cases was an extreme deviation from the
standard of care.286 These are the types of egregious
behaviors that punitive damages are intended to address.
4. Post-Trial Reductions. Mechanisms such as
remittitur, appellate review, and settlement all contribute
to the post-trial reduction of punitive awards, and judicial
review of damage awards has become increasingly
important.27 Studies that have examined post-trial reduc-
tions in punitive damage awards have found that awards
were commonly reduced post-trial and that plaintiffs rarely
received the amount awarded by the jury.
Peterson, Sarma, and Shanley found that punitive
damage awards were reduced post-trial in approximately
one-half of the cases examined and that, overall, defendants
ultimately paid approximately 50% of the total damages
that were awarded. Moreover, they found reductions were
284. See DEFRANCES ET AL., supra note 262, at 6; MOLLER, supra note 262, at
36; PETERSON ET AL., supra note 87, at 45; Eisenberg et al., Predictability, supra
note 75, at 636-37; Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, supra note 75, at 748-50;
Ostrom et al., supra note 98, at 239-40; Vidmar & Rose, supra note 262, at 494-
95.
285. See Rustad, supra note 76, at 68-73.
286. See Rustand & Koenig, supra note 76, at 1029.
287. See Colleen P. Murphy, Judicial Assessment of Legal Remedies, 94 NW.
U. L. REV. 153, 188-98 (1999); see also supra notes 57-59.
288. See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 87, at 28. Of the thirty-three cases in
their sample that were reversed (one) or reduced (thirty-two), twenty-one were
reduced by settlement between the parties, eleven by the court, and one in a
new trial. See id. Shanley and Peterson obtained similar results, finding that
plaintiffs collected 57% of awards when they contained a punitive component.
See SHANLEY & PETERSON, supra note 262, at 38; see also Ivy E. Broder,
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more likely in cases with higher total awards, higher
punitive damages, and higher punitive to compensatory
damages ratios.89 Awards in medical malpractice and
products liability cases are also quite likely to be reduced
post-trial. 9° Thus, the extremely large punitive damage
awards that attract attention are precisely the awards that
are likely to be reduced in some fashion post-trial. For
example, in the McDonald's coffee spill case, the $2.7
million punitive award was reduced to $480,000 and the
parties settled the case for an undisclosed amount of less
than $600,000.291 The $5 billion punitive damage award
against Exxon in the Valdez oil spill case was recently
overturned as well. 92
Shanley and Peterson offer a number of reasons for the
sizeable reductions of punitive damages post-trial:
First, there is often sharp disagreement about whether or not
punitive damages were appropriately awarded. Second, courts are
more likely to scrutinize punitive damage awards because they
reflect jurors' outrage and, almost by definition, can be claimed to
be a product of jury passions. Third, the basis for determining the
amount of a punitive damage award is much less precise than for a
compensatory award, which usually involves some measure of
economic loss. Punitive damages have no such benchmark. Finally,
defendants will often be insistent on appealing punitive damage
awards to help eliminate the stigma that goes with paying such
awards. In summary, defendants should be especially likely to
appeal punitive damage awards, as both the basis and appropriate
amount are likely to be disputed; and plaintiffs may be more
Characteristics of Million Dollar Awards: Jury Verdicts and Final
Disbursements, 11 JUST. Sys. J. 349, 353 (1986) (studying 198 cases of $1
million or more occurring in 1984-1985 and finding that plaintiffs received the
original amount awarded by the jury or more in slightly more than one-quarter
of the cases); Brian Ostrom et al., So the Verdict Is in--What Happens Next?
The Continuing Story of Tort Awards in the State Courts, 16 JUST. SYs. J. 97,
103 (1993).
289. See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 87, at 30.
290. See U.S. G.A.O., PRODUCT LIABILITY, supra note 76, at 42-43 (products
liability); Landes & Posner, supra note 262 (products liability); Rustad, supra
note 76, at 54-56 (products liability); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 76, at 1012
(medical malpractice); Vidmar et al., supra note 262, at 298 (medical
malpractice).
291. See Hoole, supra note 2, at 470-72.
292. Baker v. Hazelwood, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001) (remanding for the
district court to set a lower award).
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willing to discount such awards to avoid the uncertainty of judicial
resolutions.293
Recent decisions increasing the role of appellate judges
in reviewing punitive damage awards may add fuel to this
trend.294
Due to these post-trial reductions, any increases in the
incidence or size of punitive damage awards may be
mitigated by corresponding increases in the operation of
post-trial reduction mechanisms. Galanter and Luban have
suggested that critics who are concerned about the
unrestrained ability of juries to award large amounts of
punitive damages should not forget the "equally unfettered
discretion of judges in decreasing the size of punitive
awards."295 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. increases
the discretion of appellate courts to reduce awards.296
B. Some Surprising Effects of Punitive Damages Reforms
It is clear that, at the very least, the reality of punitive
damages does not live up to the reform rhetoric-awards
are much more restrained than is commonly thought.
However, it is the perception that there is a problem rather
than empirical findings that tends to drive legislative
action.297 In response to the widespread perception that
juries are "out of control" when it comes to awarding
punitive damages, a number of states have enacted and
implemented a variety of measures designed to address
punitive damage awards. 98 Some of these reforms are
intended to limit punitive damages, either in size (caps) or
frequency (standards of proof). Others are intended to
293. SHANLEY & PETERSON, supra note 262, at 37.
294. See Cooper Indus. Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1678
(2001).
295. Galanter & Luban, supra note 33, at 1409.
296. See 121 S. Ct. at 1689.
297. Songer, supra note 102, at 594 ("In politics, often the perception of
reality has a greater impact on legislative action than the underlying reality
itself.").
298. See generally Hurd & Zollers, supra note 31, at 195-97; Thomas Koenig
& Michael Rustad, The Quiet Revolution Revisited: An Empirical Study of the
Impact of State Tort Reform of Punitive Damages in Products Liability, 16 JUST.
Sys. J. 21, 27-33 (1993); James R. McKown, Punitive Damages: State Trends
and Developments, 14 REv. LITIG. 419 (1995).
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address specific concerns about punitive damages;
bifurcation of the punitive damages portion of the trial
addresses concerns that information about punitive dam-
ages will influence other trial decisions (i.e., liability and
compensatory damages) and split-recovery statutes address
concerns about windfalls to plaintiffs. Some seek to take the
decision-making out of the hands of the jury entirely and
allocate authority to determine punitive damage amounts
to judges. And a few states have attempted to give more
meaning to the jury's task by reforming jury instructions.
However, until very recently, there had been little
experimental examination of the possible effects of these
reforms. A review of the recent research suggests that many
of these reforms may have little effect, and some may in
fact have counterintuitive effects on decision-making.
1. Abolition. While the vast majority of states have
attempted to limit punitive damages in some way, there are
a few states that do not allow punitive damages at all.
These states have abolished punitive damages through
constitutional provision,299 judicial determination,... or
statutory provision.
30 1
Anderson and MacCoun studied the possible effects of
not allowing juries to award punitive damages. They found
that students who were not allowed to award punitive
damages in response to a personal injury scenario awarded
more in compensatory damages (pain and suffering
component) than did those who were allowed to make an
award of punitive damages." 2 Similarly, in their recent
investigation of limits on punitive damages, Greene, Coon,
and Bornstein found that jurors who were not given the
opportunity to award punitive damages awarded more in
compensatory damages than did jurors who were allowed to
make unrestrained punitive damage awards."' Moreover,
they found no differences in the total damages awarded by
the two groups.0 4 The results of these studies suggest that,
299. See NEB. CONST, art. VII, § 5.
300. See Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 1072, 1073-74 (Wash.
1891).
301. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1986) (prohibiting punitive
damages unless specifically authorized by statute).
302. See Anderson & MacCoun, supra note 43, at 319-20.
303. Greene et al., Limiting Awards, supra note 81, at 226.
304. Id. at 228. That is, the compensatory damages awarded by the group
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consciously or unconsciously, jurors who are blocked from
expressing their punitive intent through punitive damages,
will find other mechanisms through which to satisfy their
goals."5
The relevance of these results extends beyond states
that have prohibited punitive damages. Similar conse-
quences could result in cases in which punitive damages are
not requested by the plaintiff, in cases in which the court
holds that an award of punitive damages would not be
warranted and does not allow the jury to consider punitive
damages, or in cases in which decisions about punitive
damages are bifurcated from the rest of the trial.3 6
These results may not surprise all members of the legal
community. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has noted that
"it is generally recognized that if punitive damages are not
allowed, juries give vent to their desire to punish the
wrongdoer under the guise of increasing the compensatory
damages, particularly those awarded for pain and
suffering."0 However, such results indicate that prohibiting
punitive damage awards may not be entirely successful in
eliminating punishment from damage awards.
2. Caps. A number of states have limited the amount
of punitive damages that can be awarded. Some states cap
punitive damage awards at an absolute monetary level,
30
other states allow punitive damages only up to a multiple of
the compensatory damage award,0 9 and still others use
some combination of the two. 10 Caps and multipliers have
been criticized because they do not bear any relationship to
the conduct of the defendant. 1' Because the egregiousness
of the defendant's conduct is not always directly related to
the magnitude of the harm inflicted, many argue that caps
and multipliers give some wrongful defendants a "free
pass."12 In addition, limitations in general are thought to
inhibit the purposes of punitive damages such as deterrence
because they do not allow the damage amount to be large
not allowed to award punitive damages were no different from the total of the
compensatory and punitive damages in the group allowed to award both. Id.
305. See Galanter & Luban, supra note 33, at 1406 ("[Tlhe legal line
between punitive damages and compensatory damages does not accurately
demarcate the presence of motives or perceptions of punishment.").
306. The effects of bifurcation on punitive damages are discussed infra Part
III.B.4.
307. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 447 (Wis. 1980).
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enough in some cases. 1' Finally, limitations on punitive
damage awards are thought by some to invade the province
of the jury and to frustrate individualized assessment of
appropriate punishment and deterrence."4
308. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §51-12-5.1 (2000) ($250,000 unless harm
results from products liability or substance abuse); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1
(Michie 2000) ($350,000).
309. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(1)(a) (2000) (exemplary damages
shall not exceed actual damages); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-240b (2000) (punitive
damages in product liability cases shall not exceed twice the compensatory
damages awarded); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1301.812-A(g) (1999) (except in cases
alleging intentional misconduct, punitive damages against an individual
physician shall not exceed 200% of compensatory damages).
310. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(a)-(b), (d) (2000) (greater of three times
compensatory damages or $500,000, or $1.5 million for physical injuries; for
small businesses, greater of $50,000 or 10% of net worth); ALASKA STAT. §
09.17.020(f)-(g) (Michie 2000) (greater of $500,000 or three times compensatory
damages; where defendant was motivated by financial gain, greatest of four
times compensatory damages, four times financial gain, or $7 million); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (1)(a)-(b) (West 1997) (greater of three times the amount of
compensatory damages or $500,000, or, in certain cases, greater of four times
the amount of compensatory damages or $2 million); IND. CODE § 34-51-3-4
(1998) (greater of three times compensatory damages or $50,000); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3702(e)-(f) (1998) (lesser of defendant's annual gross income, 50% of
net worth, or $5 million; if profit from defendant's misconduct exceeds this
measure, capped at 150% of such profit); NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.005 (1996)
(greater of three times compensatory damages or $300,000 in some cases); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.14 (West 2000) (greater of five times compensatory
damages or $350,000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25(b) (1999) (greater of three times
compensatory damages or $250,000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(4) (1996)
(greater of two times compensatory damages or $250,000); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2315.21(D)(1)(a)-(b) (Anderson 1998) (lesser of three times compensatory
damages or $100,000; for large employers, greater of three times compensatory
damages or $250,000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1(B) (Supp. 2001) (different
caps relative to egregiousness of conduct); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §
41.008(b) (Vernon 1997) (greater of $200,000 or two times economic damages
plus amount equal to non-economic damages not to exceed $750,000).
311. See Thomas M. Melsheimer & Steven H. Stodghill, Due Process and
Punitive Damages: Providing Meaningful Guidance to the Jury, 47 SMU L. REV.
329, 347-48 (1994); see also Polinksy & Shavell, supra note 33, at 900 ("[Calps
cannot be justified on deterrence grounds because they might preclude the
proper award of punitive damages."); Common Sense Legal Standards Reform
Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 10 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. (1995).
312. Melsheimer & Stodghill, supra note 311, at 347.
313. See Hurd & Zollers, supra note 31; Jacqueline Perczek, On Efficiency,
Punishment, Deterrence, and Fairness: A Survey of Punitive Damages Law and
a Proposed Jury Instruction, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 825, 865 (1993); Polinsky &
Shavell, supra note 33, at 900.
314. See Perczek, supra note 313, at 864.
2002] DETERMINING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The experimental research suggests that caps may have
the counterintuitive effects of increasing both the size and
variability of punitive damage awards in some cases.
Psychological theory suggests that caps on punitive
damages may serve to anchor the decisions of jurors.
Anchoring and adjustment is a cognitive bias in which
decision makers begin with an initial value and then adjust
that value to arrive at their final decision. Typically,
decision makers fail to sufficiently adjust away from the
anchor value. 15 Thus, if jurors anchor on the value of the
cap, awards could, paradoxically, be pulled higher in some
cases.
The first experimental study examining caps
investigated the effects of caps on compensatory damage
awards, particularly the pain and suffering component.
Saks, Hollinger, Wissler, Evans, and Hart asked students
to make awards for pain and suffering in response to a
description of an injury; some participants were told that
there was a cap on the amount they could award. They
found that when the plaintiffs injury was more severe, caps
on compensatory damage awards decreased the size and the
variability of compensatory damage awards. 16 However, in
cases in which the plaintiffs injury was less severe, a cap
on compensatory damage awards increased both the size
and variability of the compensatory damage awards. 17 Saks
and his colleagues suggest that the cap served to anchor the
jurors' responses, assimilating their awards toward the
value of the cap."' In a similar study, Hinsz and Indahl
found that mock jurors' damage awards were pulled toward
an anchor value, whether the anchor was presented as a
limit or as a recommendation.319
315. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 193; Barry Markovsky,
Anchoring Justice, 51 SoC. PSYCHOL. Q. 213 (1988).
316. See Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards,
21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 243, 252-53 (1997).
317. See id. at 250-5 1.
318. Id. at 254.
319. Verlin B. Hinsz & Kristin E. Indahl, Assimilation to Anchors for
Damage Awards in a Mock Civil Trial, 25 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 991, 1005,
1010, 1013-15 (1995). Results consistent with anchoring and adjustment
processes have also been obtained in the context of attorney requests for
damage awards. A number of studies have found that as the amount of
compensatory damages requested by the plaintiff increased, the amount of
compensatory damages awarded increased as well. E.g., Gretchen B. Chapman
& Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask For, the More You Get: Anchoring in
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Robbennolt and Studebaker specifically studied the
effect of caps on punitive damage awards. Their results
were similar to the findings of the studies examining
compensatory damages. In two separate studies in which
students were asked to award damages in response to a
personal injury scenario, as the level of the cap on punitive
damages increased, the size and variability of mock jurors'
punitive damage awards increased as well.20 Notably, when
the cap was set high relative to the typical amount of
punitive damages mock jurors awarded in the case in the
absence of the cap, the size and variability of punitive
damage awards were higher than awards in a control
condition in which no cap was presented."'
Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 519, 526, 531 (1996);
Hastie et al., supra note 90, at 454; John Malouff & Nicola S. Schutte, Shaping
Juror Attitudes: Effects of Requesting Different Damages Amounts in Personal
Injury Trials, 129 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 491, 494 (1989); see also Mollie W. Marti &
Roselle L. Wissler, Be Careful What You Ask For: The Effect of Anchors on
Personal Injury Damages Awards, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH: APPLIED 91 (2000)
(finding plaintiff and defense request increased and decreased awards,
respectively, although less so when the request was extreme). Jurors may also
presume that the amount in damages requested by the plaintiff has some
content, that is, that the amount of the request has some relation to the facts of
the case and to the appropriate amount to award. Viscusi also purports to show
an anchoring effect of the amount requested by the plaintiffs attorney. Viscusi,
supra note 106, at 329. However, the introduction of the plaintiffs request as an
anchor was accompanied by several arguments by the plaintiff about why a
high award would be appropriate (e.g., the relevance of net worth and profits,
suggestions about how to calculate the award, the necessity of protecting the
public, the need to get the defendant's attention etc.). Id. at 348. The arguments
provided confound the findings about the plaintiffs request as an anchor; it is
impossible to distinguish the effect of the plaintiffs request from the effects of
the persuasive arguments. Viscusi also examined the possible anchoring effects
caused by media reporting and found that providing participants with a media
report of a "similar case" influenced their punitive damage awards. Id. at 329;
see also Guthrie et al., supra note 192 (anchoring effect of diversity amount on
judges' damage awards); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Opening Offers and
Out-of-Court Settlement: A Little Moderation May Not Go a Long Way, 10 OHIO
ST. J. DISPUTE RES. 1, 18-19 (1994) (anchoring effect of first offer in settlement
negotiation).
320. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in
the Courtroom: The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 353, 359, 361, 364-66 (1999).
321. See id. at 359; see also Greene et al., Limiting Awards, supra note 81,
at 225 (finding that relatively low caps reduced awards). Some states explicitly
provide that the jury is not to be informed of the cap. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-
11-21(g) (2000) ("jury may neither be instructed nor informed" of the cap); FLA.
STAT. § 768.73(8) (2000) ("jury may neither be instructed nor informed" of the
cap); IND. CODE § 34-51-3-3 (1998) (jury "may not be advised of' the cap); NEV.
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Studies have found that jury awards are highly
positively skewed such that the great majority of cases
result in low and moderate awards and only a few cases
result in high awards. 22 Accordingly, even with relatively
moderate caps, a great many cases may be susceptible to
the effects described here. Thus, while the intuition and the
intent of tort reformers is that caps should keep awards
down, the available experimental evidence suggests that
caps on punitive damages could result in higher levels of
punitive damages across cases."'
REV. STAT. § 42.005(3) (1996) ("jury must not be instructed, or otherwise
advised" of the cap); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.16 (West 2000) ("jury shall not
be informed of the cap on punitive damages"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25(c) (1999)
(cap "shall not be made know to the trier of fact through any means, including
voir dire, the introduction into evidence, argument, or instructions to the jury");
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(4) (1996) ("jury may not be informed" of the cap);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(F) (Anderson 1998) ("[T]he court shall not
instruct the jury with respect to the limits on punitive or exemplary
damages.., and neither counsel for any party nor a witness shall inform the
jury or potential jurors of those limits."); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie
2000) ("jury shall not be advised of the" cap); see also Michael S. Kang, Don't
Tell Juries About Statutory Damage Caps: The Merits of Nondisclosure, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 469 (1999) (arguing that juries should not be told about damage
caps). However, the effectiveness of such a "blindfolding" provision assumes
that jurors will not know about the cap. If any juror has information about the
cap, the anchoring effect of the cap may still occur. Moreover, jurors may have
incomplete or incorrect information about damages caps. For example, a juror
may be aware that there is a cap, but be incorrect about the level of the cap. To
the extent that jurors are not informed about the cap and their assumptions
about the law of damages vary (i.e., some juries end up with correct
information, others end up with varying degrees of incorrect information),
blindfolding the jury may result in even greater variability. See Diamond &
Casper, supra note 143, at 518; see also Guthrie et al., supra note 192, at 793
(demonstrating that judges are susceptible to anchoring effects). Because judges
will be aware of any damage cap, such caps might influence punitive damage
awards determined by judges.
322. See generally Daniels & Martin, supra note 23.
323. The results of archival studies are mixed. Eisenberg and his colleagues
conducted an analysis of civil trial outcomes from forty-five counties in 1996 in
which they compared the rates of punitive damage awards in states with caps
on punitive damage awards to states without punitive damage caps. They found
no significant differences in the frequency or size of punitive damage awards
between states with and states without punitive damage caps. Eisenberg et al.,
Juries, Judges, supra note 75, at 769-70; see also Patricia Danzon, The
Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 49 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 57, 77-79 (1986) (finding that caps reduce total awards in medical
malpractice cases); William P. Gronfein & Eleanor DeArman Kinney,
Controlling Large Mal Claims: The Unexpected Impact of Damage Caps, 16 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 441 (1991) (finding that awards in Indiana (with cap)
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Caps may also have paradoxical effects on litigation
strategy, particularly the settlement of cases. The presence
of a cap on punitive damages is likely to influence the
expectations that litigants and attorneys have about
potential outcomes at trial in ways that might affect
pretrial bargaining. In a series of studies, Babcock and
Pogarsky experimentally examined the effects of damage
caps on negotiation patterns. 4 They found that when a
damage cap was low enough to prohibit many awards that
the participants might have predicted, participants who
were subject to the cap were marginally more likely to
settle and to settle at lower amounts than were those for
whom damages were not capped. 325 However, when the cap
was high relative to participants' expectations, they found
that participants in the capped condition were less likely to
reach a settlement than were those in the uncapped
condition.326
Babcock and Pogarsky found evidence that these effects
of damage caps on settlement were mediated by the
participants' judgments about the probable result at trial.
Consistent with a growing body of research on the effects of
egocentric biases on settlement negotiations, they found
that plaintiffs made higher estimates of the factfinder's
likely award than did defendants.327 This is an example of
are higher than awards in Michigan and Ohio (with no caps)). Frank A. Sloan
et al., Effects of Tort Reform on Value of Closed Medical Malpractice Claims, 14
J. HEALTH PO.. POL'Y & L. 663 (1989) (finding no effect of limitations on punitive
damages, but finding caps on non-economic award or total award reduced size of
indemnity payments).
324. See Linda Babcock & Greg Pogarsky, Damage Caps and Settlement: A
Behavioral Approach, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 341 (1999) [hereinafter Babcock &
Pogarsky, A Behavioral Approach]; Greg Pogarsky & Linda Babcock, Damage
Caps, Motivated Anchoring, and Bargaining Impasse, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 143
(2001) [hereinafter Pogarsky & Babcock, Damage Caps]. In each study,
participants were assigned to the roles of either plaintiff or defendant, provided
with case facts, and asked to attempt to negotiate a settlement. Legal fees were
assessed based on the length of time spent in reaching a settlement and
students were graded based on the settlement results. Participants were either
told there was a cap on damage awards or were told nothing about a cap. A
Behavioral Approach, supra, at 359-63; Damage Caps, supra, at 150-53.
325. Babcock & Pogarsky, A Behavioral Approach, supra note 324, at 362
(the plaintiffs request was $1 million, the average settlement in the uncapped
condition was $490,000, and the cap was set at $250,000).
326. Pogarsky & Babcock, Damage Caps, supra note 324, at 154 (cap set at
$1 million); see also Robbennolt & Studebaker, supra note 320.
327. See Babcock & Pogarsky, A Behavioral Approach, supra note 324, at
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egocentric bias, a cognitive heuristic under which a decision
maker perceives and interprets information and forms
expectations in a manner that is favorable to the decision
maker.2s In addition, the cap served to anchor participants'
predictions of judge's likely award.3 29 Thus, when the cap
was relatively low, the disparity between the predictions of
the plaintiffs and defendants was smaller in the capped
condition than it was in the uncapped condition, facilitating
settlement."' However, when the cap was relatively high,
plaintiffs' estimates increased to a greater degree than did
defendants' estimates. 31 This disparity in the effects of a
relatively high cap on plaintiffs' and defendants' predictions
about trial outcomes discouraged settlement by increasing
the discrepancy between the parties' positions.
363-64; Pogarsky & Babcock, Damage Caps, supra note 324, at 155. Several
studies have demonstrated that litigants form expectations about potential
outcomes in a self-serving manner. In these studies, participants who were
provided with the same case information, but were randomly assigned to the
roles of plaintiff and defendant, made self-serving judgments about the case,
with plaintiffs making higher estimates of a factfinder's likely award and of an
objectively fair award than defendants. See, e.g., Linda Babcock et al., Biased
Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1337 (1995); Linda
Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of
Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109 (1997); George Loewenstein et al.,
Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pre-Trial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL
STUD. 135 (1993); Leigh Thompson & George Loewenstein, Egocentric
Interpretations of Fairness and Negotiation, 51 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 176 (1992).
328. See MAX BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 99-
101 (4th ed. 1998); see also Eisenberg, supra note 194 (bankruptcy judges);
Guthrie et al., supra note 192, at 811-16 (judges' reversal rates); Albert H.
Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. ABNORMAL &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 129 (1954) (Princeton/Dartmouth football game); David. M.
Messick & Keith Sentis, Fairness and Preference, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 418 (1979) (mechanisms for compensating joint work); Ross & Sicoly,
supra note 194 (estimating percentage of household work performed).
329. See Babcock & Pogarsky, A Behavioral Approach, supra note 324, at
363-64; Pogarsky & Babcock, Damage Caps, supra note 324, at 155.
330. See Babcock & Pogarsky, A Behavioral Approach, supra note 324, at
364.
331. See Pogarsky & Babcock, Damage Caps, supra note 324, at 155.
332. These two studies investigate the effect of caps on total damages,
rather than caps only on punitive damages (leaving compensatory damages
unlimited). It is possible that if compensatory damages, particularly general
damages, were unlimited, these effects might be attenuated. While further
study is warranted, the results are nonetheless instructive about the
unintended effects that caps might have on settlement.
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3. Standard of Proof. In recent years, many states
have heightened the evidentiary standard of proof that
must be met in order to impose punitive damages, requiring
"clear and convincing" evidence for a punitive damage
award.333 While the standard for proving the defendant's
compensatory liability in these states remains by a
preponderance of the evidence, once such liability is proven,
the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that punitive damages are warranted. This higher burden
of proof strikes the balance between the fact that punitive
damages are awarded in a lawsuit between two private
parties and the fact that punitive damages are assessed in
order to punish the defendant.334 One state, Colorado, has
adopted the even higher "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard for the determination of punitive damages. 35 The
remaining states continue to use the preponderance of
evidence standard. The effectiveness of adopting a higher
standard of proof for punitive damages assumes that jurors
can distinguish between the varying standards and apply
them appropriately.
Little empirical research has examined jurors' response
to differing standards of proof in civil trials. However, the
existing research suggests that the stated standard of proof
may have little impact on decision-making. Kagehiro and
Stanton asked students to render verdicts in civil cases
using traditional legal instructions describing one of the
three evidentiary standards. They found that participants'
liability verdicts were unaffected by the standard they were
instructed to use.336 More research is needed to determine
333. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a) (Supp. 2000); ALASKA STAT. §
09.17.020m (Michie 2000); CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294(a) (West 1997); FLA STAT.
ANN. § 768.725 (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (2000); IDAHO CODE §
6-1604(1) (Michie 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-2 (1998); IOWA CODE §
668A.1(1)(a) (1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(c) (1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
549.20(a) (West 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1)(a) (1999); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-1-221(5) (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.005 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:15-5.12 (West 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15(b) (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE §
32-03.2-11(1) (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(D)(2) (Anderson 1998);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1(B) (Supp. 2001); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18.537(1)
(1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-33-135 (1993); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
41.003 (Vernon 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(1)(a) (2000); see also UNIF.
MODEL PUNITIVE DAMAGES ACT §5 (1996).
334. See Hurd & Zollers, supra note 31, at 201.
335. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-127(2) (West 1997).
336. Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified
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the robustness of these findings. Moreover, there are no
studies specifically examining the impact of the standard of
proof on punitive damage awards.
It is possible that even if raising the standard of proof
did impact the frequency with which defendants are found
liable for punitive damages, the impact might not be in the
direction intended. It has been suggested that, in practice,
requiring clear and convincing evidence that punitive dam-
ages are warranted could operate contrary to proponents'
intentions:
Though "clear and convincing" is a higher legal burden than
proving liability by a preponderance of the evidence, the new
standard may work in a plaintiffs favor for common-sense
reasons. The term "by a preponderance of the evidence" is often
explained to the jury as 51% or the majority of the evidence. It
could raise in the jurors' minds a mathematical requirement, a
ratio, or an amount that must outweigh the opponent's evidence.
"Clear and convincing" on the other hand, is soley [sic] ends
oriented. The law mentions nothing of a specific amount of
evidence required, but rather focuses on the feelings of the
jury .... The standard thus becomes subjective in orientation and
focuses on quality rather than quantity. Whether this will make
337
any difference at all as a practical matter remains to be seen.
Thus, while an increased standard of proof should make
it more difficult for jurors to find punitive damages liability,
there is some indication from previous research that little
or no effect is likely. Moreover, the intuition of some
commentators is that any effect might be to reduce the
barriers to findings of punitive liability. A more definitive
answer awaits research specifically examining the effect of
the standard of proof on punitive damages. 38
Definitions of Standards of Proof, 9 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 164, 168 (1985).
(finding some differences between standards if the standards were expressed in
quantified terms).
337. Crump, supra note 33, at 176 n.8 (citing Jan Woodward Fox & Kate
McConnico, Punitive Damages in Texas 1995: Chapter 41 of the Texas Civil
Practice & Remedies Code, 21 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 21, 27 (1996)) (emphasis
added).
338. The symbolic function of such standards should not be ignored. Even if
such standards prove to have little effect, they may still serve the expressive
function of communicating a different balance of interests.
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4. Bifurcation. Another reform that many states have
adopted is the bifurcation of the trial into two parts,
separating the issue of punitive damages from the rest of
the trial.9 This is done out of a concern that some
information relevant to a determination of punitive dam-
ages, such as the wealth of the defendant, may prejudice
the jury in its initial determination of liability." In recent
years, bifurcation of punitive damage claims has been one
of the fastest growing areas of bifurcation under Rule 42(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.341
Landsman and his colleagues experimentally examined
the effects of bifurcating the issue of punitive damages.
Jury-eligible adults were asked to review a videotaped trial
in a case involving exposure to a toxic substance and to
assess liability and damages. They found that individual
jurors who heard punitive damages testimony in a
bifurcated trial were less likely to find the defendant liable
for the injuries to the plaintiff than were mock jurors who
339. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(a) (Michie 1997) (separate
proceeding shall be conducted to determine amount of punitive damages); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3295(d) (West 1997) (defendant may apply for separate proceeding);
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(2) (2000) (trial shall be recommenced to determine
amount of punitive damages); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(a) (1992) (amount of
punitive damages shall be determined in a separate proceeding); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 459.20(3) (West 2000) (separate proceeding to determine liability for and
amount of punitive damages); Mo. REV. STAT. § 510.263(1) (2001) (any party
may request bifurcated trial for punitive damages); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-
221(7)(a) (1996) (separate proceeding to determine amount of punitive
damages); NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.005 (1999) (separate proceeding to determine
amount of punitive damages); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.13 (West 2000)
(defendant may request bifurcation of punitive damages); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-
30 (2000) (defendant may request bifurcation of punitive damages); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-03.2-11 (1999) (either party may elect to bifurcate punitive damages);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (West 2001) (any party may request bifurcation
of punitive damages); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1 (West 2001) (amount of
punitive damage to be determined in a separate proceeding); 40 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1301.812-A(e) (West 1999) (punitive damages shall be bifurcated); TEX.
Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.009 (Vernon 2001) (defendant may request
bifurcation of amount of punitive damages); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(2)
(1996) (evidence of defendant's financial condition admissible only after finding
of punitive liability); see also UNIF. MODEL PUNITIVE DAMAGES ACT § 11
(permitting bifurcation of punitive damage claim).
340. Hurd & Zollers, supra note 31, at 197; see also Edith Greene et al., The
Effects of Defendant Conduct on Jury Damage Awards, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
228, 232 (2001) (finding influence of nature of defendant's conduct on
compensatory damage awards).
341. Landsman et al., supra note 180, at 305; FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b).
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made this decision in a unitary trial. 42 However, jurors who
found compensatory liability in bifurcated trials were more
likely to find the defendant liable for punitive damages and
awarded larger amounts of punitive damages than jurors
who found liability in unitary trials.343 Landsman concluded
that bifurcation may have effects that work at cross-
purposes. On the one hand, bifurcation may protect
defendants by preventing information that is relevant only
to punitive damages from influencing compensatory
liability decisions. Conversely, defendants who lose on
liability in a bifurcated trial face the prospect of a more
likely and larger punitive damage award. Similar results
were obtained by Greene, Woody, and Winter who asked
jury-eligible adults to award both compensatory and
punitive damages in either a products liability case, an
automobile negligence case, or a medical malpractice case.
They found that jurors' punitive damage awards were
higher in bifurcated trials than in unitary trials in all three
cases. 345
Horowitz and Bordens examined the effects of
bifurcation in a toxic tort case. They found that jury-eligible
adults were more likely to find the defendant liable for the
plaintiffs injuries in the unitary trial than in the bifurcated
trial.346 They also found higher damage awards in the
bifurcated trial, although they found higher compensatory
damage awards rather than higher punitive damage
awards. 47 Similarly, Robbennolt and Studebaker found that
students awarded similar amounts in punitive damages,
but higher compensatory damages in a unitary trial.348
Thus, there is experimental evidence that there is
spillover or leakage between punitive damages and liability
in unitary trials and that bifurcation can help to prevent
such confusion. However, the research also suggests that
342. Landsman et al., supra note 180, at 316. This pattern did not hold for
jurors who deliberated as a group. Id. at 322; see also Hans Zeisel & Thomas
Callahan, Split Trials and Time Savings: A Statistical Analysis, 76 HARV. L.
REV. 1606 (1963) (finding lower rates of liability in bifurcated trials than in
unitary trials in a sample of federal civil trials).
343. Id. at 323-24.
344. Id. at 334.
345. Greene et al., Is Bifurcation Necessary?, supra note 81, at 198.
346. Horowitz & Bordens, supra note 82, at 278-79.
347. Id.
348. Robbennolt & Studebaker, supra note 320, at 364-65.
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the effects of bifurcation are complex and that bifurcation
may ultimately result in increased amounts of damages
(compensatory or punitive) awarded against defendants
who are found liable for the plaintiffs injuries.
5. Split-Recovery Statutes. In theory, plaintiffs are
fully compensated through compensatory damages; punitive
damages are awarded when an additional amount is
required to adequately punish and deter the defendant.
Responding to concerns that plaintiffs receiving a punitive
damage award are receiving a windfall and that, accord-
ingly, the punitive damage system is akin to a lottery or a
jackpot, a number of states have enacted legislation that
allocate some portion of the punitive damage award to the
state. 49 The portion of the award allocated to the state is
349. These are often referred to as "split-recovery" statutes. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(j) (Michie 1997) (50% to general state fund); GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-12-5(e)(2) (2000) (in products liability actions, 75% less costs and fees
to Office of the Treasury and Fiscal Services); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 2-
1207 (West 1992) (court may apportion award among plaintiff, plaintiffs
attorney, and State Department of Human Services); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-
6 (West 1999) (75% to Violent Crimes Victims Compensation Fund); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 668A.1(2) (West 1998) (under some circumstances, 75% to civil
reparations trust fund); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675 (1997) (50% to Tort Victims'
Compensation Fund); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18.540 (1999) (60% to Criminal
Injuries Compensation Account); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2105(3) (2001) (court has
discretion to select organization(s) "engaged in charitable or educational
activities involving the fine arts" to receive award); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-
1(3) (2000) (50% of amount in excess of $20,000 less fees and costs to general
state fund). But see ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(1) (1999) (no portion of the punitive
damage award shall be allocated to the state). See generally James A. Breslo,
Taking the Punitive Damage Windfall away from the Plaintiff: An Analysis, 86
Nw. U. L. REV. 1130 (1992); Richard W. Murphy, Superbifurcation: Making
Room for State Prosecution in the Punitive Damages Process, 76 N.C. L. REV.
463 (1998).
Provisions allocating punitive damage awards to the state have been
challenged on constitutional grounds in some states. A Colorado provision was
held unconstitutional in violation of the takings clauses of the state and federal
constitutions. Kirk v. Denver Publ'g Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991). But see
State v. Mosley, 436 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993), cert. denied 511 U.S. 1107 (1994)
(holding that GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) does not violate takings clauses of
state and federal constitions).
Split-recovery statutes may also raise constitutional questions under the
Excessive Fines Clause of the U.S. Constitution. In Browning-Ferris Indus. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause
does not apply to punitive damages awards "in cases between private parties."
492 U.S. 257, 260 (1989). Accordingly, the Court held that "when the
government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a
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typically distributed to a state general revenue fund or to
some specific fund, such as a fund to compensate tort
victims. Measures like these are intended to remove at least
some of the windfall to the plaintiff without directly
inhibiting the deterrence and punishment functions of
punitive damages by limiting their size.35 ° Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that:
Punitive damages are generally seen as a windfall to plaintiffs,
who are entitled to receive full compensation for their injuries-
but no more. Even assuming that a punitive "fine" should be
imposed after a civil trial, the penalty should go to the State, not
to the plaintiff-who by hypothesis is fully compensated. 
51
However, in eliminating or reducing the benefits to the
plaintiff, such measures may decrease the incentive for
private law enforcement.3"
It is the intuition of many that allocating punitive
damage awards to the state will result in an increase in the
size of such awards. First, it is thought that if punitive
damages are awarded to the state, jurors will be relieved of
any concern about awarding a windfall to the plaintiff and
will feel free to fully punish the defendant.353 Second,
because judges and jurors are residents and taxpayers in
the states that would be receiving the award, they have
some interest in the amount of the award and, accordingly,
may award higher amounts in punitive damages than they
would if the entire award was to go to the plaintiff.3"'
Moreover, if the portion of the punitive damage award
allocated to the state is directed to a state fund which jurors
share of the damages awarded," the Excessive Fines Clause is not implicated.
Id. at 264. Thus, the Court stopped short of holding the Excessive Fines Clause
applicable only to criminal cases, but limited its holding to those cases in which
the government did not play a role in the prosecution or collect any of the
proceeds. This ruling leaves open the question of whether the clause would
place limits on awards if the state were to participate more directly, especially if
the state were to receive a portion of the punitive damages award.
350. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 33, at 921; Hoole, supra note 2, at 481.
351. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
352. Dede W. Welles, Charitable Punishment: A Proposal to Award Punitive
Damages to Nonprofit Organizations, 9 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 203, 204-05
(1998).
353. E. Jeffrey Grube, Punitive Damages: A Misplaced Remedy, 66 S. CAL.
L. REV. 839, 855 (1993).
354. Michelle Riley Stephens, Punitive Damages: Making the Plaintiff Whole
or Making the State Wealthy?, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 698, 700 (1996); Jury
Determination of Punitive Damages, supra note 240, at 1535.
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perceive as a "good cause," the temptation again, may be to
increase the punitive damages assessed.' One commenta-
tor stated the intuition thus: "If jurors realized that any
punitive damage award were to be returned to public use,
the size of the awards would not simply skyrocket. They
would follow the Voyager spacecraft out of the solar
system.""6 Indeed, in response to such concerns, some states
do not inform the jury that part of the punitive damage
award will go to the state.357
However, the only experimental study to examine the
effect of allocating the punitive damage award to the state
rather than to the plaintiff found that such measures had
precisely the opposite effect. In two studies, Anderson and
MacCoun asked students to award damages in response to
a personal injury case; in some conditions the punitive
damages awarded were to go to the plaintiff, in other
conditions the award was to go to the state. They found that
jurors were more likely to award punitive damages when
they were to be awarded to the plaintiff than when they
were to be awarded to the state and found no differences in
the size of the punitive damages awarded."' This was true
both when the state treasury was to receive the award359
and when a consortium of relatively uncontroversial state
funds was to receive the award.36 ° Anderson and MacCoun
suggest that perhaps punitive damages serve a symbolic
restorative function that is dependent upon receipt by the
plaintiff. 361 In such a relational capacity, punitive damages
355. Jury Determination of Punitive Damages, supra note 240, at 1535-36.
356. Steven J. Sensibar, Punitive Damages: A Look at Origins and
Legitimacy, 41 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 375, 387 (1991).
357. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(g) (1999) ("jury may neither be instructed
nor informed"); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-3 (West 1999) (jury may not be
informed of the allocation of punitive damage awards). But see supra note 321
(discussing the risks of blindfolding a jury to this kind of information).
358. Anderson & MacCoun, supra note 43, at 320-21.
359. Id. (study 1).
360. Id. at 325 (study 2). The charities used were adapted from the tax
donation charities listed on the 1995 California state income tax form: State
Children's Trust Fund for the Prevention of Child Abuse, California Breast
Cancer Research Fund, California Firefighters' Memorial Fund, California
Public School Library Protection Fund, and California Infectious Disease
Research Fund. Id. at 323.
361. Id. at 326-27; see also G. Bazemore & M. Umbreit, Rethinking the
Sanctioning Function in Juvenile Court: Retributive or Restorative Responses to
Youth Crime, 41 CRIME & DELINQ. 296 (1995).
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may advance a societal interest in mending the breach
caused by the defendant's reprehensible actions.362
6. Judge-Determined Punitive Damages. Responding to
popular concerns about juries and punitive damages, a
number of observers have advocated that "[the most
obvious first step in promoting predictability and
rationality is for judges instead of juries to make the
primary determination of punitive awards."63 This type of
reform is usually justified by arguments that judges are
less susceptible to bias and prejudice and are more
qualified, through training and experience, to determine
damages.364 In his concurrence in BMW of North America v.
Gore, Justice Breyer noted that one cannot "expect those
jurors to interpret law like judges, who work within a
362. See also Baron & Ritov, supra note 119, at 25. The authors found that
twenty-four of eighty-three participants were awarded greater amounts of
compensation when the money was to be paid directly to the plaintiff than when
a penalty was to go to the government, which would then compensate the
injured party (only four participants awarded less). They concluded that "many
people assign compensation not in terms of the injury but rather in terms of
setting the balance right between the injurer, if any, and the victim." Id. at 31
363. Problems and Proposals, supra note 240, at 1802; see also Sunstein et
al., supra note 70, at 2127 ("[An incremental shift from jury to judicial
determinations of punitive damages appears to be the most promising [of
proposed reforms].").
364. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 37; Mallor & Roberts, supra note 244;
Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages: On the Path to a Principled
Approach, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1001, 1012 (1999); Mogin, supra note 240; Lisa M.
Sharkey, Judge or Jury: Who Should Assess Punitive Damages?, 64 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1089 (1996); Viscusi, supra note 71. Specifically addressing the result of
the Landsman et al. study of bifurcation, Mallor and Roberts argue that "It
seems unlikely that this inflationary effect [of larger punitive damage awards in
bifurcated trials than unified trials] would occur if the judge, rather than the
jury, were assessing the damages." Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: On the
Path to a Principled Approach, supra, at 1012; cf. Landsman et al., supra note
180, at 335-36. But see David Luban, A Flawed Case Against Punitive Damages,
87 GEO. L.J. 359, 362 (1998):
The contrast between juries and judges is remarkable: jurors award
punitive damages in only one or two plaintiffs victories in fifty, and
make large awards in only a small fraction of those; but judges remit in
one punitive damages case out of two. Critics of punitive damages
frequently complain about the unfettered discretion of juries to award
punitive damages of any size that tickles their fancy, but these same
critics conveniently neglect the equally unfettered discretion of judges
to reduce awards without explanation. Compared with remitting
judges, jurors are models of restraint.
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discipline and hierarchical organization that normally pro-
motes roughly uniform interpretation and application of the
law. 365
Consistent with this reasoning, a few states have
decided to allow judges to assess the amount of punitive
damages to be awarded rather than juries.366 Under these
provisions, the jury determines compensatory damages
(both liability and amount) and determines liability for
punitive damages; then the judge steps in and fixes the
amount of punitive damages to be awarded. Even where the
judge has not been specifically allocated the power to
determine punitive damage awards in all cases, judges
determine punitive damages in bench trials and have some
measure of control over punitive damage awards through
evidentiary rulings, the decision whether to allow a claim
for punitive damages, and the formulation of jury
instructions. In addition, judges have a central role in
reviewing jury awards of punitive damages for
excessiveness .36
However, the empirical evidence described above
demonstrates notable similarity in the decision-making of
jurors and judges.366 In particular, the existing research
lends little clear support for the contention that judges
would make smaller or more consistent punitive damage
awards. Specifically, judges report a high degree of
agreement with jury verdicts and archival studies report
striking similarities in decision-making (and even find that
365. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 596 (1996) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
366. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., § 52-240b (West 1991) (court shall
determine amount of punitive damages); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702 (court shall
conduct separate hearing to determine amount of punitive damages); see also,
e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2805(d)(2) (1994) (exemplary damages to be determined by the
court, rather than by the jury); MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT §
120(B). For discussion about whether judicial determination of punitive
damages violates the right to trial by jury guaranteed in the Seventh
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, see Charles Jared Knight, State-Law
Punitive Damage Schemes and the Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial in
the Federal Courts, 14 REv. LITIG. 657 (1995); Murphy, supra note 287;
Scheiner, supra note 186. While at least one state supreme court has upheld a
statute providing for judicial assessment of punitive damages, Smith v. Printup,
866 P.2d 985 (Kan. 1993), at least one other state has found such a statute
unconstitutional. Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397 (Ohio 1994).
367. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 524
(2001).
368. See supra Part II.D.
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plaintiffs are often more successful in front of judges than
before juries). Certainly, the research cannot rule out the
possibility of systematic differences in the punitive
damages decisions of judges and jurors in some circum-
stances. In particular several studies show a greater
tendency on the part of jurors to find punitive liability,
although others find no differences. To the extent that
judges determine that punitive damages are legally
inappropriate in these cases, they may refuse to instruct
the jury about punitive damages. Empirical research that
identifies the circumstances under which differences
between judges and jurors emerge and that paints a more
nuanced picture of the conditions under which differences
emerge will go a long way toward informing our
understanding of punitive damages decision-making. In the
meantime, it does not appear that reforms that reallocate
punitive damages decision-making to judges will have the
dramatic effects that proponents expect.
7. Jury Instructions. Traditionally, juries have been
empowered to use their discretion to determine whether or
not an award of punitive damages is justified, and if so, in
what amount.369 However, the instructions that are pro-
vided to guide the jury's use of discretion in making these
decisions generally provide little assistance. The following
instruction is typical:
If you find that the defendant's conduct was willful and wanton
and proximately caused injury to the plaintiff and if you believe
that justice and the public good require it, you may, in addition to
any other damages to which you find the plaintiff entitled, award
an amount which will serve to punish the defendant and to deter
the defendant and others from similar conduct.
3 7 0
Vague instructions such as this one raise the concern
that juries are not being given sufficient guidance.
Melsheimer and Stodghill argue that such vague instruc-
tions are "little better than advising the jury to 'do the right
thing.' The jury is given no guidepost with which to
measure whether one million dollars or one hundred is
369. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991); Melsheimer
& Stodghill, supra note 311, at 331.
370. ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES, ILL.
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CVIL 35.01 (2000).
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appropriate punishment."37' Given the finding that jurors
have difficulty translating their outrage into a dollar
amount,... this lack of guidance should be of significant
concern.
The U.S. Supreme Court has evaluated jury
instructions on punitive damages on several occasions. In
Haslip, the Court found that the jury's inherent discretion
was adequately limited by confining the jury to the
purposes of punitive damages-punishment and deter-
rence-by requiring the jury to take into account the
character and degree of the wrong, and by reminding the
jury that they were not required to award any punitive
damages. 73 However, Justice O'Connor, in dissent, noted:
371. Melsheimer & Stodghill, supra note 311, at 337. At least one state
supreme court has concluded that "BMW demands that we articulate objective
standards for the imposition of punitive damages that can be communicated to
the jury in the form of instructions and against which the imposition of the
punitive award can be weighed in the process of judicial review." Farmers Ins.
Exch. v. Shirley, 958 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Wyo. 1998) (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)); see also id. at 1053 ("[Tlhe only sensible approach is
to tell the arbiter of punitive damages [the jury] what the rules are."); Geressy
v. Digital Equip. Corp., 950 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) ("If the jury is to
accomplish its task under the Seventh Amendment, it is entitled to be informed
of its role."). Lack of guidance to the jury may also create difficulty for reviewing
courts. If juries are not given meaningful standards to apply to the facts in
order to determine whether and in what amount punitive damages should be
awarded, it is difficult for a trial or appellate court to adequately review the
jury's decision. Further, appellate review of punitive damages without adequate
standards to guide the court becomes merely the court substituting its
standardless determination for the jury's standardless determination.
Melsheimer & Stodghill, supra note 311, at 338-39. Ellis notes that without
more meaningful standards to guide decisions about punitive damages, "judicial
decisions reducing large awards make little contribution to consistency and
certainty; they merely reduce the probability that very large awards will be
upheld." Ellis, supra note 32, at 55.
372. See supra Part II.C.2.
373. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1991). The trial
court instructed the jury:
Now, if you find that fraud was perpetrated then in addition to
compensatory damages you may in your discretion, when I use the
word discretion, I say you don't have to even find fraud, you wouldn't
have to, but you may, the law says you may award an amount of money
known as punitive damages.
This amount of money is awarded to the plaintiff but it is not to
compensate the plaintiff for any injury. It is to punish the defendant.
Punitive means to punish or it is also called exemplary damages, which
means to make an example. So, if you feel or not feel, but if you are
reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the plaintiff, whatever
plaintiff you are talking about, has had a fraud perpetrated upon them
2002] DETERMINING PUNITIVE DAMAGES 187
States routinely authorize civil juries to impose punitive damages
without providing them any meaningful instructions on how to do
so. Rarely is a jury told anything more specific than "do what you
think best."
... [There is] a strong need to provide juries with standards to
constrain their discretion so that they may exercise their power
wisely, not capriciously or maliciously. The Constitution requires
as much.374
O'Connor concluded that the instruction at issue
"identified the ultimate destination, but did not tell the jury
how to get there. Due process may not require a detailed
roadmap, but it certainly requires directions of some
sort.""' Making a similar assessment of the instruction at
issue in TXO, 6 Justice O'Connor concluded in dissent that
and as a direct result they were injured and in addition to compen-
satory damages you may in your discretion award punitive damages.
Now, the purpose of awarding punitive or exemplary damages is to
allow money recovery to the plaintiffs, it does to the plaintiff, by way of
punishment to the defendant and for the added purpose of protecting
the public by detering [sic] the defendant and others from doing such
wrong in the future. Imposition of punitive damages is entirely
discretionary with the jury, that means you don't have to award it
unless this jury feels that you should do so.
Should you award punitive damages, in fixing the amount, you must
take into consideration the character and the degree of the wrong as
shown by the evidence and necessity of preventing similar wrong.
499 U.S. at 6 n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
374. Id. at 42-43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
375. Id. at 49.
376. In TXO, the jury was instructed:
In addition to actual or compensatory damages, the law permits the
jury, under certain circumstances, to make an award of punitive
damages, in order to punish the wrongdoer for his misconduct, to serve
as an example or warning to others not to engage in such conduct and
to provide additional compensation for the conduct to which the injured
parties have been subjected.
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that TXO Production
Corp. is guilty of wanton, wilful, malicious or reckless conduct which
shows an indifference to the right of others, then you may make an
award of punitive damages in this case.
In assessing punitive damages, if any, you should take into
consideration all of the circumstances surrounding the particular
occurrence, including the nature of the wrongdoing, the extent of the
harm inflicted, the intent of the party committing the act, the wealth of
the perpetrator, as well as any mitigating circumstances which may
operate to reduce the amount of the damages. The object of such
punishment is to deter TXO Production Corp. and others from
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"the lack of clear guidance heightens the risk that arbitrari-
ness, passion, or bias will replace dispassionate deliberation
as the basis for the jury's verdict." '77
A few states afford somewhat more guidance to jurors
by providing statutory standards to guide the punitive
damages decision. For example, the California jury
instructions provide definitions of several legal terms and a
list of factors that the Jury is to consider in determining the
amount of the award. 78 Commentators have also proposed
committing like offenses in the future. Therefore the law recognizes
that to in fact deter such conduct may require a larger fine upon one of
large means than it would upon one of ordinary means under the same
or similar circumstances.
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 464 n.29 (1993).
377. Id. at 475 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
378. The California jury instruction reads:
If you find that plaintiff suffered actual injury, harm, or damage
caused by - (cause of action) you may then consider whether you
should award punitive damages against defendant r only], for the
sake of example and by way of punishment. You may in your discretion
award such damages, if, but only if, you find by clear and convincing
evidence that said defendant was guilty of [oppression] [fraud] [or]
[malice] in the conduct on which you base your finding of liability.
["Malice" means conduct which is [intended by the defendant to cause
injury to the plaintiff] [or] [despicable conduct which is carried on by
the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard for the] [rights]
[or] [safety] of others.] [A person acts with conscious disregard of the
rights or safety of others when [he] [she] is aware of the probable
dangerous consequences of [his] [her] conduct and willfully and
deliberately fails to avoid those consequences.] ["Oppression" means
despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship
in conscious disregard of that person's rights.]
["Despicable conduct" is conduct which is so [vile,] [base,]
[contemptible,] [miserable,] [wretched,] [or] [loathsome] that it would
be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.]
["Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or
concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the
intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of
property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.] The law provides
no fixed standards as to the amount of such punitive damages, but
leaves the amount to the jury's sound discretion, exercised without
passion or prejudice.
In arriving at any award of punitive damages, you are to consider the
following:
(1) The reprehensibility of the conduct of the defendant.
(2) The amount of punitive damages which will have a deterrent effect
on the defendant in the light of defendant's financial condition.
[(3) That the punitive damages must bear a reasonable relation to the
injury, harm, or damage actually suffered by the plaintiff.]
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specific instructions with more substantive content37 9 and
the Model Punitive Damages Act includes a list of factors
that the factfinder ought to consider in determining the
amount of punitive damages to award.38° Specific standards
are intended to give some substance to the task that juries
and judges are required to perform.
However, the impact of these more substantive
instructions on juror decision processes and the resulting
damage awards remains largely untested. Scant research
has examined the influence of punitive damages jury
instructions. For instance, we know relatively little about
how jurors interpret the legal concepts involved, how
different instructions influence patterns of awards, and if
If you find that plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages
against defendant, you shall state the amount of punitive damages
separately in your verdict.
CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL 14.71 (8th ed. 1994); see also CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1997).
379. See, e.g., Perczek, supra note 313, at 866-73; Melsheimer & Stodghill,
supra note 311; Polinksy & Shavell, supra note 33; see also infra Part III.C.2
(discussing specific proposals).
380. Section 7 of the Model Punitive Damages Act reads, in relevant part:
(a) If a defendant is found liable for punitive damages, a fair and
reasonable amount of damages may be awarded .... The court shall
instruct the jury in determining what constitutes a fair and reasonable
amount of punitive damages to consider any evidence that has been
admitted regarding the following factors:
(1) the nature of defendant's wrongful conduct and its effect on the
claimant and others;
(2) the amount of compensatory damages;
(3) any profit or gain, obtained by the defendant through the wrongful
conduct, in excess of that likely to be divested by this and any other
actions against the defendant for compensatory damages or restitution;
(4) the defendant's present and future financial condition and the
effect of an award on each condition;
(5) any fines, penalties, damages, or restitution paid or to be paid by
the defendant arising from the wrongful conduct;
(6) any adverse effect of the award on innocent persons;
any remedial measures taken or not taken by the defendant since the
wrongful conduct;
(7) compliance or noncompliance with any applicable standard
promulgated by a governmental or other generally recognized agency
or organization whose function it is to establish standards; and
(8) any other aggravating or mitigating factors relevant to the amount
of the award.
UNIF. MODEL PUNITIVE DAMAGES ACT § 7 (1996), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mpda/MPDAFNAL.htm (last visited Dec. 6,
2001).
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so, in what manner. Given research suggesting low
comprehension and ability to use punitive damages
instructions,"8 ' simply providing additional substantive
instructions may not be sufficient.
C. Exploring Reforms Aimed at Improving Decision-Making
While the empirical research has identified several
aspects of punitive damages decision-making that pose
difficulties for jurors, the reforms described above do not
address these problems. Jurors are influenced by non-
representative reports of awards in previous cases, jurors
have difficulty coming up with a dollar equivalent for their
intended punishment, juror decisions appear to stress
retribution to the neglect of optimal deterrence goals, andjurors have difficulty understanding jury instructions about
punitive damages. Rather than continuing to pursue reform
measures aimed at the largely illusory problem of overly-
generous punitive damage awards, effective reform ought to
target these specific problems. Psychological research
suggests several avenues that this targeted reform might
take.
1. Improving Jury Instructions. Because jurors have
difficulty understanding traditional jury instructions,"'
simply providing additional substantive instructions may
not be adequate to improve juror comprehension. Attention
must also be paid to the content of the instructions
themselves and to the manner in which they are conveyed
to jurors. A number of studies have had some success in
improving jurors' comprehension of instructions on other
legal issues by rewriting the instructions using principles of
psycholinguistics such as using shorter sentences, using
more logical organization, and minimizing or eliminating
uncommon and abstract words, legalese, words with
multiple interpretations, passive voice, complex sentence
structure, and negatives. 83 Other techniques such as
381. See supra Part II.C.3.
382. See supra Part II.C.3.
383. Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language
Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 1306 (1979); Elwork et al., supra note 177; Irene Glassman Prager et al.,
Improving Juror Understanding for Intervening Causation Instructions, 2
FORENSIC REP. 187 (1989); Laurence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus,
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instructing jurors about the law prior to the presentation of
evidence,' providing jurors with written instructions,3"5
and allowing jurors to take notes... have been demonstrated
Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury
Instructions, 17 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 153 (1982); Laurence J. Severance et al.,
Criminology: Toward Criminal Jury Instructions That Jurors Can Understand,
75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198 (1984); Walter W. Steele Jr. & Elizabeth G.
Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L.
REV. 77 (1988). There is some evidence in other contexts that group deliberation
improves juror understanding if instructions are rewritten according to
psycholinguistic principles. For a review, see Lieberman & Sales, supra note
177, at 634-35.
384. See Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Instructing Jurors: A Field
Experiment with Written and Preliminary Instructions, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
409, 424-25 (1989) (finding that jurors in criminal trials, but not civil trials, who
were preinstructed performed marginally better in understanding the
instructions and that judges were less surprised and more satisfied with the
verdicts); Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, On the Requirements of
Proof. The Timing of Judicial Instruction and Mock Juror Verdicts, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1877, 1881 (1979) (preinstructed jurors
demonstrated better recall of the evidence); JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS 161-65 (G.
Thomas Munsterman et al. eds., 1997) (discussing use of jury instructions
before closing arguments and use of plain english instructions); Vicki Smith,
The Feasibility and Utility of Pretrial Instruction in the Substantive Law: A
Survey of Judges, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 235 (1990). Preinstruction has been
studied in the context of compensatory damages. There is some evidence that
preinstructed jurors are better able to apply the judge's instructions. Two
studies have found that the compensatory awards of jurors who were
preinstructed about compensatory damages demonstrated better differentiation
among differently injured plaintiffs than did the awards of jurors who were not
preinstructed. Preinstructed jurors also demonstrated better memory for trial
evidence. Lynne ForsterLee & Irwin Horowitz, Enhancing Juror Competence in
a Complex Trial, 11 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 305 (1997); Lynne ForsterLee
et al., Juror Competence in Civil Trials: Effects of Preinstruction and Evidence
Technicality, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 14, 18-19 (1993). In an additional study by
the same researchers, this effect was not replicated. See Martin J. Bourgeois et
al., Nominal and Interactive Groups: Effects of Preinstruction and Deliberations
on Decisions and Evidence Recall in Complex Trials, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 58
(1995) (study 1).
385. See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 384, at 418-20 (finding that while
jurors who were provided with written instructions found them helpful, no
difference in understanding was detected); Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M.
Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal Jury Instructions? Analyzing the
Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension Project, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
401, 428 (1990) (finding better comprehension with written instructions);
Prager et al., supra note 383, at 191-92 (finding better comprehension with
written instructions).
386. See Lynne ForsterLee et al., Effects of Notetaking on Verdicts and
Evidence Processing in a Civil Trial, 18 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 567, 574-75 (1994)
(finding that jurors who were allowed to take notes were better able to
distinguish among differently injured plaintiffs when awarding compensatory
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to improve comprehension and ability to apply instructions
somewhat."' None of these techniques have been examined
in the context of instructions on punitive damages.
2. Providing Reasons and Explanations. Research in
social psychology and jury decision-making suggests that
another approach to helping jurors determine punitive
damages would be to provide explanations and reasons for
the legal rules in addition to the rules themselves.
Providing this information to jurors has been shown to
improve juror compliance with the substantive law. In
particular, this approach may help jurors adopt a
deterrence perspective where appropriate.
Polinksy and Shavell have proposed a jury instruction
calculated to improve decision-making by providing juries
with a specific technique for determining the appropriate
level of punitive damages. 388 The Polinsky and Shavell
instructions ask jurors to determine three different dollar
amounts. First, jurors are to determine the amount
necessary for deterrence. According to optimal deterrence
theory, punitive damages provide the additional deterrence
that is necessary when the defendant has some chance of
escaping liability.389 Following this analysis, then, the total
damages assessed against a defendant ought to equal the
harm caused multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability
damages); Irwin A. Horowitz & Lynne ForsterLee, The Effects of Note-Taking
and Trial Transcript Access on Mock Jury Decisions in a Complex Civil Trial,
25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 373, 387 (2001) (same). But see Larry Heuer & Steven
Penrod, Increasing Jurors' Participation in Trials: A Field Experiment with
Jury Notetaking and Question Asking, 12 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 231, 244-51
(1988) (no effect of notetaking on understanding of instructions).
387. See generally Leonard B. Sand & Steven Alan Reiss, A Report on Seven
Experiments Conducted by District Court Judges in the Second Circuit, 60
N.Y.U. L. REv. 423 (1985). Other techniques such as allowing jurors to ask
questions and to discuss the case may also influence understanding. But these
effects have not been demonstrated in empirical research to date. See Heuer &
Penrod, supra note 384, at 251-57; Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial
Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its Meaning and Its Effects, 18 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 29, 42-43 (1994) (finding that jurors (but not judges) found that allowing
juror questions helped them understand the law); Paula L. Hannaford et al.,
Permitting Jury Discussions During Trial: Impact of the Arizona Reform, 24
LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 359 (2000) (permitting jurors to discuss evidence during
trial).
388, Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 33, at 957-62.
389. Id. at 957-61.
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of being found liable (the "damages multiplier").39 Thus,
jurors are asked to estimate the likelihood that the defen-
dant will escape liability, to use a table to obtain the
multiplier that corresponds with this assessed likelihood,
and to calculate a deterrence value by multiplying their
compensatory damage award by the multiplier. Second,jurors are to determine the amount they think is necessary
to punish the defendant. Finally, jurors are to determine
the appropriate level of punitive damages by selecting an
amount between these deterrence and punishment
values."'
Viscusi conducted an experiment designed to evaluate
the potential impact of this proposal on jury decision-
making. Viscusi asked jury-eligible adults to read scenarios
in which the likelihood that the defendant's wrongful
conduct would escape detection was explicitly stated.
Participants were then asked to assess punitive damages
using instructions following the Polinsky and Shavell
approach.392
Across the scenarios, Viscusi determined that only 15%
of participants made a correct calculation of the appropriate
optimal deterrence amount.393 It is not clear from the data
reported why so few participants' answers were correct. A
number of possibilities exist. Participants may have failed
to use the proper terms in the calculation. Using the incor-
rect probability of escaping liability or the incorrect amount
of compensatory damages might indicate a problem with
understanding or remembering the trial evidence. Using an
incorrect multiplier could signal a problem in under-
standing how to use the table appropriately. Alternately,
participants could have failed to do the mathematical
390. Id. at 889.
391. Id. at 957-62.
392. Viscusi first asked participants to determine an amount of damages
that would accomplish deterrence. He provided participants with a table that
linked a list of probabilities of escaping liability (in 10% increments) with an
appropriate multiplier and asked them to multiply the compensatory damages
(given in the scenario as a fine) by the multiplier. Viscusi next asked
participants to determine an amount of damages that would accomplish
punishment. Finally, participants were to indicate an amount between these
two values (deterrence and punishment) as their final punitive damages award.
Viscusi, supra note 106, at 317-18.
393. Id. at 326.
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calculations properly. Finally, participants may have been
unwilling to perform the calculation requested.1
4
Participants were much more successful at providing
final damage awards in the appropriate range: 76% of all
respondents provided responses between the values for
deterrence and punishment.395 However, driven by the low
numbers of respondents who made correct determinations
of the appropriate deterrence value, only 14% of
respondents correctly calculated the deterrence value and
made a final damage award that fell in the proper range."'
Viscusi also reports that the median deterrence value of
statistical juries was often incorrect. However, it is highly
unlikely that using the median of the group members'
individual judgments correctly models the effect of group
deliberation in this context. Groups have been found to be
most effective in determining solutions to problems with
demonstrably correct answers. Research suggests that this
is because groups tend to be better able to recognize correct
answers and to reject incorrect solutions.97 Thus, it is likely
394. Viscusi concluded that because a high proportion of those who gave
incorrect answers to the deterrence question had college or professional degrees,
they were likely capable of completing the calculation (simple multiplication)
but were simply unwilling to follow the instructions. Id. at 338.
395. Id. at 326.
396. Id. at 325. Viscusi also argues that the general influence of these
instructions in this instance "appear[ed] to be to decrease the assessed value of
punitive damages awards for scenarios in which there is no anchoring effect."
Id. at 330. It is possible that these instructions decreased punitive damages.
However, it is impossible to draw that conclusion from the data reported. In the
scenarios using the Polinsky and Shavell instructions, the defendant company
had been fined $100,000 to cover the actual damages sustained; in the control
scenario using more standard instructions, the company had been fined
$20,000. See id. at 319-20, 330 n.20. This difference clearly confounds the
comparison between the Polinsky and Shavell instructions and the standard
instructions. To the extent that punitive damages decisions are influenced by
the severity of the harm caused, see supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text,
this difference may have caused any decrease in punitive damage awards.
Moreover, the instructions specifically told participants that amounts already
paid in compensatory damages may have already led to punishment. Id. at 345.
Clearly, participants may have found $100,000 to have effected greater
punishment than $20,000.
397. See Reid Hastie, Review Essay: Experimental Evidence on Group
Accuracy, in INFORMATION POOLING AND GRouP DECISION MAKING (Guillermo
Owen & Bernard Grofman eds., 1986); Patrick R. Laughlin et al., Collective
Versus Individual Induction: Recognition of Truth, Rejection of Error, and
Collective Information Processing, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 50
(1991).
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that had jurors actually deliberated in groups, more of them
would have discerned the "correct" answer.
Viscusi concludes that not only are people intuitive
retributionists rather than intuitive deterrence theorists,398
but they are also not able to give effect to the expectations
of deterrence theory when explicitly asked to do so.
31 9
Research by Darley, Carlsmith, and Robinson into the
motivations for criminal punishment also suggests that
people are intuitive retributionists; however, their research
indicates that people are capable of assessing punishment
from an alternative (non-intuitive) perspective when asked
to do so.40 ° Participants were asked to assign punishment to
an actor in response to a series of scenarios describing
criminal behaviors without receiving any specific instruc-
tions. Subsequently, participants were asked to re-evaluate
each scenario from a "just deserts" (retributive) perspective
or an incapacitation (deterrence) perspective. Participants'
initial responses were similar to the responses they
provided from a just deserts perspective and different from
the responses they provided when considering the
incapacitation perspective. Moreover, participants were
sensitive to factors that should have influenced punishment
from the appropriate perspectives, that is, recidivism had a
greater influence on punishment when participants were
asked to make their decisions from an incapacitation
perspective while case seriousness was more influential
when taking a retributive perspective.4 ' They found further
that under certain circumstances the incapacitation
perspective was intuitively more salient.4 2 Darley et al.
concluded that "[allterations in the way that the punish-
ment question is put to respondents may also alter the
motives evoked to answer the question. 0 3
398. See supra Part II.B.2.
399. The U.S. Supreme Court noted in this regard: "However attractive such
an approach [Polinksy and Shavell's] to punitive damages might be as an
abstract policy matter, it is clear that juries do not normally engage in such a
finely tuned exercise of deterrence calibration when awarding punitive
damages." Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1678,
1687 (2001).
400. See Darley et al., supra note 113, at 676-78.
401. Id. at 666-71.
402. Id. at 674-75.
403. Id. at 677.
195
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One mechanism that might influence jurors' inclination
or ability to take a non-intuitive perspective is the inclusion
of an explanation of the reasons for taking that perspective
in the instruction. Wegener and Petty's general model of
bias correction, the Flexible Correction Model, suggests that
one meaningful factor in jury decision-making is the jurors'
"motivation to implement judges' instructions.""4 4 Thus, "the
judge's instructions must sell them on the goal of adhering
to the constraints of the law;" possibly by explaining why
the law has particular expectations of their decisions. ' The
Polinsky and Shavell instructions tested by Viscusi did not
include an explanation for why the described calculations
were appropriate.4"6 Thus, it is possible that including such
an explanation will increase the degree to which jurors
fulfill of the objectives of the instructions.
Consistent with this reasoning, several studies in other
contexts have found that including an explanation of the
reasons the jurors are being asked to take an action is more
successful in effecting their compliance with the law.
Diamond and Casper found that jurors who were told that
their compensatory damage award would be trebled made
smaller awards than did jurors who were unaware of the
trebling provision.4 7 They found that a simple admonition
to disregard the knowledge that their award would be
trebled did not restore awards, but that the same admoni-
tion combined with an explanation of the rationale for the
rule resulted in significantly higher awards.4 8 Similarly,
Wissler, Huehn, and Saks found that instructing jurors not
to adjust their compensatory damage awards in accordance
404. Duane T. Wegener et al., Flexible Corrections of Juror Judgments:
Implications for Jury Instructions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 629, 646 (2000).
For discussion of the Flexible Correction Model, see generally Duane T.
Wegener & Richard E. Petty, The Flexible Correction Model: The Role of Naive
Theories of Bias in Bias Correction, in 29 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 141 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1997); Duane T. Wegener et al., The
Metacognition of Bias Correction: Nafve Theories of Bias and the Flexible
Correction Model, in METACOGNITION: COGNITIVE AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 202
(Vincent Y. Yzerbyt et al. eds., 1998).
405. Wegener et al., supra note 404, at 647.
406. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 33, at 957-62; Viscusi, supra note
106, at 344-46.
407. Diamond & Casper, supra note 143, at 532-33.
408. Id. But see Kerri L. Pickel, Inducing Jurors to Disregard Inadmissible
Evidence: A Legal Explanation Does Not Help, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 407, 415
(1995) (finding that providing a legal explanation was not more effective).
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with their uncertainty about the level of the defendant's
culpability and the reasons that they should not do so was
effective in diminishing the effect of perceptions of defen-
dant responsibility on damage awards. 09
3. Providing Legally Appropriate Benchmarks.
Perhaps the key difficulty that decision makers experience
is converting their desire to punish the defendant in a civil
case into a monetary equivalent. Absent a constructive
index against which to gauge their award, decision makers
are forced to come up with their own frame of reference. It
follows that a specific mechanism for better structuring
punitive damage decisions would be to provide jurors with
information about representative damage awards from a set
of reference cases. This may be one answer to the
difficulties posed by the task of mapping an assessment of
moral reprehensibility onto a dollar value scale.41 It also
seems likely that providing jurors with information about
actual jury awards in similar cases will give jurors a frame
of reference from which to determine damages that is an
alternative to the reference frame presented in the media41'
or by the plaintiffs or the defense attorney.412 "Unlike
judges, jurors are systematically denied any information
about decisions by other juries in prior cases, depriving
them of information that could help them treat like cases
alike."4"3 Comparitive information offers structure to the
determination of punitive damages as it "sharpens the
proportionality issues and disciplines the decision-making
process."4"4
409. Roselle L. Wissler et al., The Impact of Jury Instructions on the Fusion
of Liability and Compensatory Damages, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 125, 134-35
(2001).
410. See supra Part II.C.2.
411. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
412. See supra note 319 and accompanying text; Hastie et al., supra note 90,
at 449, 463.
413. Roselle L. Wissler et al., Instructing Jurors on General Damages in
Personal Injury Cases: Problems and Possibilities, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY. & L.
712, 718 (2000).
414. David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages
Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of
Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1109,
1156 (1995) (speaking of efforts at quantification of punitive damage though
comparative review by judges).
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Saks, Hollinger, Wissler, Evan, and Hart have
examined the influence of such referent information onjuror decision-making regarding compensatory damages.
Saks et al. provided student-jurors with various types of
guiding information about damage awards: the average
dollar amount awarded in similar cases, the range in which
80% of similar cases fell, both of these types of information,
or a range of example awards from similar cases. They
found that while none of the types of jury guidance affected
award variability when the injury to the plaintiff was low,
in the moderate severity condition all four types of guidance
reduced award variability, and in the high severity
condition, three of the four types (all except the average)
reduced compensatory damage award variability. 41
Legally appropriate benchmarks to aid jurors' decision-
making could consist of summary statistics to help jurors
see the typical distribution of awards, as in the above study.
Alternately, jurors could be given sets of cases with which
to compare the case they are being asked to decide. In the
most straightforward version of this approach, attorneys
would be allowed to present comparable cases to the jury.16
The jury could then calibrate its punitive damages award in
light of awards in other similar cases."'
415. Saks et al., supra note 316, at 249-52. Providing jurors with this type of
information was more effective than were caps on damages. Id.
416. Diamond et al., supra note 94, at 321. A more structured approach
would have the legislature or judiciary create a set of standardized scenarios
from which to select. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Public Policy: Valuing Life
and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 953
(1989) (raising such a proposal in the context of damages for pain and
suffering).
417. For other proposals on scheduling damages and discussion of the
practical issues raised by such an approach, see Baldus et al., supra note 414
(comparative additur/remittitur for general damages and punitive damages);
Bovbjerg et al., supra note 416, at 953-56 (addressing the issues involved in
presenting injury scenarios to juries to guide their decisions about damages for
pain and suffering); James F. Blumstein et al., Beyond Tort Reform: Developing
Better Tools for Assessing Damages for Personal Injury, 8 YALE J. REG. 171
(1991); Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards,
23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763 (1995) (proposing a grid by which pain and suffering
damages could be calculated); Diamond et al., supra note 94, at 318-22 (pain
and suffering); see also Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent
Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002) (raising the possibility of cross-
category comparisons but raising concerns about cognitive overload and the
risks of manipulation); Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp., 980 F. Supp. 640
(E.D.N.Y. 1997). In Geressy, Judge Weinstein conducted a statistical analysis of
cases comparable to the plaintiffs' cases to determine whether the jury awards
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The research reviewed here suggests that lay decision
makers may be well suited to make comparisons between
cases. Jurors rank cases in similar orders when deter-
mining their level of outrage, punitive intent, and punitive
damage awards.418 Across a large number of different
injuries, jurors' ratings of injury severity and their general
damage awards are highly correlated with those of judges'
implying that the two groups rank cases in similar ways.
In addition, Baldus found that law students were able to
rank cases in order of the severity of the injury and to make
judgments about cases' relative levels of compensable non-
economic damage with reasonable reliability.4 ° This
suggests that jurors may perform well if asked to make
judgments about where a case falls within a distribution of
cases. Overall, these results suggest that jurors might be
quite able to make the relevant comparisons between cases,
particularly if the comparison was made explicit. Thus,
there is preliminary evidence that providing guiding infor-
mation to jurors can help to reduce the variability in their
awards.
CONCLUSION
The depiction of punitive damage awards that emerges
from the systematic empirical research is a picture that is
much more complex than the simple images of civil
litigation as a lottery, of punitive damages as bonanzas for
lucky plaintiffs, and of unprincipled, out-of-control juries
routinely awarding multi-million dollar punitive damage
awards out of sympathy for injured plaintiffs and bias
against large corporations.
First, the empirical research suggests that jurors have
a range of competencies, performing some aspects of their
"deviate[d] materially from what would be reasonable compensation." 980 F.
Supp. at 653. The "reported opinion bias" identified by Eisenberg and Wells
suggests that caution ought to be exercised in making comparisons only to cases
that result in reported opinions. Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 235, at 413-16.
418. Kahneman et al., supra note 70, at 59-60.
419. Wissler et al., supra note 94, at 798-99. Thus, the groups saw the same
injuries as being more serious and awarded more in general damages in
response to the same injuries. Id. Ratings of injury severity were also highly
correlated with general damage awards, greater amounts were awarded to
plaintiffs with more severe injuries. Id. at 795-96.
420. Baldus, supra note 414, at 1145, 1151.
199
BUFFALO LAW REiVIEW
decision tasks quite well, and demonstrating difficulty with
other functions of their role. On the one hand, juries seem
to operate quite successfully as intuitive retributivists,
gauging outrage in a consistent manner, and reflecting
community standards as they punish reprehensible
behavior. Moreover, jurors seem to respond appropriately
to a number of factors thought to be important legal
underpinnings of punitive damages, adjusting their awards
in accordance with the degree to which the defendant has
violated important social norms, the damage the defendant
risked and ultimately caused, and the financial status of
the defendant. On the other hand, the research suggests
that jurors have difficulty understanding legal instructions,
giving effect to optimal deterrence, and translating their
outrage into a monetary equivalent. In addition, the
information that is available to jurors in the media is not
representative of most cases and can have complex effects
on decision-making. Despite these difficulties, however, it is
not clear that decisions by juries differ dramatically from
those of judges.
Second, current reforms have not been responsive to
this literature. To a large extent, punitive damage reform
has been at least in part, a "solution in search of a
problem." Archival research has consistently found that
punitive damages are seldom awarded, tend to be of low to
moderate size, are typically awarded in response to
egregious conduct, and are routinely reduced post-trial in
some fashion. In addition, the magnitude of punitive
damage awards varies appropriately with characteristics
that differentiate cases-larger punitive damage awards
tend to be assessed when a plaintiff is seriously injured by
egregious conduct. Still, increases in punitive damage
amounts have been found at the high end of the distribution
and it is these awards that are well publicized. The threat
of punitive damages, even if the possibility is remote, may
have a substantial impact on behavior, particularly if
behavior is driven by perceptions of awards influenced by
the non-representative information about awards that is
presented in the media and by reform advocates.
Perceptions of the threat of punitive damages are likely to
drive decisions about appropriate conduct and to color
421. Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, supra note 75, at 778.
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evaluations of settlement offers. 22 And it is these percep-
tions of awards that are likely to drive legislative reform
decisions. To the extent that policymakers have a set of
perceptions about punitive damages that is at odds with
what the empirical data show, it is unlikely that efforts to
improve the system will be appropriately targeted. Indeed,
with few exceptions, most current reform efforts have been
largely aimed at restraining awards rather than at
improving the quality of punitive damages decision-making.
Moreover, the research suggests that the assumptions
behind several of the primary reform efforts are overly
simplistic (at best) or inaccurate (at worst). Thus, for
example, caps on punitive damages may not simply trun-
cate awards over the level of the cap, leaving the balance of
the distribution unchanged. Rather, caps operate as a factor
that changes the nature of the decision-making task,
changing the distribution of awards in non-intuitive ways.
The determination of punitive damages is not a decision
made in a vacuum. Jurors faced with the decision whether
to award punitive damages and in what amount are also
charged with finding the facts of the case and making
determinations about liability and compensatory damages.
Changes in the system intended to influence deter-
minations of punitive damages may also have implications
for these other decisions. Decision makers do not
necessarily make a clear distinction between compensatory
and punitive damages, decisions about liability may
influence decisions about punitive damages and vice versa,
and changes in trial structure may change how decision
makers resolve the mix of issues they face. Thus, abolishing
punitive damages may have important effects on other
decisions, such as compensatory damage awards. The study
by Landsman and his colleague of the effects of bifurcation
is a notable example of this interdependence.
Surely there are ways in which jury determinations of
punitive damages can be improved. The research described
here suggests several enhancements to punitive damages
decision-making that specifically target the shortcomings in
decision-making that have been identified. Measures such
as improving jury instructions to increase comprehension
and motivate juror compliance and providing benchmark
information to facilitate the process of translating outrage
422. See Koenig, supra note 272, at 172.
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into a monetary award explicitly address the difficulties
jurors show in understanding instructions, giving effect to
principles of optimal deterrence, and converting punish-
ment to dollars. Ideally, these improvements to the system
should be carefully designed and evaluated with an eye for
unintended effects.
There is still much more to be learned about how
punitive damages are determined. The questions for this
future research are many and varied, ranging from
evaluating particular efforts at improving the system to
inquiring into the perceptions of legislators, judges, and
attorneys. In particular, very little research has examined
the potential effects of punitive damage reform efforts on
patterns of litigation and settlement behavior.4 2' There are
many phases of the process of disputing that exist in the
"shadow" of punitive damages about which we know very
little.424 Changes to the processes by which punitive dam-
ages are determined at trial are likely to influence case
filings, to alter demands, and to affect the likelihood,
timing, structure, and size of settlements.425 The Babcock
and Pogarsky research into the effects of damage caps on
settlement demonstrates the complex effects that reforms
targeted at juries may have on other stages of the process.
Effects of reform on these other stages of the process may
result if legal actors recalibrate their reference points in
response to changing verdict patterns. However, even in the
absence of changes in verdicts, behavior may change to the
extent that decision makers believe that reform has or will
change outcomes. Given that most cases are resolved before
trial, any effects of reform on pre-trial processes have the
potential to be significant. Certainly, "without more infor-
mation on the settlement process, it is hard to predict the
impact of punitive damages tort reforms."
42 6
Additional studies will attempt to replicate and build
upon the findings reported here and to extend the
knowledge base by examining questions that have not yet
423. For notable exceptions see Babcock & Pogarsky, A Behavioral
Approach, supra note 324, at 346-47; Pogarsky & Babcock, Damage Caps, supra
note 324.
424. See generally Saks, supra note 270 (discussing the overall difficulty in
quantifying what we "know" about the punitive damage system).
425. See generally Kritzer & Zemans, supra note 272; Koenig, supra note
272.
426. Koenig, supra note 272, at 208.
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been addressed. These questions ought to be examined from
a variety of perspectives, using a variety of methodologies,
with the goal of providing convergent validity to the results.
Confidence in our understanding of punitive damages
decision-making will increase as the effects described here
are demonstrated under a variety of conditions and by
multiple methodologies. Through systematic examination of
potential influences, hypothesized explanations, and consid-
ered solutions, our understanding of punitive damages
decision-making will become more nuanced and our ability
to enhance such decision-making will improve.

